New Deal experiments in production control : by Lambert, C. Roger,
T his d isser ta tio n  has been 62—3956 
m icro film ed  ex a ctly  as rece iv ed
LAM BERT, C. R oger, 1933-  
NEW DEAL EXPERIM ENTS IN PRODUCTION 
CONTROL: THE LIVESTOCK PROGRAM, 1933-35.
The U n iversity  of O klahom a, P h .D ., 1962 
H istory , g en era l
University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan
Copyright by
C. ROGER LAMBERT
1962
THE imiVEESITY OF OKLAHOMA. 
GRAniATE COLLEGE
HEW DEAL EXPERIMEETS IE PRODUCTION CONTROL: 
THE LIVESTOCK PROGRAM, 1933-35
A DISSEREATICaü 
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY 
in partial fxilfilLment of the requirements for the
degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
BY
C. ROGER LAMBERT 
Norman, Oklahoma
1962
EDETJ DEAL EXFERIMEMTS IN PRODUCTKM CONTROL: 
THE LIVESTOCK PROGRAM, 1933-35^
approve;
DISSERTATION CCMtETTEE
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author vould. like to acknowledge with deep gratitude the 
advice and counsel of Research Professor Gilbert C. Fite in directing 
this dissertation. Recognition of indebtedness must also be extended 
to the other members of the doctoral committee. Professors Donald J. 
Berthrong, Herbert J. Ellison, John S. Ezell, W. Eugene HoUon and 
John E. Leek. For their considerate cooperation in facilitating the 
research for this project, Harold T. Pinkett and Helen T. Finneran of 
the Agriculture and General Services Branch of the National Archives 
deserve special recognition. Special commendation must be extended to 
Mrs. Josephine Soukup for her outstanding typing of the manuscript as 
well as her patience and understanding. Finally, many others will be 
long remembered for their helpful, synçathetic and constructive advice,
iii
TABLE OF CŒÜTEKTS
Chapter Page
I. FAEM SUKPLUSESs A KATIQKAL PROBLEM.  ................  1
II. LIVESTOCK PROBLEMS AMD DEVELOPMENT OF THE EMEB3ENCÏ
HOG MARKETING PRWRAM.........    30
III. CRITICISM OF THE OPERATION OF THE EMERGENCY PROJECT.....  6l
IV. ATTACKS AGAINST THE VIANTON WASTE OF FOOD; GOVERNMENT
SLAUGBTÉR OF LITTLE PIGS AND PIGGY SOWS............... 90
V. THE FEDERAL SURPLUS RELIEF CORPORATION.................  119
VI. CATTLE RANCHERS CAPITULATE TO THE AAA; THE DEMAND FOR
FEDERAL AID BRINGS A PRODUCTION CONTROL PLAN..........  1^9
VII. THE EMERGENCY DROUGST PURCHASE PROGRAM  ..........  l86
VIII. PROBLEMS OF THE DROUGHT PURCHASE PROGRAM...............  21?
IX. CONCLUSIONS..........................................  247
BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................  271
iv
MEW DEAL EXPERIMENTS Hî PRODUCTION CONTROL:
THE LIVESTOCK PROGRAM, 1933-35
CHAPTER I 
FARM SURPLUSES: A NATIONAL PROBLEM
The economic developments which followed World War I made it 
increasingly difficult for American farmers to sustain on adequate 
living. In searching for a way back to prosperity, they were confronted 
with a number of complex adjustment problems created by wartime expan­
sion of output accompanied by increases in farm debts and taxes. In 
spite of the end of hostilities, farmers continued to produce at a war­
time rate; but, they found their production far in excess of what could 
be sold at profitable prices. In the last six months of 1920 the 
average price of the 10 leading farm crops dropped 57 per cent. Ry 
November 1921, it had fallen below the 1913 level. For some crops and 
in certain areas the collapse was even more drastic. Secretary of 
Agriculture i^ anry C. Wallace declared th?t "the farm price of com in 
the autumn of 1921 was only half that in 1913 and one-fourth that in 
1919" in the state of lowa.^ As a consequence, American agriculture
^"Report of the Secretary of Agriculture," Agriculture Year­
book, 1921 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 192I), 12.
2entered a depression state which, in varying degrees of intensity, 
lingered throughout the decade and aroused a feeling that farmers were 
not receiving a "fair share of the national wealth."
While farm prices fell helow prewar levels, the "prices of
most other things remained from 50 to 100 per cent above the pre-war 
2
level." This created a great disparity between what was received for 
farm crops and livestock, and what farmers paid for other commodities. 
As traditional individualists, farmers were unable to control the 
production or the price of their products. Both agricultural exports 
and domestic consumption declined in proportion to rising productivity, 
leaving the farmer with large unwanted supplies which frequently sold 
below the cost of production. Thus the heart of the farm problem was 
surplus production and the resulting decline in prices. For this 
situation, no simple solution existed.
Faced with the almost catastrophic results of wartime over­
expansion in acreage, production and debts, farmers and their leaders 
in the twenties generally turned from the nineteenth century attacks 
on the middlemen to demands for federal assistance in solving the 
surplus problem. While accepting and even welcoming higher teuriffs, 
credit benefits and encouragement of cooperatives, agrarian spokesmen 
recognized that these concessions would have little if any beneficial 
influence upon farm prices. Instead, agricultural leaders concentrated 
their attention on methods to achieve "equality for agriculture."
^Ibid., 1922, p. 2.
3
The total value of farm exports in 1921 was only slightly 
more than half that of 1919*
3Principally, this phrase came to mean government aid -with farm marketing 
and surplus production problems.
There w.*re historical precedents for the surplus control 
proposals of the t’^fenties. %en a decline in foreign demands for some 
of the leading American farm products occurred shortly eifter 1900, the 
theory that reduced output vould result in higher prices brought drives 
to cut production. Organizations such as the Cotton Grovers’ Associa­
tion were established to lead restriction movements. Meetings were 
held at which growers resolved "to keep their remaining bales off the 
market and reduce their acreage for the coming year." These campaigns, 
however, faltered when confronted with the basic impossibility of 
getting voluntary cooperation in such a limitation program. Failure 
of earlier reduction movements did not prevent similar efforts in the 
more serious farm crisis of the early 1 9 2 0's.
Before the planting season of 1922 a futile effort was made to
get a 25 per cent reduction in cotton acreage. At the same time,
Henry A. Wallace, editor of Wallaces' F&rmer, and other farm leaders
in the Worth conducted a vigorous and equally unsuccessful com acreage
reduction campaign. "There is such a thing as overproduction," Wallace
warned the farmers. He added the admonition that if farmers had to be
5
shown for themselves they had only to continue to overproduce. Al­
though Wallace called this 1921-22 voluntary reduction effort a
hUlrich Bonnell Phillips, "The Overproduction of Cotton and a 
Possible Remedy," Agricultural History, XII (April 1939), 123.
^Gilbert C. Fite, George W. Peek and the Fight for Farm Parity 
(Worman; University of Oklaiioma Press, 195^)> 131»
14-
"thankless" educational campaign, he remained a staunch advocate of 
production control.
Some type of restriction on output was essential, Wallace felt, 
because "in agriculture, supply sets the price," while "in industry, 
price sets the supply. He Insisted, however, "that government price 
fixing, if unaccompanied by some plan for regulation of production is 
bound to be a heavy tax on the government and in the end almost certain 
to ruin the industry it has been trying to save. " By 1923 Wallace was 
disillusioned with the practicability of voluntary crop reduction. 
Nevertheless, he defended the right to limit output and opposed those 
who felt it the farmers' duty to produce at full capacity. To increase 
their income, farmers "have as much right to cease production’ wholly or 
in part as union labor has to strike" he stated. "It is no more wrong,"
Wallace declared, "for farmers to reduce production when prices are\
below cost of production than it is for the United States Steel Corpora-
g
tion to cut pig iron production in half when prices are rapidly falling. " 
The difficulty lay not so much in the right as in the method 
of controlling production. It was obvious that farmers were too indi­
vidualistic, or suspicious of their fellow producers, to restrict output
^Henry A. Wallace, "Supply and Price Interaction in Farm and 
City Products," The Agricultural Situation in the United States, The 
Apnals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, CXVII
7
Malcalm 0. Sillars, "Henry A. Wallace's Editorials on Agricul­
tural Discontent I92I-I928," Agricultural EL story, XXVI (October I9 5 2),
1 3 3.
Q
Henry A. Wallace, "Controlling Agricultural Output, " Journal 
of Farm Economics, V (January 1 9 2 3), 1 6 .
5voluntarily. Itew at this date, however, advocated govemjnent adminis­
tered regulation or control of farm production. Wallace apparently 
moved about as far in this direction as anyone, evidently feeling that 
it was the only way to get that regional and national cooperation 
essential for curtailment. He confessed that it might be necessary
9
for the government to handle the farm production control program. But 
the movement for restriction on either a voluntary or required basis 
failed to gain any real popularity during the twenties.
Farmers were quite ready to recognize as God-given their right 
to a fair share of the national wealth, to parity prices, and to equal­
ity with other industries. Yet, the idea of cutting production grated 
against a deep instinct within most producers. Few Americans, either 
farm or nonfarm, could see the sense In limiting food production when 
millions throughout the world were hungry. Ootton producers held the 
same view toward reducing output when equal numbers were ill-clothed. 
Supporters of other methods of farm aid regarded the idea of restricting 
production not only immoral but also a cowardly withdrawal from foreign 
markets.Regardless of the price advantages which might derive from 
controlling farm output, most agrarian leaders hoped to find other ways 
of aiding the farmer. Spokesmen for the Republican Administrations 
nevertheless endorsed voluntary reduction of output from time to time 
during the twenties.^
9
Malcalm 0. Sillars, "Henry A. Wallace's Editorials on Agricul­
tural Discontent 1921-28," 1§6.
^^Henry A. Wallace, New Frontiers (New York; Reynal and 
Hitchcock, 193^), l4l-l65; Fite, George N. Peek, 119-137-
■^^allace. New Frontiers, l4l-l6o.
6Evidence of Republican concern for the plight of the American
fanner was revealed when Secretary Wallace called an Agricultural
Conference in 1922. The gi-oup suggested that Congress and the President
"take steps immediately to reestablish a fair exchange value for all
12farm products with that of other commodities." Secretary Wallace, 
more sympathetic t/ith the dire straits of individual farmers than the 
rest of the Administration, supported both limitation of production and 
more vigorous federal aid to the farmer. He endorsed a 1923 report on 
the wheat problem which recommended that the government create an export 
corporation to aid the farmer in obtaining a fair price for his prod­
ucts. The report further encouraged another basic change in agricul­
tural policy by suggesting a contraction in the agricultural plant. As 
foreign consumers reduced their purchases of Ameidcan farm goods, produc­
tion, the report indicated, "should be gradually placed on a domestic 
basis." Farmers, therefore, should carefully consider changes away from
the major money-export crops or, if possible, movement to the city and
13industrial jobs. Contraction of agriculture was more widely discussed 
and approved during the twenties than has been generally appreciated.
A number of observers, both critical and sympathetic, saw a reduced 
agricultural plant as the most feasible solution to the farm problem.
12Chester C. Davis, "The Development of Agiricultural Policy 
Since the End of the World War," Farmers in a Changing World; Yearbook 
of Agriculture, 19^0, U. S, DeparWent of Agriculture (Washington:
U. S. Government Printing Office, 19^1), 301*
13W. A. Schoenfeld, Eels A. Olsen, et. al., "The Wheat Situa­
tion," Agriculture Yearbook, 1923, U. S. Department of Agriculture 
(Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 192k), lk8-150. Also,
"Report of the Secretary of Agriculture," in same.
7Among the leading advocates of curtailing farm output vere 
Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover and William M. Jardine ^ Secretary 
of Agriculture after I9 2 5. Before the National Agriculture Committee 
called by President Calvin Coolidge in 1925> Secretary Hoover called 
for the contraction of agricultural production to basically domestic 
self-sufficiency, saying that "generally the fundamental need is 
balancing of our agricultural production to our home demand." Hoover 
insisted "that our drive must be for a balanced agriculture, tuned to 
the domestic market, increasing in its productivity as the consumptive 
demand of our country requires." He urged more adequate tariff protec­
tion for farmers, encouragement of cooperative marketing and an increase
llj.
in the consunption of agricultural goods by the American people. The
carefully selected committee backed his call by advising farmers to
fashion their output to satisfy home consunption and "only such foreign 
markets as shall be profitable.
Secretary Jardine added his support to the production limita­
tion movement, and like Hoover he insisted that such a program should 
be on a voluntary basis. Farmers, Jardine maintained, must be convinced 
of the necessity of regulating farm output through voluntary cooperative 
action.This, indeed, constituted one of the major tasks of the co­
operative marketing associations which the Administration encouraged.
In spite of the rather obvious impossibility of such a voluntary
l4
New York Times, January 20, 1925; p. 2 5.
^^New York Times, January 28, I925, p. 3; Davis, "Agricultural
Policy Since the End of the World War," 309-
^^Fite, George N. Peek, 134.
8curtailment program, Administration leaders persisted in advocating 
only that type of control. The major result of such prompting was to 
make the idea of crop limitation more unpopular among farmers. Farmers 
came to regard Hoover especially as an enemy and contraction as another 
scheme of the urban-manufacturing element to further subject agricul­
ture to industrial supremacy.
Evading the overproduction thesis, most farm relief spokesmen 
emphasized the necessity of achieving what was known as parity or 
equality for agriculture. Although proponents of the various farm aid 
measures recognized the ability of agriculture to produce beyond the 
demands of the domestic market as the major and immediate source of 
farm price difficulties, they refused to attack that basic problem. As 
the contradictory principles of high protectionism and the right, even 
duty, of the farmer to produce at full capacity were unassailable to 
most agrarian leaders, their goal became the implementation of some 
device to guarantee a fair exchange price while maintaining high tariffs 
and high production. Achievement of all three necessitated governmental 
action on an extensive scale. This growing recognition of the need for 
a national farm relief policy constituted the most important trend in 
the changing demands of agricultural leaders. Even those opposed to any 
real action by the federal government more and more frequently found 
themselves forced into accepting or at least mouthing the slogans of 
the group favoring government aid.
The turbulent decade 1922-32 served as a fertile feeding 
ground for new and seemingly radical demands for action by the federal 
government. Major efforts of the farm relief lobbyists centered on the
9need for higher prices and "making the tariff effective for agriculture." 
Camouflaging the vital problems of adjustment to an industrial society 
and overproduction, these propagandists bombarded the national govern­
ment with "equality for agriculture" plans. Originator of much of this 
farm lobby activity was George K. Peek, a farm machinery manufacturer 
from Mbline, Illinois.
Late in 1921, Peek and Hugh Johnson prepared a booklet. Equal­
ity for Agriculture, which presented the basis for new farm relief 
demands. Recognizing that the tariff on farm products did not- work to 
the same advantage as that on manufactured goods. Peek sought some 
device to make the tariff benefit the farmer. Without questioning the
validity of protectionism, he advocated the establishment of a "fair
17exchange value" for farm products. In time this principle would 
become known as parity and serve as a rallying cry for future hordes 
of impoverished farmers as they wrestled with the problems of agricul­
ture.
While denouncing the curtailment thesis. Peek and his backers 
recognized the surplus production problem. The heart of the Peek 
project, incorporated in the MoWary-Haugen measures, was a schema to 
segregate and dunq) abroad the surplus farm output. According to this 
plan, all production in certain designated major export crops above 
the total which could be sold on the domestic market at an established
17Peek's original parity or "fair exchange price" was "one 
which bears the same ratio to the current general price index as a 
ten-year prewar average crop price bore to average price index, for 
the same period." As quoted in John D. Black, Parity, Parity, Parity 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts; The Harvard Committee on ReRpamb in the"~ 
Social Sciences, 1942), 46.
10
fair exchange price would be considered the exportable suiplus. A 
government export coiporation would purchase the suiplus and then sell 
or dump it on the world market for whatever price could be obtained.
thus separating the export from the home supply it was assumed that 
the world price would not depress domestic prices. Proponents insisted 
that an equalization fee charged against all crops would make the 
project self-liquidating. They also maintained that suipluses could 
be controlled under the plan through manipulation of the equalization 
fee. Although success of such control remained doubtful, the conten­
tion indicated an awareness of the production problem even among farm 
leaders opposed to a curtailment policy. The idea of controlling out­
put never became, however, an important element in the McNary-Haugen 
movement, the most popular of the farm aid programs of the twenties. 
Instead, the dream of establishing a two price system for farm products 
formed the basis of not only the Peek plan but also other favorite 
solutions, notably the export debenture and domestic allotment schemes.
Although very popular with the farmers, CJoolidge vetoed the 
McITary-Haugen bill in 1927 and again in 1928. With improvement in 
agricultural conditions during the election year of 1928, critics of 
Republican farm policies were unable to make the agricultural question 
a decisive issue in the presidential campaign. Bferbert Hoover, having 
promised relief to the farmer, presented his remedy in the Agricultural 
Marketing Act passed in June I9 2 9• The extent to which the Hoover 
legislation capitulated to the farm slogans was significant. The 
stated purpose of the act was to give agriculture "an econojoic basis 
of equality with other industries. " Although the methods of the
11
Agricultural Marketing Act differed from those proposed by most farm 
lobbyists, its failure during the early years of the depression 
influenced the policies ultimately adopted by the Hew Deal.
The Federal Farm Board, created by the Hoover legislation, 
planned to aid farmers by stabilizing prices through reforms in market­
ing. As the basis for operation, a revolving fund was established from 
which the board made loans to producer cooperatives. To control extra­
ordinary surpluses stabilization corporations could be organized. 
Unfortunately for the Administration, the depression struck just as the 
system began operation. As the Farm Board made large loans to coopera­
tives and as it endeavored to fix or maintain farm prices through 
stabilization corporations it gsiined ownership of large supplies of 
cotton and wheat. Under these circunmtances the Administration, led by 
Alexander Legge, chairman of the Farm Board, and Secretary of Agricul­
ture Arthur Hyde, campaigned vigorously for voluntary reduction of
. 4.4 18 production.
Preparing for sn extensive acreage reduction campaign both 
Legge and Hyde insisted in July 1930 that farmers would bear the respon-
19
sibility for any further "back-breaking" wheat surpluses. In a 
Hastings, Nebraska address on July 7, Legge emphasized overproduction 
as the source of the farm problem and encouraged a 25 per cent reduc­
tion in acreage planted to "put production on a domestic basis and give
you the full benefit of the h2. per cent tariff." He further observed
 ^Q
Alexander Legge, "The Policy and Program of the Federal Farm 
Board, " Journal of Farm Economics, XII (Januaiy 1930), ?•
^^Hew York Times, July 1930, p. 26.
12
that the "hurdensome surplus" Justified the organization of producers
20which could adjust output to demand. Legge later insisted that the 
farmers were beginning to realize that "their present unhappy condition 
is a result of long years of unregulated production." He also main­
tained that the Farm Board, whose "first emphasis" had been placed on 
the importance of farmers organizing "to control the production and 
marketing of their crops," offered the "permanent remedy" for the farm 
situation. Legge concluded that it must be a voluntary solution for 
"anything done must be done on the part of the farmer, as we have no 
authority to make them do anything, and wouldn't exercise that authority 
if we did.
Although some Hepublicans had long advocated farm contraction,
the Farm Board had no real lever for inducing such action. Still, the
voluntary reduction campaign continued. In February 1931, Legje again
requested a 20 per cent cut in wheat acreage, warning "that unless
farmers voluntarily comply with its program the board would withdraw
22
from the market in an effort to stabilize prices." Although willing
to use threats to induce reduced production, the Farm Board refused to
endorse a plan of Texas bankers to deny credit to farmers who refused
23
to reduce cotton acreage by 25 per cent. By March with both the wheat 
and cotton acreage reduction campaigns failing, Legge expressed dis-
20
Ibid., July 8 , 1930, p. 13-
21
Ibid., July 22, 1930, pp. 1 and 4-, 
I .
23.
22
Ibid., February 6, 1931, P* 3
Ibid., January 18, 1931, II, 20.
13
llluslonment with the voluntary program and doubt as to the Intelligence 
of the American farmer. "'Whan cotton prices get down to about five 
cents," he declared, "maybe they'll begin to see things our way. But 
if prices go up again they'll go back over the fence like a flock of 
sheep." With the failure of the voluntary cooperative control pro­
gram, the Federal Farm Board continued to follow soim of the practices 
which Coolidge, Bbover and others had attacked as being unsound during 
the prolonged fight over the McWary-Haugen bills. It must have been 
sadly amusing to the McUary-Haugenites to see the Farm Board endeavoring 
to set prices on agricultural products through the cooperatives and 
stabilization corporations and become burdened with vast storehouses 
of unsalable wheat and cotton.
Despite efforts of the Farm Board, agricultural prices plunged
almost steadily downward from the peak of prosperity in 19^. Even at
25that time farm products averaged only 91 Per cent of parity. During 
the three bitter years that followed, the situation markedly worsened. 
Between 1930-32 industry reduced production of manufactured goods by 
59 per cent and maintained prices "within l6 percent of what they had 
been in 1929." Farmers, however, cut their output for sale only 6 per 
cent, and farm prices dropped 63 per cent
2U-
Ibid., March 6 , 1931, p . 4l.
25Mordecai Ezekiel and Louis H. Bean, Economic Bases for the 
AgricultureJ. Adjustment Act, U. S, Depsurtment of Agriculture (Washing- 
ton: Government Printing Office, 1933)f 7*
^Agricultural Adjustment Administration, Industry's Produc­
tion Policy and the Farmer, G-44 (Washington; Government Printing 
Office, September 1935), 1-
Ih
Reduced ex^ ports was a major factor in the fall of farm prices. 
The value of farm exports in 1931-32 totaled about 6o per cent less than 
in 1928-2 9 .^  ^ In 1932 the foreign sale level of pork products, the
28
major livestock export, reached its lowest point in 50 years. I'Jhile 
the economic collapse of 1929 was a severe blow to farm exports, it 
merely accelerated a decline obvious since 192I. In spite of declining 
foreign markets, American farmers retained in production the millions 
of acres added during World War I. Even during the depression acreage
29
planted was maintained at about 10 per cent above the prewar level.
Reduced exports plus continued high production resulted in 
greater offerings to a smaller domestic market and record carry-overs 
in some of the major cash crops. The world ceirry-over of American 
cotton in the 1932-33 season totaled 13 million bales, or "about two 
and a half times" normal. The 370,000,000 bushel wheat holdings was
30
over three times the usual carry-over. Smaller foreign purchases and 
continued high output had a major influence on the farm economy. Ex­
cessive supplies thrown upon the domestic market forced prices down. 
fj3 a result, farmers tried to produce more than before in order to meet
27
lAuis H. Bean, "Agriculture and the World Crisis," Yearbook 
of Agriculture, 1933j U, S. Department of Agriculture (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 193^), 93*
pQ
U. S. .Agricultural Adjustment Administration, Analysis of 
the Com-Hbg Situation, C. H.-7 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing
Office, 1933), 3-
29
Ezekiel and Bean, Economic Bases for the AAA, 32-33-
30
"Report of the Secretary of Agriculture," Yearbook of 
Agriculture, 193^ (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1935)>
15
their standing obligations. Illustrative of this vas the five million 
acre increase in cotton planted in 1933 over that of 1932. With 
prices often too low to pay the cost of production, farmers seemed to 
feel that their only salvation was to produce even greater supplies at, 
probably, still lower prices.
Prices of most commodities plummeted after 1929 with some
reaching levels lower than any recorded in modem times. The decline
rs 
,,33
32
was most acute in agricultural and other raw materials. Februa y
1$, 1931, some farm prices were the "lowest of any period on record, ' 
and they continued to go down. The shrinkage in gross farm income from 
$12 billion in 1929 to only $5 billion in 1932 indicated the extent of
9ii
the disaster. With farm commodity prices falling eeirly in 1933 to
about half of the prewar level, the relationship between farm prices
and costs became disastrous.
Although agricultural prices had dropped drastically, there
had been only a slight decline in farm expenses especially in fixed
debt charges and taxes. The debt burden in 1932, compared to gross
income, was three to four times heavier than in the prewar era. It
also took about four times as much of farm products to pay the more
35than doubled taxes as in the 1910-14 period. With the 1910-14 average
^^ Ibld., 28.
^^zekiel and Bean, Economic Bases for the AAA, 2.
^^ev fork Times, March 3, 1931, p. 2Ô.
^^Louis H. Bean, "Agriculture and the World Crisis," 93. 
^^ Ibid., 94.
16
as 100; the general level of farm expenses in the fall of 1932 remained 
at l4o per cent while agricultural prices had dropped to ahout 55 per 
cent. In September 1932 the exchange value of agricultural commodities 
tfas only 56 per cent of the prewar level. For some farm products 
circumstances were even more calamitous. The exchange value of 100 
pounds of hogs, for example, stood at only k-2 per cent, while a bushel 
of wheat retained only 37 per cent of its 1910-14 exchange value. The 
purchasing power of some farm products dropped lower than at any time 
since the 1 8 7 0's-
The worsening economic condition of agriculture intensified
the pressure for some more effective type of farm relief program. As
early as the fall of 1931> Representative Wright Patmaa of Texas ashed
37President Hoover to set minimum prices on farm products. Within 
another year fanmrs irare acting on their own to gain higher prices 
and to prevent the loss of property through mortgage foreclosures or 
tax sales. In 1932 the Farmers Holiday Association attempted to prevent 
the sale of farm commodities until prices were raised. On February 5, 
1933f Milo Reno, national president of the militant organization, warned 
that farmers must have "quick relief or a nationwide farm strike" would 
be called. The next month delegates of Farm Holiday groups from I6 
states met in Des Moines, Iowa. They threatened such a strike unless 
their legislative requirements were fulfilled. These included a nation-
^^Ibid., 94.
37Hew York Times, August 10, 1931, p. 5*
Ibid., February 6, 1933, P« 3*
17
al moratorium on foreclosures, the refinancing of farm loans at lov 
interest rates, the federal operation of banks as public utilities,
90
and. cost of production for farm commodities.
Meanwhile, the threat of force to prevent the sale of property
for debts or taxes had spread throughout much of the nation. Almost
daily during the first three weeks of January 1933 farmers blocked "one
or more" mortgage foreclosure or tax s a l e A  group of 800 men at
Lemars, Iowa early in the month halted a sale by threatening to hang
the agent of the mortgage holder from the "highest tree in Lemars."
The group also "cuffed and bruised" the sheriff and prevented the judge
4lfrom going for help. Although this growing disrespect for the rights 
of mortgage holders and a willingness to use force was most prevalent 
in the Midwest, signs of a similar spirit cropped up in the East. In 
Doylestown, Pennsylvania a bidding committee for the Farmers' Protec­
tive Association of Bucks County purchased the personal property of a
fellow farmer for $1.18. The property was then returned to the farmer
k-2under a "99-year rent-free lease." In spite of these rather forceful 
reactions to their economic situation, most farmers demonstrated a 
willingness to wait for the development of a more practical agricultural 
relief plan.
^^Ibid., March 13, 1933, p. 11.
hoIbid., January 22, 1933, pt. IV, 7 .
^^Ibid., January 5, 1933, p. ih. 
h2
"At the sale three plow horses were bid in by the farmers' 
committee at a nickel apiece, fifty chickens were knocked down for 3 
cents, five cows, three heifers and a bull for a quarter and all house­
hold furnishings for 6 cents." Ibid., January 5, 1933; P- 1^»
18
During the trials and tribulations of the Pbderal Farm Board,
the older two-price schemes were joined by a third major farm program.
Domestic allotment advocates supported the idea of a fair exchange price
only on the domestically consumed portion of the farm crop. On the
exported share of his production, the farmer would receive only the
world price. Unlike other such propositions the system offered no
hi
major incentive for increasing production. This represented a defi­
nite, though hesitant, step toward a program of aiding agriculture 
through restricting output.
As originally discussed during the late twenties, the domestic 
allotment plan contained no provision for controlling production. 
Revised after 1930 by M, L. Wilson, a farm economist at Montana State 
College, and others, the 1932 version of the allotment scheme was 
definitely tied to a control program. Reduction and regulation of the 
agricultural pleint, discussed throughout the twenties, became a vital 
part of agricultural relief proposals during the last year of the 
Hoover Administration. Widespread support now developed for some type 
of reduction program. Even the Farm Board indicated that something 
more effective than the Agricultural Marketing Act was necessary.
"Prices can not be kept at fair levels unless production is adjusted 
to meet market demands," declared the Farm Board in December 1932. At 
the same time, the Board further emphasized that "any nethod which 
provided higher prices and did not include effective regulation of 
acreage or of quantities sold, or both, would tend to increase the
^^W. R. Ronald, "The Origin of the Domestic Allotment Plan," 
Congressional Digest, XII (February 1933); 37«
19
14|.
present surpluses and soon break down as a result. " Others agreed 
that farm output must be decreased. A Georgia farmer, J, M. Gaston, 
suggested that the government loan money to needy farmers to buy the 
already harvested surplus cotton, "on condition that they ■will not gro'w 
any cotton or allow any to be grown in 1933 on any land they own or 
control. Another feirmer, A. Heckscher of New York, proposed that 
each American farmer produce only a "one-half crop" in 1933- This, he 
believed, would leave the farmer the domestic market and the foreigner 
could "shift for himself.
At this time the necessity for some control over production 
was -virtually forced on those groups leading the fight for agricultural 
relief. All but the most obstina"te now recognized that the possibility 
of dumping surpluses abroad had disappeared with the world economic 
crisis. Withholding farm supplies by the Farm Board had failed dismally 
and had demonstrated the inrpracticality, even the foolhardiness, of 
extensive federal price-lifting action without some type of control 
over production. In December 1932, a Washington, D. C. conference of 
the leaders of major farm organizations backed some type of government 
program to regulate crop output. As a principle necessity for any 
agricultural policy, the farm spokesmen suggested that "production of
w
farm products must be reduced in line with effective demand. "
-  —
U. S., Congress, Bouse, Federal Farm Board, Special Report 
of the federal Farm Board on Recommendations for legislation, December
7, 1932, House Document 4Ü9, pp. 4-5.
I4.5
Letter to the Editor, New York Times, January 1, 1933, IV, 6 .
^^Ibid., December I9 , 1932, p. l4.
ky
Ibid., December 15, 1932, p. 8 .
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Edvard A. O’Keal, President of the American Farm Bureau Federation,
placed his organization behind the movement to control the "constantly
recurring crop surpluses." He insisted that:
It is now necessary that we set about in a consistent way to 
retire submarginal lands from cultivation, developing a program 
of forest rehabilitation, setting aside ample areas for parks 
and public playgrounds and doing all things necessary to preserve 
for future generations as much of the value of the lands as can 
be preserved.^
So the old production control advocate, Henry A. Wallace, there remained 
"no alternative but the direct and logical plan of trying to prevent
49
surpluses from comi'ng into existence." Even the confirmed opponent 
of output regulation, George E. Peek, now admitted its necessity. Be 
claimed, however, that restriction should not be adopted as a permanent 
policy but used for the emergency only.^^
The theory behind reducing farm production, with a few added 
quirks, remained basically that of the old supply and demand school.
Most of those who advocated this policy felt that United States tariff 
and credit policies had doomed the farm export trade. Proponents of 
control maintained that agriculture must adjust to the domestic, market 
plus what small amount could be profitably exported. The justification, 
often cited, for restricting production was that consumers paid about 
the same for food whether prices of farm products were high or low. The 
farmer, therefore, could reduce his production, save the labor and cost 
of greater effort, and sell his smaller supply at higher prices. As
Ibid., December 6, 1932, p. 3 8.
kq
Wallace, Hew Frontiers, I8 6 .
^^Hew York Times, February 15, 1933, p. 8.
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each individual farmer could not easily cooperate ifith more than six
million other feurmers on a voluntary basis, it was necessary to create
a coordinator to enable cooperation among interested farmers. M. L.
Wilson explained government-aided mutual action as merely granting to
the farmer some of the advantages which other producers had always had
under American capitalism;
Only the farmers have been unable to control their own opera­
tions. This plan ^ domestic allotmen]^ provides a mechanism 
through which farmers can secure for themselves some of the 
same advantages which the planning and control of production 
have given to_other producers under our present capitalistic 
institutions.
îÇy the 1932 election the basic ingredients essential to the 
vigorous New Iteal farm relief programs had gained wide acceptance.
There are three major trends evident in the evolution of farm policy 
after I9 2 0. Fundamental, and most readily accepted, was the principle 
that agriculture had the right to equality with other industries, an 
idea most commonly expressed in the demand for parity prices. Basic 
to this objective was the recognition that government action on a more 
extensive scale than ever before in history was essential to farm 
equality. Last, and most difficult to win acceptance, was the realiza­
tion that accompanying such government aid some degree of control or 
national planning was required. As these three axioms were being united 
in the midst of the depression, the nation was poised at the gateway to 
the modem era in government-agriculture relations.
During the campaign of 1932, Franklin D. Roosevelt affirmed
L. Wilson, "Explanation of Domestic Allotment, " United 
States Congressional Record, 72d Congress, 1st Session, vol. LXXV, 
part l4, p. 15643.
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his acceptance of the farm relief ideas proposed in the twenties as 
well as his adherence to agricultural fundamentalism. Without agricul­
tural prosperity, he felt that national prosperity could he only "arti­
ficial and ten^orary. " The basis of American economic difficulty, he 
declared, lay in the "lack of equality for agriculture. " Beyond calling 
for "national planning in agriculture," candidate Roosevelt failed to
set forth any definite policies, although it was evident that he leaned
52
toward the principles of the domestic allotment plan.
Agriculture's failure to receive a fair share of the nation's
income in the 1920's was widely proclaimed during the early thirties as
a major factor in causing the depression. A natural result of such
thinking was the belief that the quickest way to end the economic crisis
was to retvim prosperity to the farm. Senator Arthur Capper clearly
expressed this common view;
There are many who believe— and I am one of them— that the way 
to start our economic machine running is to apply the weight at 
the right place by restoring the purchasing power of agricul­
ture. That will get the wheels off deeid center and start the 
general exchange of commodities and services that will restore 
industry and end unemployment. 53
Roosevelt told a group in Boston that "you are poor" because the farmers
are poor. If agriculture were made prosperous, the country would return
to prosperity. As the Roosevelt Administration prepared to take over
^^Speech on the Farm Problem, September l4, 1932; Topeka^ 
Kansas, The Public Papers and Addresses of FrankJin D. Roosevelt: The
Genesis of the Hew Deal; 192B-32, I (!wew York: Random Rouse, 193^),
697 and 699*
53Arthur Capper, "Congress and the Domestic Allotment Plan," 
Congressional Digest, XII (February 1933);
5k
New York Times, November 1, 1932, p. lb.
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from the vanquished Hoover, it \ms ohvious that one guiding principle 
of future farm legislation would he to raise agricultural income.
Henry A. Wallace, the new Secretary of Agriculture, had pointed
to surplus production and farm price problems while still editing
Wallaces* Farmer in February 1933’.
The problem is 50,000,000 surplus acres, for which there has 
been no effective demand abroad during the past two years. 
Furthermore, there is no likelihood of an effective demand 
abroad during the next two years. Lowering tariffs on manu­
factured goods and negotiating reciprocal tariffs may restore 
a part of this market, but I do not see any prospect of it all 
being restored. The European nations have been making desperate 
efforts to act as debtor nations should, and, therefore, have 
increased their taariffs on American farm products and have 
handled their currency exchanges so as to make almost impossible 
any large purchases of American farm products. Furthermore, 
they have fostered the increase of their wheat and hog produc­
tion to the greatest possible point.
None of the old palliatives such as lowering the tariff, Wallace
insisted, were sufficient "to restore the purchasing power to American
agriculture.
Secretary Wallace called a special conference on farm legisla^ 
tion to meet during the second week of March. Leaders of many of the 
major farm organizations, representing most of the major commodities, 
were present. The gathering demonstrated full agreement on the desired 
goals, but revealed little unanimity on the legislative methods to 
achieve them. Nevertheless, Wallace warned the nation on March 10 that 
"it will take time to bring about an effective demand for our surplus 
products at home and abroad. There is little likelihood oi an effective 
demand abroad for our surplus farm products during the next two years. "
55
Henry A. Wallace, "Odds and Ends," Wallaces* Farmer, LVIII 
(February l8 , 1933), 5*
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In. the meantime, he advised, "we must adjust downward our surplus 
supplies until domestic and foreign markets can he r e stored.The 
farm leaders held the old Peek-Johnson idea of fair exchange value for 
farm products as their prime objective, with some type of control over 
production as the basic method. W. R. Ronald suggested in a memorandum 
that the legislation grant to the Secretary power "to lease agricultural 
land and/or enter into contractual agreements" to control farm output.
Although the farm leaders seemed to prefer a leasing program
to the allotment plan, no agreement could be reached on a single produc-
57tion control program. The group, therefore, recommended that the 
legislation be "so flexible that the Secretary could apply whatever 
scheme seemed best adapted to a given commodity." According to Wallace, 
the cotton, wheat and com representatives strongly favored an acreage 
rental control system; the cattle people were uncertain and the agents 
of the dairy cooperatives were the "most skeptical of all."^ President 
Roosevelt presented the draft of a farm bill prepared by the Department 
of Agriculture to Congress on March l6 .
In submitting the proposal for legislative consideration, the
President emphasized the urgency of the situation and the necessity for
new and drastic tactics:
I tell you frankly that it is a new and untrod path, but I tell 
you with equal frankness that an unprecedented condition calls
^^Henry A. Wallace, "Farm Crisis," Radio Address, Iferch 10,
1933 f in Democracy Reborn, selected from public papers and edited by 
Russell Lord (Uew York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1944), 4l-42.
57
"^'Ibid., March 12, 1933, p. 1 6.
58Wallace, Hew frontiers, I6 3.
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for the trial of new means to rescue agriculture. If a fair 
administrative trial of it is made and it does not produce the 
hoped for results I shall he the first to acknowledge it and 
advise you.59
■While the spirit of emergency and readiness for experimentation domi­
nated the Roosevelt attitude toward farm legislation, others remained 
unconvinced about the efficacy of the "new and untrod path." CSongres- 
sional scrutiny of the measure took far longer than had been expected.
Although Secretary Wallace had hoped for the passage of farm 
legislation during the month of March, it was not until 12 that the
Agricultural Adjustment Act was ready for the signature of the Presi­
dent. The new measure adopted the major principles enunciated by farm 
lobby groups since 1922 and was designed to draw support from advocates 
of most farm relief programs. Congress declared that suffering by "the 
basic industry of agriculture" and the resulting effects on the national 
economy made enactment of emergency legislation necessary.
Achievement of a price giving "agricultural commodities a 
purchasing power with respect to articles that farmers buy equivalent 
to the purchasing power of agricultural commodities in the base period"
6obecame the goal of Hew Deal farm policy. To accomplish this objec­
tive, the Secretary of Agriculture received authority to experiment with 
a variety of methods.
To control production agreements could be made with individual 
producers for reductions in acreage planted or supplies for market of
 i ---------------^ ^ ----The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt,
II, 74. ^
6o
The base period on all products, except tobacco, was August 
1909 through July 1914.
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any of the basic commoditiesAs condensation for reducing output, 
participating producers were to receive rental or benefit payments. 
Eevenue for the payments and other expenses was to be obtained through 
processing taxes, levied and collected from the first dcmmtic processor 
of any crop on which the Secretary declared benefit payments were to be 
paid. Authority was also granted to make marketing agreements with 
producers, processors and others who handled farm products for the 
purpose of raising prices. In addition, the Secretary received the 
power to use "the proceeds derived from all tajces imposed under this 
title . . . for expansion of markets and removal of surplus agricultural 
products. ..." Apparently the basis for this last section, included 
on Peek's suggestion, was the old surplus duig)ing idea.^^ Weillace 
never approved this scheme and little was accomplished along the line 
of encouraging exports. The authority to purchase and remove surplus 
products, however, proved very useful in subsequent Hew Deal activities 
and was later expanded.
With the passage of the Agricultural Adjustment Act the nation 
began a most ambitious experiment in economic planning. Congress had 
emphasized the measure ' s emergency nature by declaring the act termi­
nated whenever "the President finds and proclaims that the national
"^Sche term basic commodities, as control advocates first used 
it referred only to major export crops, such as cotton and wheat, and 
to a few crops inportant enough to influence the price and supply of 
other products, such as com and hogs. Political necessity forced a 
considerable expansion of the basic commodity list. Da the first AAA 
those termed basic were wheat, cotton, field com, hogs, rice, tobacco, 
and milk.
^^George W. Peek, Why Quit Our Own (Hew York: D. Van Nostrand
Ctonpany, 1936), 98*
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economic emergency in relation to agriculture has ended. ..." Thus, 
many of the legislators regarded the act as singly a temporary measure 
designed for the specific and sole purpose of Increasing agricultural 
Income for as many of the nation's farmers as possible. Others, such 
as Roosevelt and Wallace who had been talking about national planning, 
saw more long range purposes In the legislation. There were. Indeed, 
provisions In the legislation which lent comfort to the national plan­
ners. Economic equality was not only to be established but also main­
tained. Under the law, the Secretary of Agriculture was to determine 
and Inform the President when the emergency had passed. If the farm 
emergency were equated with the concept of parity, it definitely would 
not be a short term affair.
Obviously, the Agricultural Adjustment Act did not solve the 
farm problem; It merely ordered and granted powers to the Secretary of 
Agriculture to endeavor to accomplish that feat. Although he recognized 
the relief task as the immediate goal of the new legislation, Wallace 
sought to emphasize the necessity for uniting price-raising and relief 
with national planning. In explaining the farm bill, he pointed out 
that:
The method to be used in increasing the farmer's purchasing 
powçir is by restoring the balance between production and con­
sumption as rapidly as possible. Let's help the farmer, the 
bill says in effect, plan his production to fit the effective 
demands of today's and tomorrow's rather than yesterday's 
market
Control of production, he urged, must be viewed not only as a tool of 
long-range planning but also as the major means of immediately raising
New York Times, March I9, 1933; P- 2.
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prices. Increasing prices without instituting controls, he insisted,
would only mean greater production in subsequent years and renewed low
farm prices. According to Wallace, the "first effort" must adjust
production downwai'd to provide ang>ly for domestic requirements "plus
that amount which we can export at a profit. " Such action would
"reorganize agriculture," taking out of production that surplus land
"on which men and women are . . . toiling, wasting their time, wearing
out their lives, to no good end. . .. "  It would also mean reducing
supplies and raising prices to parity. Secretary Wallace concluded his
address on the farm act •v/ith a clarion call to farmers to unite and look
to the future with hope:
I want to say, finally, that unless, as we lift farm prices, we 
also unite to control production, this plan will not work for 
long. And the only way we can effectively control production 
for the long pull is for you farmers to organize and stick, and 
do it yourselves. This act offers you promise of a balanced 
abundance, a shared prosperity, and a richer life. It will work, 
if you will make it yours, and make it work.
I hope that you will come to see in this act, as I do now, a
Declaration of Interdependence, a recognition of essential 
unity, and of our absolute reliance one upon another.^
The Heaven Wallace sought was a manipulated economy to "maintain a
continually balanced relationship between the income of agriculture,
labor and i n d u s t r y . T h e  Secretary labeled this the theory of
"balanced abundance, " Tdiich contrasted markedly with what critics
characterized as the "theory of scarcity."
614-
Henry A. Wallace, "The Hoad to Higher Prices; Farm Act Gives 
Farmers Opportunity to Ck>ntrol Production, " Radio Address printed in 
Wallaces* Farmer, LVIII (May 27, 1933), 1.
^^Wallace, Mew Frontiers, 22.
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The first two and one-half years of the Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration demonstrated the great flexibility of the powers granted 
to the Department of Agricultinre for solving the farm problems. As 
programs were instituted, efforts were made to combine the relief and 
planning needs of American agriculture. Programs taking millions of 
acres of cotton, wheat, tobacco, and com out of production were put 
into effect as rapidly as possible. The contracts usually called for 
an immediate partial payment of the benefit allowance. Ijoans were made 
on crops which were kept on the farm, again putting money into the hands 
of the farmers. Products of various kinds were purchased and distributed 
through relief channels, aiding both the farm and urban needy. These 
measures carried out the double goals of the farm legislation. In making 
benefit payments early and in purchasing agricultural commodities, the 
AAA put the farmer on what amounted to relief. At the sane time, before 
the farmer received his relief check, he usually signed a contract which 
committed hijn to reduce his production, thereby participating in the 
program of national planning.
CHAPTER II
LIVESTOCK PROBLEMS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
EMERGENCY HOG MARKETING PROGRAM
Since passage of the Agricultural Adjustment Act uas delayed 
until the growing season was well advanced, a sense of urgency permeated 
the development of early commodity control measures. Cotton and wheat 
farmers were considered among the most needy, eind general agreement 
existed among both producers and the AAA planners that production must 
be restricted. Consequently curtailment programs were promptly insti­
tuted for cotton and tobacco, although bad weather destroyed the pros­
pects of a bungler wheat crop and the need for a wheat reduction program. 
The plowing up of 10,495,000 acres of growing cotton plants and the 
distribution of millions of dollars in benefit payments served as a 
worthy introduction to the emergency measures adopted by the AAA in 
1933* During the early summer, control programs were also developed 
which gave wheat producers cash in 1933 in return for promises to reduce 
acreage in 1934 and 1935- The livestock producers, however, appeared 
to be overlooked during the early and hectic days of the AAA.
Hog producers, along with cotton and wheat famers, had been 
i-egarded as needing help since the early twenties. Almost every farm 
relief proposal introduced from the early McNary- Haugen plans to the
30
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passage of the Agricultural Adjustment Act included s"«rine as a basic 
commodity. Bfost of the plans had also included com. Control of com, 
"primarily a raw material used by farmers" to produce livestock, was 
considered by most agricultural authorities as almost essential to any 
livestock regulation program.Because of the close price relationship 
bettzeen pork and beef, a joint hog-cattle program was also considered 
desirable. Cattle producers, however, compared to other farm commodity 
groups maintained a relatively favorable position throughout the twen­
ties and had been little interested in the various relief measures.
Livestock producers suffered with other farm groups in the 
price drop of the early twenties. Hog prices, for example, fell from
an average of $1 6 .2 3 per 100 pounds in I919 to only $7 .1 3 in 1923> which
2
was slightly below the $7*25 prewar average. The livestock industry 
revived more quickly than the rest of egriculture, and the disparity 
between livestock producers' costs eind prices was gradually decreased 
between 1921 and 1929. The favorable situation for livestock growers 
was of short duration, however. Although livestock prices did not drop 
as precipitously as did those of some other farm commodities, they 
declined steadily and disastrously after 1929• By 1931 income from 
livestock had dropped I9 per cent below the 1924 level, while income
O
from grains had fallen almost 74 per cent. After 1931, however, the
A. FitzGerald, Livestock Under the A A A  (Washington: The
Brookings Institution, 1935), 1-
2
G. F. Warren and F. A. Pearson, The Agricultural Situation; 
Economic Effects of Fluctuating Prices (New York: John Wiley and Sons,
1924), 62. "
^"Report of the Secretary of Agriculture," Yearbook of Agri­
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price decline, especially for hogs, continued, at an accelerated, pace.
In 1932 the farm price of hogs was only one-third, that of 1929* The
farm price of heef cattle had. dropped. 50 per cent below the I929 level
It
which had. been unusually high because of a sma].l market supply.
In reality, it was not the low price as such which caused, the 
trouble. Instead., the principal problem centered on the unfavorable 
relationship which existed between producers' costs and the prices 
received for livestock. This problem had, of course, been present since 
the end of World War I. CJosts had increased markedly during the war, 
but they did not decrease afterwards to the degree livestock prices 
declined. The marked increase in this disparity between costs and 
prices by 1932 had a disastrous influence on livestock producers. In 
that year the purchasing power of 100 pounds of pork had dropped from 
85 per cent of the 1910-1914 level in 1929 to only 44.5 per cent. The 
situation was not so serious for beef cattle producers, as 100 pounds 
of beef in 1932 retained 75 per cent of the prewar purchasing power.^ 
The continuing relatively favorable position for cattle growers induced 
leaders of that industry to oppose inclusion of beef as a basic com­
modity in the Agricultural Adjustment Act
culture, 1933, U. S, Department of Agriculture (Washington: U. S.
Government Printing Office, 1934), 4.
1*.
FitzGerald, Livestock Under the A A A, 20.
^Ibid., 2 2.
^Agricultural Emergency Act to Increase Farm Purchasing Power, 
ifearings before the Senate Agriculture Committee, 73d Congress, 1st 
Session, March 1933* Testimony of F. E. Mollin, Secretary of the 
American National Livestock Association, pp. 259-269.
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Because beef cattle "were not included on the basic commodity 
list, the Administration could not develop an over-all livestock control 
program. Instead, adjustment planners vere forced to concentrate on 
svine and the closely related crop, com. Indeed, these two commodities 
had. never really recovered from the collapse of the early twenties. In 
the three year period, 1919-1921, com prices fell by ttjo-thirds and
7
hog prices over one-half. Not even in 1929 did the com-hog industries
fully recover. A short crop in 1930 lifted the price of com to 90
cents a bushel by fall, but the price then declined to only 19 cents in
1932, which was only 28 per cent of the prewar parity price. Swine
prices suffemd a similar fate declining in December 1932 to their
"lowest level" since I8 7 8. Hbg prices, only $2.95 per 1(X) pounds in
8Chicago, were well below the "average price of all fann products."
The gross income from hogs in 1932 was only one-third that of 1929, and
9
their purchasing power was only two-fifths that of the 1910-1914 period.
The grave hog price situation resulted both from long-term 
factors and the temporary influences of the depression. Declining 
exports and reduction in farm work stock were two principal old influ-
7
U. S., Agricultural Adjustment Administration, Com-Bog Adjust­
ment, C.E.-II3 (Washington: Ü. S. Government Printing Office, 1935), 86.
O
"What’s New in Agriculture," Yearbook jf Agriculture, 1934,
U. S. Department of Agriculture (Washington: TJ. S. Government Printing
Office, 1935), 112-113 and II6; U, S., Department of Agriculture, "The 
Agricultural Outlook for 1933," Staff of Bureau of Agricultural Econom­
ics, Miscellaneous Publication No. 156 (Washington: U. S. Government
Printing Office, 1933), 20-21.
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"Economic Situation of Hog Producers," Letter from the 
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ences on. the sirf.ne industry. Among temporary causes, the decline in 
domestic buying power was of major importance.
An almost continuous decline in the foreign demand for American 
pork products after I919 seriously affected the domestic hog situation. 
%r 1932, pork exports had dropped below the prewar level. In the 
previous decade hog producers had lost an export outlet for approxi­
mately eight or nine million head.^^ Refusing to reduce their produc­
tion to congoensate for the loss, American hog farmers forced additional 
pork products onto an already depressed domestic market. If, as studies 
indicated, the total e:qienditure of consumers for hog products Upended 
not on the price but on their own income, the only possible result of 
such excessive supplies was lower prices. The truth of this was 
demonstrated in Itebruary 1933» At that time the retail price of pork 
had dropped below the 1910-1914 level, although the retail prices of
other farm commodities, including wheat and cotton products, remained
11above the prewar average.
Farm mechanization and the consequent reduction in work stock
numbers also influenced the com-hog situation. With a reduction of 10
or 11 million horses and mules, the output of approximately 15 million
acres was freed for production of grain, especially com, to be turned 
12into meat. Much more of this went into the production of pork than
'^^ Mordecai Ezekiel and Louis H. Bean, Economic Bases for the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act, U. S. Department of Agriculture (Washing­
ton: W. S. Government Printing Office, 1933)> 17-18-
^Ibid., 21-23; W. S., Agricultural Adjustment Administration, 
The Oom-Eog Problem, O.E.-l, U. S. Department of Agriculture (Washing­
ton: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1933)> 3*
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■faeef as pork constituted a far larger proportion of the total meat sup-
ply than before World War I. The price of com was also basic to the
"hog cycle," a relatively regular rise and fall In hog production. When
com was cheap, farmers were Inclined to Increase hog production. When
com prices went up, swine producers cut their output. By 1933; the
pork Industiy was prepared to enter the expansive phase of the cycle.
This close relationship between hogs and com further congllcated the
1^4-construction of a control program for either. Efforts to develop 
separate programs for the two farm commodities proved extremely diffi­
cult. A done Stic allotment scheme for hogs appeared too complicated, 
while rental of com acreage. It was feared, would take too long to 
affect the swine Industry to be of any real benefit to hog producers.
As Secretary Wallace said, the delay In help for the Com Belt came 
"not from any lack of Interest, but from an Inability to see any way to 
help."^^
The general outline of control programs for cotton and wheat 
had been under consideration for some time, and spokesmen for producers 
of those commodities had generally accepted the plans. But, such was
Adjustment Act; Developments up to March 193^ (Washington: The
Brookings Institution, 193^); 5*
FitzGerald, Livestock Under the A A A ,  10.
^^0. F. Sarle, "Control of Hbg Production by Eeducing Com 
Production," Confidential Plan, May 12, 1933; Agriculture Division of 
the National Archives, Record Group l4$. All archival material here­
after cited Is located In the Agriculture Division of the National 
Archives, Washington, D. C.
^^Henry A. Wallace, New Frontiers (New York: Eeyneil and
Hitchcock, 1934), 186.
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not the case for com-hog farmers. Not only vas there no commonly 
accepted program but there was no recognized spokesman or organized 
group representing com and hogs. Also, producers were extremely slow 
in expressing their d e s i r e s . 5 y  the time the Department of Agricul­
ture turned to consideration of the com-hog problem, its officials 
had apparently decided that for their own protection, as well as for 
achieving broad producer cooperation, the farmers should orgemize and 
present their own control program.
Com Belt pressure, however, remained invisible or at least
unorganized until after the hog situation worsened and then appeared
17only tfith encouragement from the Secretary of Agriculture. A specula­
tive boom which developed during the summer brought a temporary rise in 
prices for com and other commodities but not pork. Instead, excessive 
supplies started to hit the market in May. With domestic consumption 
up only slightly, exports up even less, and storage supplies rapidly 
increasing the hog picture was indeed dark. Adding to the dismal 
prospects was the June pig survey of the Department of Agriculture which
indicated a 13 per cent increase in sows for farrowing in the Com 
18
Belt.
^^"The plans of the Department have been stopped cold by the 
question as to whether the producers wish to co-operate." A. G. Black 
to the Com-Hbg Producers Meeting, Des Moines, Iowa, July l8 , 1933- 
As quoted in D. A. FitzGerald, Com and Hogs, n., p. 10.
17Because of the large proportion of both com and hogs pro­
duced in the ten state Com Belt area, the Department always emphasized 
this region in dealing with the com-hog problem. This was true in 
organizing a producer group, in working out a hog program and in trying 
to arouse producer support and response to the com-hog programs.
"Report of the Secretary of Agriculture," Yearbook of 
Agriculture, 1934, p. 3 8.
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A somewhat abortive attempt was undertaken in May to organize
the com-hog producers. C. V. Gregory, editor of the Pj.-airie Farmer,
called for a parley on the com-hog problem to meet in Chicago late in
the month.Wallace obviously knew of and supported the purposes of
the gathering. Other than asking the Secretary to appoint a group to
20represent the interests of hog farmers, the meeting accomplished very
little. 3Phe need for a representative pressure group was still felt.
On May 30, J. S. Russell, farm editor of the Des Maines Register,
declared that the lack of organization was proving a handicap to com-
21
hog producers in getting consideration in Washington for a program.
It was not an accident, therefore, that 7Jowa farmers confronted with
the deteriorating hog situation led the way in creating a com-hog
pressure organization.
Roswell Garst, Coon Rapids, Iowa, one-time partner and an old
acquaintance of Secretary Wallace, reports that Russell conferred with
Wallace about the economic problems of the Com Belt and specifically
about the com-hog situation. The Secretary informed Russell, Garst
states, "that he was not going to impose any programs on any group.
The wheat program had been asked for by the wheat growers— if the com
22and hog farmers wanted a program, they would have to ask for it."
Garst and Russell took an active role in getting the Iowa producers to
^^Des Moines Register, May 2k, 1933, p. l6 .
20
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organize. According to Garst, they opened their campaign at a meeting
of the lo'wa Association of Farm Cooperatives. Because of the "great
jealousy" which existed among the better known farm organizations,
23this, they felt, was "an inoxious place to start." In any case,
Bussell reported on June 8 that the Federation of Iowa Farm Qrganiza-
21».
tions had agreed to sponsor a meeting on com and hogs.
Bussell, Garst, Itonald Murphy, editor of Wallaces * Farmer, and
25a few others organized the meeting. Jfepresentatives from the state 
farm organizations and about 50 farmers without any organizational ties 
attended the gathering. On June l6, 1933> the Iowa conference estab­
lished a permanent state com-hog committee with Garst as chairman.
Bequesting early action to aid Com Belt producers, the group supported 
production control. These promoters suggested a com acreage reduction 
program for 193^ but with immediate partial cash benefits. Another 
recommendation was the payment of a bonus on light hogs to reduce 
market tonnage over the next year. The delegates directed the committee 
to present details of their suggestions to the Agriculture Department. 
More important to the development of a hog program than the Iowa recom­
mendations, however, was the initiation of a Com Belt pressure gmup.
Organization of the Iowa committee served as the lever the 
Administration had needed to push the desirad regional organization.
^^Ibid. 
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On. June 30, A. G. Black, head of the Com-Hog Section of the AAA, sent
telegrams to farm leaders and farm groups in the remaining nine Cora
Belt states telling them of the Iowa activity, encouraging similar meet-
27ings, and announcing a regional com-hog conference, which Wallace had
28suggested he held in Des Moines about the middle of July. The Depart­
ment of Agriculture obviously took a leading role in creating a national 
com-hog producer pressure group. Black sent members of the Iowa commit­
tee as organizational agents to the other states. Garst worked in 
Illinois Indiana, R. M. Evans campaigned in Minnesota and South 
Dakota, and other committee members were active in the remaining Com
Belt states.^  Once organization began, it proved so effective, Garst
said, that "in about a week we had com-hog committees in eveiy state 
that was prominent.
On July l8 representatives from Iowa, Illinois, Indiana,
Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin 
gathered in Des Moines. A. G. Black, representing the Administration, 
emphasized the importance of the meeting:
I am trying to learn what farmers want and are willing to do 
and the farm act administration will give heed to demands of
the producers. Just what action is taken and how soon it is
forthcoming will depend largely on what develops out of this
27Copies of Black telegrams, June 30, 1933, National Archives,
R. G. l4$.
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29..I appreciate your sending Mr. Garst, of Iowa, to the meet­
ing, and I may say that he made a good impression and was very help­
ful." J. S. Skinner to A. G. Black, July 8 , 1933, National Archives,
R. G. 1^5.
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conference.
Certainly it is not the puiToose of Secretary of Agriculture 
Wallace and the farm act administration to force anything on 
the farmers. We are hoping they can formulate their own 
program. 31
Although there was no unanimity on methods, the group "expressed a de­
termination to use every available means of bringing hog prices up to 
a level with their prewar purchasing power." The conference backed 
this objective with an endorsement of the "regulation of the production 
of com and hogs if necessary. . . ." Consequently, a National Com- 
Hog Committee of Tvrenty-Plve was created to carry "out an aggressive 
canroaign to bring hog prices to a higher level." Twenty-one of the 
members were named by the delegations from the various states, accord­
ing to the importance of the state as a com-hog producer. The other
34four were appointed by the Com-Hbg Administrator, A. G. Black. In 
reality, the actions of the delegates may have belied the actual opinion 
of the people they represented. Bspre sent at ive s of almost heilf the 
states opposed any com production program which logically would have 
meant opposition to hog reduction also. There is no question but that 
Black and a few of the control supporters exerted considerable pressure 
on the group to get the National Committee established. Indeed, L. W. 
Drennen, chairman of the Folk County (Iowa) Democratic Central Commit-
"^^ s  Moines Register, July 1 8, 1933; P- 1.
3^Ibid., July 19; 1933; p. 1.
^^Ibid.
"Action on Com-Hog Reduction," Editorial, Wallaces' Farmer, 
LVIII (August 5; 1933);
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tee, accused Black and the Farm Bureau of "ramrodding" the meeting and
35preventing soma delegates from expressing their opposition. Although 
Drennen exaggerated, it is doubtful that the group as a whole would have 
supported production control had the supporters of control not been able 
to present the dismal hog price situation as a justification. After the 
conference, the National Committee went almost immediately to Chicago 
for inportant meetings ifith representatives of the Administration and 
the meat packers.
During the preceding months there had been plenty of discussion 
but no real decisions on the com-hog problem. Several serious obsta­
cles merit attention. The natural difficulties of planning a program 
for hogs because of the close relationship to the com and beef indus­
tries have been discussed. Too, the absence of any consensus on a 
program either within the AAA or among farmers, and the lack of a 
producer pressure group has received attention. Still another reason 
for slowness in developing a hog program was the conflicting views of 
Henry A. Wallace and his control group and the export-dumping advocates 
led by George N. Peek, now AAA administrator. During Senate hearings 
on the agriculture bill in March, Wallace expressed his belief that it 
was necessary to control hog output. Ha also emphasized that it was 
"necessary to control com acreage if you are going to control the hog 
situation." Wallace warned that the high output and low prices of com 
in 1932 had greatly stimulated hog production. While still editor of
35Drennen to Henry A. Wallace, July 1 9, 1933  ^National 
Archives, B, G. 1^5.
^^Agricultural Emergency Act to Increase Farm Purchasing Power, 
Hearings before the Senate Agriculture Committee, 45 and l4l.
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Wallaces* Farmer, the Secretary had supported the allotment plan for 
com and hogs. Be suggested that farmers be paid $4 an acre to cut 
com acreage by 15 per cent and that a $1 per hundred bonus be paid on
hogs if the total -weight tzas reduced 20 per cent, and providing that
37no hog sold weighed over 210 pounds. Wallace obviously regarded both 
com and hog output as excessive. Although the 1933 hog program did 
not exactly follow his suggestions, the bonus idea on light hogs may 
izell have influenced the plan developed by the National Com-Ksg Commit­
tee.
Administra-tor Peek maintained quite different ideas as to the 
cause and solution of the hog problem. Be denied that foreign price 
or overproduction hurt the hog farmer. Peek insisted that "the diffi­
culty -with hogs lies in the processing industry, in the distributive 
systems. ..." He further maintained that the essential necessity for
improvement of the hog situation -was "a straightening up of the dis-
38tributive system." The conflict in attitude -within the Administration 
over the cause of and the solution of the hog problem was a factor 
hindering the development of a program for the pork producers. That 
some type of control program would be worked out became evident, however, 
when A. G. Black, chief of the feirm economics section at Iowa State Col­
lege, -was appointed to head the Com-Hbg section of the AAA. Not only 
had Black been in "close touch" with Wallace in regard to production
37 "Benefits of the Allotment Plan," Editorial, Waiiaces *
Farmer, LVIII (January 7, 1933), 4.
-^Agricultural Emergency Act to Increase Farm Purchasing Power, 
Bearings before the Senate Agriculture Committee, 76.
^3
control measures but he had also been associated ulth "other com belt
economists and farm organization officials in preliminary conferences"
on the com-hog problem.The appointment of Black was taken by the
editor of Wallaces' farmer as proof that the Secretary vas "determined
to take a personal part" in helping farmers to develop a com-hog 
it-0
program.
Wallace had been kept informed of the development of the Iowa
Com-Hbg group. On June 10, Garst wrote to Paul Appleby, assistant to
the Secretary, advising him of the coming state meeting of the com-
hog producers in Das Moines. Garst felt the Iowa gathering could be
of considerable value in working out a plan "if we know what program
the Itepajrfcment of Agriculture has for the com-hog situation." He
added that "we are particularly anxious to endorse only a program
which he ^allaceÿ^ will feel is sound and w o r k a b l e . A t  the same
time Garst wrote Wallace about the Iowa project and emphasizing the
necessity of an immediate reduction in pork supplies. But, he wanted
the Secretary's recommendations so as not to "embarrass" him with the
kg
"wrong suggestions."
Even before the organization of the National Com-Hog Commit­
tee, there had been conferences among AAA officials, farm representa-
"Plans for Hog Reduction, " Editorial, Wall aces* Farmer, 
LVIII (June 10, 1933), 1-
koIbid.
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tives from the Com Belt, and processor representatives. On July 5, 
Black met vith Garst, Ed O'Neal, President of the American î^rm Bureau, 
C. V, Gregory, Eeirl Smith, President of the Illinois Agricultural 
Association, and unofficial producer representatives in Chicago te 
discuss the com-hog problem. Although most of the discussion at this 
meeting pertained to proposed trade agreements "with the meat processors, 
some consideration vas given to the production control problem. The 
farm group agreed "that a reduction in production of com and hogs vas 
necessary." But, the producers insisted that efforts should be made 
to increase prices vhile output vas being reduced. One vay to put money 
into the pockets of farmers inmiediately and at the same time to reduce 
future production vas considered. Sentiment favored the payment of a 
bonus on brood sovs to be marketed during the months of August and 
September. This vould out the number of hogs coming to market during 
the next year and vould also provide some extra income for Com Belt 
farmers. The producer representatives sav one dravback to the scheme. 
They feared the action might harm the normal market and, therefore, 
insisted that some "special outlet" be found for the meat product 
before the bonus campaign started. For this purpose, the group sup­
ported the creation of an export coiporation to handle the pork. To
pay for the bonus program and for export losses, a differential tax by
k3
veight on hogs vas suggested. Rosvell Garst, Mrho vas in Washington 
vhen the June pig survey report vas made, claims credit for developing 
the "idea of killing the pregnant sovs" because, as Garst later vrote,
"Beport of Conference vith Producers," Chicago, July 5,
1933, National Archives, B. G. l4$.
45
"uQ would have raised so many pigs that fall that they wouldn't have 
paid the freight to market. Something of this sort was mentioned, 
hoTOver, two months before the July meeting. C. F. Sarle, AAA econo­
mist, suggested in May that to control hog production it might be neces-
45sary to reduce the number of brood sows farrowing in the fall of 1933- 
Considering the communication between Garst and Wallace, it seems 
probable that the bonus sow scheme originated in the Bspaortment of 
Agriculture.
On July 6 the producer group met with representatives from the 
processing industry. Black and Gny C. Shepard, chief of the ffeat Proc­
essing and Marketing Section of the AAA, also attended the conference. 
Both groups strongly supported the current attempt to work out a sale 
of pork surpluses to Russia. But beyond that point little agreement 
could be reached. Some of the packers recognized that the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act was designed to work "for parity prices on hogs, " but 
they offered no suggestions on how to raise prices. They denied that 
there was any need for reducing hog production and opposed the idea of 
a bonus on piggy sows. One processor contended that the purchase of a 
million sows, as planned under the bonus scheme, "would have a bad 
effect upon all prices." The packers also insisted that any processing 
tax on hogs would hurt rather than help the farmers. The producers 
argued that if they supported the export and trade agreement plans 
which would exempt packers from antitrust laws, the packers must recog-
44
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nize the rl^t of producers to parity prices and support production
46control measures. Although subsequent talks were held with the 
packers, no definite agreement could be reached and the need for a 
temporary hog program for 1933 became more important than any possible 
agreement worked out with the processing industry.
Garst wired Administrator Peek on the same day that the pro­
ducers and packers were conferring. The hog situation, he said, re­
quired "immediate action" and suggested a "credit export" of pork to
4tRussia and a bonus program on one million pigQr sows. Until this 
tine there had been no apparent sense of urgency or inpending doom 
about the circumstances of the hog farmer. But, in the two weeks before 
the formation of the National Com-Bog Committee demands for drastic 
measures to save the hog industiy developed. On July 8 , the editor of 
Wallaces* Farmer warned "we are headed stredght for big trouble in hogs, 
unless we get busy with a reduction program." Although production 
should have been decreased, it had actually been increased. The edi­
torial concluded:
Worse news is coming in the fall. In the com belt, 13 per 
cent more sows were bred for fall litters than a year ago. The 
national increase is 8 per cent.
Cheap com always is turned into cheaper hogs in the long run.
Last winter and spring, it seemed more profitable to feed hogs 
than to sell com. As a result, everybody and his brother 
have been going into the hog business.
Hog prices are low now. What will they be when this increased
"Report of Conference between Producers and Processors,"
July 6, 1933; National Archives, R, Q. l4$.
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load of spring pigs hits the market, and when the increase in
fall pigs adds to the total?
We are going to be forced to take drastic steps to cut hog 
tonnage.
When the AAA representatives met with the National Committee 
in Chicago during the third week of July, they could only present the 
same pessimistic report. The parity price of hogs was lower than that 
of any other major farm product. Excessive supplies coming to market
during the previous two and one-half months had increased hogs slaugh­
tered in federally inspected plants by 30 per cent and further depressed 
prices. Storage supplies of both leard and pork were up greatly over 
the year before. At the same time, hog supplies for the fall and winter 
market would likely be larger than in 1932. In addition, a developing
feed shorteige indicated that large numbers of unfinished cattle would
49be thrown on the market to compete with hog products.
On July 24, discussion turned to methods of immediately aiding 
the hog industry. C. F. Sarle presented the producer committee with 
the situation and previously suggested programs. Sarle pointed out 
that bad weather had reduced the com crop by 500 million bushels.
Thus, there was no need for action on com in 1933» The hog situation, 
however, was quite serious and demanded immediate attention. Among 
suggested remedies, Sarle seiid, was a processing tax on hogs graduated 
according to weight wiiich, it was hoped, would reduce the total amount
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of pork going to market. But, he vas more enthusiastic about the bonus 
on piggy BOVS. Under this program, a $5 bonus could be paid over a 
four to six veek period in August eind September. If 600,000 head could 
be acquired, it vould "probably" cut the next spring and summer market­
ing by three million head. To prevent "seriously depressing prices" 
this tonnage vould be diverted out of "regular consumption channels. "
He estimated that the total cost of the project, both the bounty and 
the diversion to other outlets, vould not exceed $20,000,000. Sarle 
optimistically forecast that this reduction in tonnage for the following 
spring and summer markets vould materially increase prices, probably by 
"60 per cent during the latter half of this marketing year."^^
The National Committee vas quite receptive to the bonus plan 
on piggy sovs, although some members questioned the practicality of its 
operation. It vas pointed out that if the program vere announced too 
early, "farmers vould tend to defeat the program by breeding more sovs
51
to farrov next spring." Some concern also existed about the disposal 
of the meat procured from the project. Guy Shepard attempted to remove 
any doubts along that line. Consideration, he said, had already been 
given to the problem, and there vas some hope of selling the product to 
Russia. Indeed, Shepard added: "the details are an worked out vlth
the exception of getting Russia to agree. . . . Two representatives of 
the packing industry are already on their vay to London for the purpose 
of making the same deal yôotto^ for 2$0 or 300 million pounds of pork
50Minutes of the Meeting of the National Com-Ebg Producers 
Committee, Chicago, July 24, 1933, National Archives, R, G. 145.
^^Ibid.
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52products."
At this point John Wilson, of Ohio, made the most momentous 
contribution to the development of the 1933 emergency hog program. "I
suggest," Wilson said, "that the government buy 4 million pigs -weighing
53between 4o and l4o pounds be-tween, say, August 20th and October 1st."
He estimated the purchase program would cost $22 million and expected 
a processing tax on hogs to pay the expenses. Wilson saw some salvage 
value in the meat procured from the young hogs. The product could, he 
suggested, "be made into sausage and turned over to the Red Cross or 
sold to Russia." The plan would benefit the 1933-34 hog market, he
54
felt, by reducing the available tonnage by ^74 to $82 million pounds.
Although some committee members expressed reservations about 
the program, Wilson, Garst and the AAA representatives maintained enough 
enthusiasm for all. To a protest that the plan would not help the price 
of heavy hogs, Wilson responded that "a psychological effect would cause 
the price of heavy hogs to rise." Sarle felt that "it should be possi­
ble to take out 10 per cent of the December 1st to June 1st pig crop," 
which "should have an immediate effect on prices." G. B. Thorne, of 
the AAA, felt that a "reduction of five per cent in the crop of pigs 
for the year should raise prices during half the year, or less, 20 to 
25 per cent." Geurst joined in support of the purchase plan, but he 
insisted that it be tied to the piggy sow project. Otherwise, "there
52
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will be a tendency to hold sows back, " thereby defeating the whole emer­
gency program. Garst further emphasized that these proposals must be 
considered only as emergency measures, and added that "in the long run
we must include a com acreage reduction program to correlate with
55reduction in hog numbers." The national Committee adopted an official 
report favoring the pig purchase program, added it to the bonus sow 
plan and prepared to recommend both to the Department of Agriculture.
Earl 0. Smith, chairman of a special committee set up by the 
national Committee to work with Department Officials on ensrgency plans, 
called C. G. Davis on July 27 to report uneuaimous agreement of the pro­
gram, and to ask for a conference with Secretary Wall ace. The emer­
gency project as now envisioned included the purchase of 4 million 
young pigs weighing between 25 and 100 pounds and the payment of a $4 
bonus on 1 million piggy sows weighing over 275 pounds. This was to 
be done between August 15 and October 1. The edible meat procured 
through the operation was to be sold on a "moderate basis to relief 
agencies," with the smaller pigs condemaed to tankage. To finance the 
program, the committee recommended a "high" processing tax on all hogs 
over 235 pounds, except sows. It was hoped, continued the report, that 
the project would remove two billion pounds of live weight pork from 
the market during the next twelve months. Although the committee 
members recognized the temporary character of the scheme, they emphasized 
that their program to meet the . "present emergency" would provide immedi-
^^Ibid.
^^C* C. Davis to George E. Peek: Memorandum on Call from Earl
C. Smith, July 27, 1933, National Archives, R. G. 1^5-
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ately "substantial and necessary cash" to the farmers. The report con­
cluded with a promise to develop e long-term com-hog control plan by 
October 1.^^
lAiile the Administration worked out the details of the Emer­
gency Hog Marketing Program in the two weeks after July 27 evidence 
that the hog situation was worsening came to the attention of tne Depart­
ment of Agriculture. J. H. Bennett, manager of the Dakota Pig and 
Cattle Company, wired R. G. Tugwell: "Due to drought pigs can be
destroyed at minimum expense and therefore curtail pork production 
materially. Will appreciate your influence in having production group 
request me coming to Washington for explanation. Have wired Adminis­
trators Black and Davis.Although Bennett was given no encourage­
ment, he later wrote Secretary Wallace presenting his ideas and adding
that he was trying to get a petition carrying his plan through the South
59Dakota legislature. While there is no indication that Bennett had 
any influence on the development of the emergency hog program, his sug­
gestion of a similar scheme at the same time is interesting and indica­
tive of the bad conditions in the Dakota area. Administration officials
57"The Report and Recommendations of the national Com and Bog 
Committee," Probably prepared on July 27, 1933f National Archives,
R. G. 1^ 5.
58There is no evidence that Bennett had any knowledge of the 
Chicago discussion as all plans were kept secret. BLs plan to destroy 
pigs is apparently emother one of those interesting little coincidences 
which sometimes occur. In a later letter Bennett proposed using the 
product for "tankage or relief" which had also been discussed at 
Chicago; Bennett to Tugwell, July 28, 1933, National Archives, R. G.
145.
59Bennett to Wallace, August 1, 1933, National Archives,
R. G. 145.
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later useà the drought situation as a further justification for their 
emergency program.
Requests for federal aid increased after the first of August.
ÜQ August S, a wire from Catarina, Texas asked for immediate help:
"Please tiy hard to devise some emergency plan effective immediately 
to assist the southern hog grower who must market many hogs next thirty 
to forty days account shortage of feed and early maturity our feed 
crops this s e c t i o n . T h e  next day the agricultural agent of the 
Missouri Pacific Lines in Houston warned that it was "imperative 
southern hog raisers have quick action if proposed relief measures are 
of benefit to him this yeser. On the twelfth a still imjre desperate 
appeal cams from South Dakota. Charles E. J. Mitchell urged "all 
possible speed" in relief for hog producers: "Thousands of farmers in
South Ifekota who are unable to feed young pigs. How selling them for 
twenty to thirty cents a head . . . time element exceeding /sicj impera-
62
tive as no feed is available to carry these pigs."
Meanwhile, the Administration prepared for the emergency pro­
gram. Administrator Peek, on August 2, informed interested organiza­
tions that a "preliminary infozmal conference" would be held in 
Washington on the 10th to complete development of an "esmrgency hog 
program." On August 5, the Administration began contacting relief
60
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agencies about the disposal of the meat procured, under the emergency 
program. In confidential letters the agencies -were asked hov much 
additional pork could be used if it uere made available at 35 per cent 
below the regular price. The Department emphasized that the pork was
"not to be substituted for other meats," but added to normal consump-
64
tion. The AAA officials had obviously decided to accept the recommen­
dations of the National Com-Bog Committee for an emergency program.
When the interested groups gathered in Washington on August 10, 
Administrator Black presented the case for an emergency hog program.
"In view of the present hog situation," he said, it was necessary to 
give first consideration to "raising the price of hogs" and then to how 
the emergency program could be tied to a more permanent com-hog pro­
gram. Black pointed out that hog supplies had increased rapidly during 
the summer and that swine prices had not risen with those of other 
commodities. Indeed, "hog prices are further from parity than they 
were a few weeks ago, " he added. In addition, the feed situation was 
"the worst, perhaps, that the country has experienced for 50 years."
The Administration, therefore, was prepared to go along with emergency
65
measures to aid hog producers.
Earl C. Smith submitted the program which had been developed 
by the National Committee. Details of the purchase of pigs and the 
bonus on sows remained essentiaily the same as in the July 27 recommen-
64Claude R. Wickard to Wayne Coy, August 5# 1933, Night Letter, 
National Archives, R. G. 145•
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d a t i o n s . All of the representatives promised the full support of
their organizations for the emergency project.Even Milo Beno,
President of the National Farmers Holiday Association, proffered his
grudging cooperation:
As far as I am concerned, I do not understand vhy it is neces­
sary, at this time, when there are over 130,000, (XX) people in 
this country, to destroy the young sows. I think you are not 
going to solve the problem by the solution you are trying to 
give. I resent the idea of a group of supermen coming here 
and trying to show what price the farmers should get for their 
products. I think the farmers should give their views so the 
Administration can determine as to the price to be charged for 
their hogs, etc......... We are willing to cooperate with any­
thing that is adopted that will be beneficial for the farmers.^
Reno obviously resented the role of AAA representatives in drawing up
the program, and he later withdrew his halfhearted support. At the
conference, however, unanimous approval was given to the Emergency Bog
69Ifexketing Program. Although the processors continued to express their 
opposition to the theory of reducing production, they agreed to cooper-
^^Ibid.
Organizations represented at the conference and approving 
the program included:
The American Faim Bureau Federation 
The National Grange
The Farmers' Educational and Cooperative Union of America
The Com Belt Meat Producers' federation
The Iowa Farm Bureau Federation
The National Livestock Marketing Association
The National Livestock Exchange
The Institute of American Meat Packers
The Central Cooperative Livestock Commission Association
The American Stockyards Association
The United States Livestock Association
^  "Proceedings of the iDaformal Conference on Eoergency Programs 
for Bogs, " Willard Hotel, Washington, August 10, 1933? National Ar­
chives, R, G. lk-5.
^^ Ibid.
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ate in the emergency project. The producer representatives and packers 
had reached a tentative agreement in Chicago in nsetings on July 2k and 
2 5. The packers recognized the objective of parity prices on hogs and 
agreed to "cooperate in reaching it." The processors further promised 
their cooperation in any necessary "re-adjustment in production" pro­
jects. In return, the producer group agreed to support a relaxation in 
the terms of the antitrust restrictions to enable the packers "to reduce
costs." The groups thus vere to continue their efforts to reach a
70
marketing agreement.
Although everyone connected with the development of the hog
project felt that some degree of secrecy was essential to its success,
indications of a pork removal program were common. The national
Committee made public its desire to remove $00 million pounds of pork
Eind pork products before the end of 1933 in a price raising effort. Qa
July 2 6, Earl C. Smith mentioned the piggy sow proposal, declaring that
it was better to pay a "bounty of $5 or some such figure" for sows
marketed now than to be forced to pay a bounty on all the hogs those
7Xsows would produce for the 193^ market. On August 3> it was reported 
in the Des Moines Register that the hog program "may take the form of 
providing bonuses for piggy sows in order to reduce sharply the supply 
of pigs." Thus, althou^ no official announcement was made on the 
emergency measure until August I8 , the general natuare of the project
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was known early In the month. J. S. Russell reported on August 9, how­
ever, "authoritative information coming from Washington" which gave
73most of the details of the pig purchase proposal. The Department of 
Agriculture also hinted during the first half of August at the possi­
bility of a hog program. There had been some concern in the last 
Chicago conference about speculators taking advantage of the purchase 
project. The Department evidently wished to block such activity as 
well as to prepare and give comfort to distressed farmers. With these 
objectives in mind and obviously in response to complaints from drought 
stricken farmers, a press release issued after the Washington conference 
announced; "Feinners who are obliged to reduce the size of their feeding 
herd because of short feed supplies would qualify under a pig purchase 
plan, if and when it is put into effect. Although the Department 
still refused to definitely commit the government to buy hogs, officials 
later said that they hoped this announcement would cause farmers to bold 
their hogs for the government. The hints seemed to elude many farmers 
who continued to sell at very low prices, but they were very useful to 
some of the sharper country buyers.
Even though purchases had not been officially announced, a 
reporter for the Des Moines Register declared on August 11 that they 
were assured, lacking "only the formal approval of President Roosevelt. 
The Register was so certain of the buying program that interested lowans
73J, S. Russell, "Premium Light Hog Prices Slated Hext Week: 
Surplus Out is Object of Buying Plan," ibid., August 9 , 1933, p. 1.
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75Des Moines Register, August 11, 1933, P* 1*
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were Interviewed for their reaction to the idea. Opinions expressed 
indicated some of the more common attitudes evidenced during and after 
the purchases. Miss Daisy Williams, Secretaiy of the Iowa Pam Bureau 
3bderation, felt that "even if fanners do not exactly like the plan of 
killing off pigs to reduce numbers and raise prices . . .  if the plan 
will help the hog price situation immediately, it should be given a 
trial." Joe Stack, Linn County farmer, voiced the attitude held by most 
producers who would participate in the program; "Aoything that will 
raise the price of hogs to farmers will be a great help. I don't care 
much how it is done." U. C. Blattle agreed and said that "if they do 
that, UQT pigs are sold right now. " John Callison, a fanner from Carroll 
County, called the plan sound and felt that it was "bound to result" in 
higher prices. "It looks like a long step," he added, "towards the 
farmers' salvation." Harry Duncan approved and was willing to let the 
government handle things: "It's 0, K. if the farmers cooperate. Five
million hogs out of the market should send hogs up and if it does there 
will be a shortage. We farmers can't tell irtaere it will end. The 
government should know what it's doing."
Wot everyone interviewed supported the move. All of the com­
mon objections were voiced. James McDonough denied there was any over­
production "when people go hungry." Ee «LLso believed that "higher wages 
will solve the farmers' problems as well as the working man's." Others 
felt the government should allow the hog problem to "work itself out 
naturally" and that the plan would penalize producers of heavy hogs. 
Ferry Chilcote expressed the traditional independent position of 
farmers. He opposed the idea because "this plan will stir up trouble.
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Fanners don't like supervision." Dell Van Note, a Linn County farmer, 
raised a humanitarian objection. "It is wasteful," he said, "and waste 
never pays. " Van Note fuirther stated that "to slaughter piggy sows 
isn’t according to natural laws." Although there was opposition, 
the basic attitude was that of approval. The support, however, was not 
based on agreement with the control of production thesis, but on the 
farmers’ need for money and higher prices.
IJot until a week after his fellow lowans had considered the 
purchase project assured did Secretary Wallace officially announce the 
government plan. Speaking in Chicago on the l8th, Wallace described 
without any equivocation the Saergency Hog tferketing Program. A plan, 
he insisted, "which arose from the grass roots, and ^ lich is backed by 
most of the leading farmers of the com belt.'” Because "hog prices 
today are relatively lower than almost any other farm product, " he 
added, "I am willing to give the scheme a trial." The project, Wallace 
continued;
is to buy from farmers enough pigs or light hogs and enough 
sows due to farrow this fall to remove from fall and winter 
supplies between 600,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 and 700,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 pounds of hogs, 
live weight. The total reduction in tonnage for the 1933-3^ 
marketing season, as a result of this emergency program, may 
amount to 1,600,000,000 pounds. The total is about l6 per cent 
of the hog tonnage normally marketed. If past experience is a 
guide, a reduction of 1$ or l6 per cent in market supplies 
should increase hog prices for the season from 2$ to 3 0 per 
cent.77
The Secretary explained that purchases would be handled through proces­
sors who would pay cash to the farmer and bill the costs to the Depart-
^^ Ibid., h.
'^Wallaces* Farmer, LVIII (August 19, 1933), 1.
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ment of Agriculture. Wallace also emphasized the need for speed in
executing the program:
The necessity for haste vill he understood by the com belt.
We must make the purchases before more veight is added to 
spring pigs, and before farroving begins. In regions vhere 
drouth has left a feed shortage, and where farmers are 
compelled to market unfinished stuff at a sacrifice, we can 
perhaps offer some help. But above all is the necessity for 
speed in bolstering the purchasing power of the com belt .7®
Getting money into the pockets of the Com Belt farmers had been the 
most vital concern of the producer committee and AAA planners through­
out the development of the emergency program. Extremely low hog prices 
lent an even greater degree of urgency. Secretary Wallace indicated 
that the purchase program would benefit the farmers’ income in two 
ways. The purchase price would be above the prevailing market value 
of the hogs and, because of the reduction in supply, higher prices 
would "likeiy be paid over the following nine months.
Wallace expressed only one worry about the emergency project.
Be feared that the Com Belt might fail "to recognize how really danger­
ous this program can be unless it is tied up closely to a long-time pro­
gram." Without the understanding that this measure would be followed 
by a permanent com-hog control program, Wallace insisted, he could not 
approve the buying of hogs. For, he felt that unless the emergency 
purchases were followed by a real reduction in com and hog production 
in 193 ;^ they would only worsen the economic condition of the hog pro­
ducers. Without that reduction. Secretary Wallace maintained, "the
^^Ibid.
79lbid.
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after-effects . . . -vrould be disastrous to bog prices during the 193 -^
3o
35 season and for some time thereafter."
®°Ibid.
CHAFfBR III
CKITICISM OF THE OPERATION OF THE EMERGENCY PROJECT
The Emergency Hog Marketing Program of 1933 was designed to 
accomplish two goals. By paying at least twice the market value for 
pigs and giving a bonus of on sows, the Administration hoped that 
the purchasing power of hog producers, especially in the Com Belt, 
would be materially increased. This short range objective could be 
classed as purely a relief measure. More in#ortant, however, was the 
long range aim of reducing hog tonnage for the 1933-3^ marketing season 
by 1,8 0 0,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 pounds. Although earlier estimates had been consider­
ably larger, the Department of Agriculture in August expected such a 
reduction to result in a 25 to 30 per cent increase in prices. Two 
minor objectives also developed from the emergency purchase plan. From 
the first discussion of the project, a vital concern had been the dis­
posal of the meat product outside of regular consumption channels. When 
the sale of surplus pork to Russia fell through, the idea of obtaining 
meat for the needy became firmly tied to the program. Finally, as the 
plains drought situation worsened in August and early September, in­
creasing emphasis was placed on giving succor to the parched regions.
Unfortunately, planners of the Emergency Hog Program spent far 
more time anticipating the results of the project than they did organ-
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izing the details of its operation. The purchase of young hogs, which 
rapidly became the most vital portion of the whole scheme, did not come 
under consideration until the third week of July. It gained the ap­
proval of the various interested processor and producer organizations 
on August 10. Eight days later it was officially announced to the 
country, and on August 23 purchases began. Although the bonus on sows 
had been under consideration somewhat longer, the full plan from incep­
tion to execution received less than a month's study, a rather brief 
period to develop the procedure for such a complicated operation.
Original plans for the purchase program were quite simple. 
Approximately four million young porkers weighing from 25 to 100 pounds 
were to be bought at from 6 to cents per pound. One million bred 
sows weighing a minimum of 275 pounds would also be purchased. The 
government offered to pay the regular market price without the normal 
pregnancy dockage plus an inducement bonus of $4 per head for the brood 
sows. Purchases were to be handled through designated processors who 
would pay cash for the hogs and bill the Department of Agriculture.
The packers would process the hogs in the normal manner with the excep­
tion that all pigs under 8l pounds were to be turned into tankage. 
Inspectors from the Bureau of Animal Industry were to check the sows to 
see that they met the "soon to farrow" ruling of the program and to 
oversee the purchasing and processing operations. The processors would 
hold the product derived from the program in storage and later dispose 
of it through relief agencies at the direction of the Department.^
~S?he Prairie Farmer, CV (August 19, 1933)# 4.
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The purchases vere to he financed by a processing tax levied
on hogs, vith the money paid for pigs and sovs declared as "benefit
payments." Through the tax processors vould thus pay for purchasing
and processing the hogs as veil as for the administrative costs of the
can^aign. Just before purchases began, AAA economists estimated that
the hogs vould cost $38,650,000 and the full program vould total
$53,959,70^. To provide this sum, the Department of Agriculture vanted
a processing tax on all hogs marketed in the 1933-3^ marketing season
2
of 55 cents a hundred pounds live veight.
The emergency hog measure vas beset vlth problems throughout 
the duration of the purchase campaign. One of the most criticized of 
all AAA programs, the hog purchase scheme and its operation vere at­
tacked by farmers, politicians, humanitarians, and consumers as veil 
as by professional Nev Deal critics. Attacks vere directed against 
the vhole concept of the program as veil as against its administration. 
During the course of the campaign, hovever, the chief issues raised vere 
those tied directly to the operation of the program. Some serious 
problems, most of them unanticipated, developed in the course of the 
purchases. Farmers became most aroused about the handling of pig 
purchases and the activity of professional buyers. îbr the Department 
of Agriculture, the most serious threat to the project centered in the 
unexpectedly great desire to sell pigs, the refusal to release the 
anticipated number of sovs, and the demand from drought regions for a 
continuation and expansion of the purchases. But controversies also
2
Estimation of Total Gosts of Emergency Program, August 17, 
1933, National Archives, S. 6. ll^ 5.
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developed over the stringent sov inspection system, the role of packers 
and commission firms in the project, the waste of food, the cutting off 
of a young pig's life before he had even tasted hard food, the throwing 
of pigs into the rivers, the use of sow meat for food, the attempt to 
thwart God and Nature, as well as a myriad of other largely uninçortant, 
if not senseless, points.
Hog purchases began at six processing points on August 23 and
3
trouble hit immediately. During the first three days of operation, 
these centers were flooded and then overwhelmed with hogs offered to 
the government. The day after purchases started E. R. Morgan wired 
Secretary Wallace, saying; "I am in Kansas Ciiy today with two cars 
of my own pigs and no bids on them at five thirty PM tonight. Under­
stand there are twenty thousand being carried over and another twenty 
thousand coming tomorrow. This is a perishable product. Please get 
us relief. Situation here at Kansas City surely demand your atten­
tion."^ "For days, " said Administrator Peek, "there was confusion, 
with little porkers grunting and crowding the streets of t W  stockyard 
towns," because, as he explained, "it was not foreseen that so many 
would arrive at once." After some reorganization, with an attendant 
though temporary halt in purchases so that processors could catch up 
on slaughtering, the pigs were able to make a more orderly entrance 
into "the happy rooting grounds.Furthermore, to relieve the crowded
3
The first six centers in operation were Chicago, Omaha,
Kiansas City, Sioux City, St. Joseph, and St. Paul.
k
Morgan to Wallace, August 2k, 1933» National Archives,
R. G. Ik5.
^George N. Peek, as told to Beverly Smith, "The Farmers on 
Your Payroll," American Magazine, CXVH (January 193k), 72.
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conditions at existing points a number of additional centers had been
established. August 25, 36 new centers were open and by September 7,
139 packing plants at 82 processing points were in operation.^ More
important, however, was the development of a system of orderly delivery.
Following general directions of the AAA, each market center worked out
a procedure for the sale of pigs. Generally, this meant that the
producer had to have written permission before he could sell his hogs.
Permit committees, made up largely of commission men and processors,
7
now limited the receipt of hogs to the capacity of processors.
Bog sales during the first three days presented the Adminis- 
tration with two other problems. The purchase of 1G7>020 pigs and only
Q
3 ,1 7 9 pregnant sows made it quite clear that the projected proportion 
of purchases was endangered. The tremendous desire to sell more pigs 
than the planners wanted and the refusal to sell sows haunted the agri­
culture planning officials throughout the duration of the purchase opera­
tion.
Before the end of August the pig shipment j^imit system ran 
into trouble. Messaiges began to pour into Washington con#laining of 
the difficulty, if not inçossibility, of getting shipping permits. 
Attempting to rectify the situation, AAA officials announced on 
September 1 that, beginning on the fifth, permits must be held on all 
pigs sent to market. Farmers could obtain permits through commission
^D, A. FitzGerald, Oom and Bogs, 21.
^D. A. FitzGerald, Livestock IBader the A A A  (Washington; The 
Brookings Institution, 1935)» 65-6 6.
Q
FitzGerald, Cora and Bogs, 30.
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firms or in some areas directly from the packers. Ko permits, it was 
emphasized, would be given to anyone other than the original owner. 
Further, permits would never be given for shipment of more than 200
9
head to any one person. By this time sources of the problem were 
obvious. One important factor was a much stronger desire to sell pigs 
than had been anticipated. This was especially true in the drought 
regions and pig offerings simply exceeded the established quota and 
usually the ability of processors to handle them. But the thing which 
most aroused the ire of farmers was what they considered an unfair 
allotment of permits. Many insisted that only professional hog buyers, 
or speculators to use the farmers' term, could obtain permission to 
sell hogs.
In reality what the farmers considered speculative activity 
began even before government purchases started. In early August feeding 
prospects were very poor in the drought areas and hogs were worth next 
to nothing. Quite normally, many professional risk-takers purchased 
thousands of small hogs at very low prices. The Des Moines Register 
reported on August l8 that country buyers were buying up pigs "in 
anticipation of collecting" premium prices from the government on them, 
and urged farmers to consider the emergency program before selling their 
pigs.^^ When the government started buying pigs, it bought many of 
these hogs giving the speculator an extremely good profit. Even when 
the buyers, as was frequently the case, were innocent of intentionally
^AAA Press Release, No. 521-5^0, National Archives, R. G. l6.
^^Des Moines Register, August l8, 1933  ^p. 17»
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cheating, farmers resented the diversion of government money from its
rightful place. To some, it seemed "as if buyers knew of it ^purchase
progra^ before the farmers did. They bought up these pigs and sold
them for a big profit," insisted August Dahme, president of a i'armers
Holiday Association. Dahme added, "I believe this act was intended to
help the farmer and not make money for speculators." Itehme concluded
that his group protested "most vigorously against the profiteering of
buyers and speculators," especially when they were enriched on pigs
11
bought by the government presumably from farmers.
Although some buyers were quite innocent of intentional wrong­
doing, it should be remembered that most of these purchasers were far 
better informed than the average farmer. They could deduce from the 
meetings of the Oom-Hog Committee and hints from the Department of 
Agriculture that sons type of purchase program was under consideration. 
It was only natural that some would take advantage of the possibilities. 
Too, others with a genuine intent to defraud began to take advantage of 
the less perceptive farmers after the official announcement. Early in 
the campaign the Dakota Free Press in Aberdeen, South Dakota wired 
Wallace about this activity, saying:
Parmers. in this vicinity are being cheated out of their hog 
bonus by buyers. Fleane take immediate steps to reimburse and 
protect them. These buyers bought immediately after the bonus 
was announced. Before word reached the fanners. Loss to 
farmers amounts to hundreds of dollars.
'^’^ D^ahme to Henry A. Wallace, August 26, 1933 > National 
Archives, R. G. l4$.
12Dakota Free Press to Wallace, August 2k, 1933, National
Archives, R. G. 14$
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Some of the speculators, through cooperation with the commission firms 
and permit committees, were able to cheat the government and farmers 
out of considerable sums.
Some farmers believed it was the duty of the government to 
compensate the farmer for his lost opportunity. A hog producer from 
South Dakota asked Secretary Wallace to pay "a premium" on pigs he had 
sold during the first week of August. lack of "crops and no feed" had 
forced him to sell the pigs at two cents a pound. The speculator had 
then held the pigs until the government started buying when he sold 
them at a handsome profit. The farmer insisted that "this Bonus is due 
to the farmer's and not the byers ^ic/ you give Bonus on pigs to
13farmers give to all and not a few will you?" A large group of South
Dakota farmers wired the Secretary reporting that they had sold their
ll).
hogs to speculators and needed help in getting the benefit payments.
A. B, Bishman of Minnesota was even more expressive. He had sold his
31 hogs before government purchases began and had received only $210
for the lot. Bishman demanded:
How are we to pay interest, taxes and live? If you are paying 
a bonus start your payments as of July 1-33 and give us poor 
devils a break. I would readily agree to cut my production of 
hogs 50^ in fact we have already done that. Think it over.^5
Other producers, with even less justification, wanted the 
13
Rienhold Laske to Wallace, August 28, 1933  ^National 
Archives, P.. G. l4$.
Ik
John Madden and others to Wallace, August 23, 1933, National 
Archives, R. G. l4$.
^^Bishman to Wallace, August l4, 1933, National Archives,
R. G. 1^ 5.
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government to compensate them for their loss. W. R, Shortridge of 
Flasher, North Dakota wrote his congressman about his sons' loss of 25 
pigs which died in transit to market. The pigs, Shortridge reported, 
"were weighed and processed at once same as if alive only the men did 
not have to hit them on the head. The Government lost nothing by their 
premature death, " he insisted, for "they were removed from visible sup­
ply and from competition same as if they had arrived in good condition." 
The government was responsible for the loss, Shortridge maintained, 
because "had not the Government offered to buy them they would be at 
home today good as ever." He then asked his congressman to "please 
write to Secretary Wallace and ask him to pay ray son for these pigs?
He has a very poor crop and prices are so he has had a hard time to 
get along on the farm. A farmer from South Dakota also asked the 
government to pay him for hogs he had intended to sell under the 
program. Before he could offer his "70 pigs and 13 brood sows" to the 
government, he had to kill and bum them because of cholera. He
promised to furnish proof of his loss if the Department of Agriculture
17would consider paying for the destmyed hogs.
A farmer from Missouri wanted "to know if your hog program is 
for the hog raiser or the speculator?" The Missourian maintained that
^^Shortridge to H, J. Sinclair, September 11, 1933, National 
Archives, R. G. 1^5• Shortridge also suggested a solution to the farm 
problem; 'Vhy not Blue Eagle the farmer and have b-tm get and pay 
twenty four dollars for a forty hour week of work. That would greatly 
reduce production as the big fellow would be hard pressed to make it 
pay. As it is so far the farmer is bitten by the eagle, stung, by pay­
ing much more and still sells for less."
17Manly Owen to Wallace, September 12, 1933, National Archives,
R. G. 145.
70
the government was responsible for his loss because "the lack of proper 
publicity was no fault of mine." In recounting his loss, J. H. Boland 
wrote;
We do not take a daily. Only the Weekly Star which comes on 
Wednesday. We did not know that you were going to have a hog 
program worked out before Oct 1. We had 8l pigs that we had to 
sell or feed. . . .  a trader of Luton, Mo. came early Wed. 
mom, Aug 23 and offered 3 ^  but finally gave 4^ for them. He 
said he was taking them to his farm at Luton. Instead, he sent 
them as government hogs to Fowler Packing Company at Kansas 
City. We had payment on them stopped, but upon the urging of 
the County Agent Virgil Burke, gave up for an additional 
That is supposed to have left them $105 profit from the deal.
Thus, it soon became evident that the suggestions that the
government might buy hogs had been of more value to the professional
traders than to the farmers. This, with a lack of understanding on the
part of some farmers about the price schedule, aroused considerable
anger among the more impatient producers. William L. Butler of Albany,
Missouri accused the government of stealing his 30 pigs when he did
not receive as much for them as he had expected. Be concluded: "If
thats the way the government is going to help the farmer let the farmer
19help himself and leave the government out of it." This sentiment was
best expressed perhaps by August Itehme who insisted that "the new deal
20
of our government does not work for us farmers."
Bitterness over the activity of the speculators increased
■| Q
Boland to Wallace, August, no date, 1933, National Archives,
B. G. 145.
19Butler to Wallace, August 28, 1933, National Archives,
R. G. 145.
20
Dahme to Wallace, August 26, 1933, National Archives,
R. G. 145.
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tremendously after the initiation of the pig permit system. A County 
Club Agent from Ohio, lyman F. Baker, warned that "considerable senti­
ment against the hog administration" was being created by the activity 
of the speculators. Although farmers could not secure any shipping 
permits, "local stock dealers" were able to sell "all the pigs they
PI
wanted." The postmaster from Fulton, South Dakota reported that 
"your program for buying up the surplus pigs in this country has been 
a decided flop, insofar as the individual farmer is concerned." "The 
local hog de Ellers, " he continued, "have usurped the market to such an 
extent that farmers . . . have been unable to meirket their pigs. " 
Although the local packing house claimed that it could handle no more 
pigs, he added, "the local hog buyer . . .  is running an add /sic/ in 
the Mitchell Daily, saying that he can handle from 1000 to 1500 pigs 
per day, under the 'government pig deal' until further notice." The 
postmaster, in his own expressive language, concluded: "How then
there must be a nigger in the woodpile somewhere, if he can dispose of 
these pigs end the mein who raised them, cannot. On these pigs he is 
taking a toll of $1.00 per hundred below the Chicago market, making a 
clean up of $1.00 per hundred that should go to the man who raised
Op
these pigs." On August 27 J. S. Russell stated that "some of the 
Iowa packers already have started to bar purchases from speculators."
Be added that reports from northwestern Iowa revealed "that speculators
21Baker to A. G. Black, September l4, 1933  ^National Archives,
R. G. 14$.
22
Leon ¥. Kreidler to Wallace, September 2, 1933, National
Archives, R. G. l4$.
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have bought as many as 500 to 1 ,5 0 0 pigs each from fanners in lova and
South Mcota."^^ By the middle of September constituents were asking
their federal representatives to apply pressure on the Department of
Agriculture. After one of his voters complained to Senator T. P. Gore
of Oklahoma that he could not secure a permit and that speculators were
buying pigs at $1 each and selling them to the government for $2 .2 5 to
$6 each, the Senator vehemently protested to 1: xUace. There were
grounds to "debate this whole policy of murdering pigs," stated Gore:
but certainly if the Government is going to buy up these hogs 
and the taxpayers ere going to pay twice what they are worth, 
the farmer who owns the pigs ought to get the benefits of the 
bounty or subsidy and not the speculators.
You will pardon my language if I seem rather earnest and I feel 
that I ought to add that I do not think that the butchery of 
these pigs is as bad as the slaying of Rachel’s children by 
Herod of Old.^^
Neither Wallace nor anyone connected with the slaughter program could 
be expected to appreciate Gore’s humor.
The peimit system for shipping pigs had wrought order out of 
chaos, but it had also brought new and perhaps more serious problems.
The supplementary permit regulations announced on September 1 did not 
end the complaints about unfair allotment of shipping permits. Instead, 
angry reports, especially from South Dakota and Oklahoma, continued to 
overflow the mailbags of the Department of Agriculture. Individual 
farmers or farm cooperative groups found the quotas full and no permits
J. S. Russell., "Further Hog Buying Changes are Considered," 
Des Ifoines Register, August 27, 1933  ^P- 2.
PIl
Gore to Wallace, September l4, 1933, National Archives,
R. G. 145.
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available, but professional traders and buyers could apparently obtain 
permits at will to sell any number of pigs.
During the first three weeks of the purchase campaign, all 
complaints about speculator activity were answered with a form letter. 
Farmers were told that the Com-Hog Committee of Twenty-five had recom­
mended the program, and the Itepartment had announced on August 1 that 
a purchase program was under consideration. Famers had been advised
on several occasions during the first half of August to hold their hogs.
25Therefore, nothing could be done to rectify the situation. l*Jhen
speculator activity continued in spite of the order that only "original
owners" be given shipping permits, the government was forced to take
more positive action.
On September l6 Director A. G. Black issued additional permit
directives. "It has come to our attention," he said, "that in many
cases preference is being shown to buyers and speculators. . . . May
I urge you to give special consideration to original owners" in the
future, he concluded.At the same time a study was made by the Legeil
Division which concluded that there was nothing in the contracts made
with, or early instructions to, the packers requiring them to purchase
27
only from original owners holding permits. Perhaps this prevented 
the AAA from taking a stronger position on the handling of permits and
25
Claude R. Wickard to John Madden and Others, August 31,
1933, Rational Archives, R. G. 145.
^^Blaok to John Agar, September l6, 1933> Rational Archives,
R. G. 1 4 5.
27
Rathan Witt to James Frank, September I8, 1933, Rational
Archives, R. G. 145-
7^the activity of the speculators. For, the activity continued and vith 
the approaching end of government buying the ire of farmers intensified.
An Oklahoma farmer "wired Secretary Wallace on September 20 
that farmers "were "protesting rotten deal in pig buying." The "Oklahoma 
City stock yards traders, " he insisted, "vrere "getting seventy-five per­
cent of permits," "while "farmers no chance to sell, please give this
28your attention, unable to get permit since start, hundreds liket-ri.se."
Ch September 21 Black replied; "All pigs purchased for government at
Oklahoma City Monday and Tuesday "will be from actual producers "who have
not previously sold pigs not more than "twenty from indi"vlduals on these
29days permits to be issued thro"ugh county farm agents." Such orders
came late and a definite ill "will lingered in Oklahoma. Four days later
Ralph Magill of Custer City, Oklahoma, wrote Wallace "to try to find
out" why farmers could not get shipping permits. He complained:
I called the county agent at Arapaho the County Seat on August 
2 9, and he advised me to "wri"be to a commission company at 
Oklahoma Oi"ky and ask for a permit, and I did that the same 
day. I have been trying ever since. I ceOled the county agent 
last Friday, Sept. 22, and listed my pigs with him; he said he 
had 3500 head listed and could only get permits for 200 head, 
and while in his office a man from another part of the country 
told me he did not know of a single farmer getting a permit, but 
he knew of one speculator who had bought from farmers and got 
permits and shipped 1000 head; another man told me he had a 
friend in Oklahoma City who had bought pigs from farmers and 
sold them to the Qcvemment and cleared $24,000. What we want 
to do is find out if this is farm relief or speculator relief.
One speculator of Custer City sold 100 head one day last "week,
25 in his name, 25 in his wife's name, 25 in his son's name and
28W. H. Catterall to Wallace, September 20, 1933  ^National 
Archives, R. G. 1^5.
29
Black "to W, Hr Catterall, September 21, 1933, National
Archives, R. G. 14-5.
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3025 in his brother-in-law’s name.
At least two farmers reported that speculators bought their 
hogs while representing themselves as government agents. B. L. 
Carpenter of Arkansas sold seven pigs and received only $2.10 in pay­
ment. This meant that ha bad been paid less than one cent per pound 
instead of the expected 8^ cents. Carpenter protested that he could 
not "think that this is part of the ’new dead, ' and that you will
on
sanction such treatment by your appointed representatives." To a
similar protest. Black replied that the program had "no provision for
such instances," but he hoped action already taken by the AAA would
32
prevent any repetition. One of the most flagrant violations of at
least the spirit of the emergency program was reported by L. W. Burton
of Joplin, Missouri. Burton asked:
Would it be a violation to have shipped pigs to the Government 
for process purpose, putting on names of people that do not 
exist, having the Government to OrK. same and checks returned 
by proper authorities to these factitous names, same
being sent back through the malls for collection after the 
Government had acquired the names and post office address.
I handled the case, and the party represented that the pigs 
were direct from the owners and the Government required me to 
furnish names and addresses of these owners, which in some cases 
the owners did not exist. The man that I did business with 
forged owners names and allso forged endorsements on
checks to get the money.33
^^Magill to Wallace, September 25, 1933> National Archives,
B. G. 145.
31Carpenter to Wallace, October 9, 1933  ^National Archives,
B. G. 145.
32
Black to James Ingalls, September 13, 1933, National 
Archives, B. G. 145.
33Burton to Com and Bogs Section Production Division,
October l6, 1933, National Archives, B. G. l45.
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Apparently Burton had been frightened by federal investigators checking 
just such activity as he reported. The tragedy of the purchase program 
i-ms the betrayal of the spirit of the relief measure.
D. P. Trent, Director of Extension Service at Stillwater, 
Oklahoma, later attacked the whole permit-guota system. He was very 
critical of turning the permit system over to the American Institute 
of Meat Packers. According to Trent commission firms in Oklahoma City 
spl.it the quota on the percentage each handled in 1932. Each firm then 
took care of its best customers and contended that that •m.e what they 
should do. He also believed, without definite proof, that the commis­
sion firms sent truckers into the country to buy up hogs and then split 
the profits with the truckers. Trent further reported that one man 
from eastern Oklahoma had sold over 9,000 pigs in Kansas City, St.
Louis and Chicago, which he had purchased for as little as 50 cents 
each.J
In expressing a not unique reaction to the handling of the pig
purchase campaign, T. M. Kirk directed his bitter resentment at both
the purchase program and Secretary Wallace and promised political
retaliation. He wrote to Senator Elmer Thomas of Oklahoma:
This Pig Deal is benefitting the traders. Com. Houses, and 
packers. Maybe they need and are as much entitled to Govern­
ment Aid as the famars are but I be d- - - if they should 
get it and charge it to the Earmers.
But what else could you expect of a man in Sec. Wallace's 
position. He run a paper for a living and will continue to 
do so when Pres. Eosevelt ^ic/ passed out the door that 
Hoover took and Wallace knows that the Packers and Com Men
3^4-Trent to C. W. Warbuton, October 5, 1933, National Archives,
R. G. 145.
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advertise with their friends. He is looking after his own 
future, and I dont blame Him. ^  was not elected by the people. 
I blame the President who appointed and is keeping him in 
office and the Cîongress who gave him the authority and money 
to pull such deals.
And Sen. don't you think for a minute that this stuff is fool­
ing very many of the farmers. We know that Wallace is not the 
farmers friend.
In fact Senator, the Pig Iteal makes the Infamous Tea Pot Dome 
Oil deal smell like a bed of roses. Even Pres. Eosevelt's 
great popularity is not going to stand many such jolts, and 
believe me the Congressn®n who continues to support Wallace 
will have some tall explaining to do when he faces the farmers 
at the next election.
Extent of the speculator activity has never been determined. 
Impatient and complaining fexmers quite probably exaggerated. Paul H. 
Appleby, assistant to the Secretary of Agriculture, admitted that "to 
an extent" speculator activity "seemed to defeat the purpose of the 
emergency hog marketing program in that it was planned to give the pro­
ducer a reasonable price for his animals in return for his cooperation 
in the plan." If the report of Mrs. Guy Bensoof, secretary of an 
investigating committee for Grant County, South Dakota, was accurate 
and can be taken as typical, farmers lost a considerable part of their 
rightful bounty to the speculator. Mrs. Bensoof reported that she had
one hundred verifiable affidavits on file which totaled a loss to Grant
37County farmers approximating $15,000. By the third week of September 
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government investigators were in the field checking on the complaints
of f a r m e r s . A  few were actually prosecuted for their profit making.
This most difficult procedural problem could have been prevented with
only a little care.
In the July 25 meeting of the Com-Hog Committee the need to
prevent speculators taking advanteige of the purchases had been dis- 
kOcussed. When purchases began, however, there was no apparent attempt 
to make sure that the original o'wners alone benefited from the program. 
When the permit system was developed, though reports of speculator 
activity were already arriving, no attempt was made to control the 
giving of peimits. The only concern was regulating the flow to market. 
Not until September 1 did Department officials make any effort to 
prevent or control the granting of shipping permits and that proved 
ineffectual. Although most permit committees endeavored to fulfill 
their duties honestly, some were blatantly unfair in their allotments. 
It was the middle of September before Com-Hog Section officials made 
a determined effort to ensure that only original owners profited from 
the program.
Although the activity of speculators was a delicate and embar-
OQ
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rassing problem, it was not as serious a challenge to the success of 
the whole emergency program as the refusal of farmers to sell their 
bred sows. the veiy start it was obvious that producers were
hesitant about disposing of this class of hogs. On the first day of 
buying 29,500 pigs and only 800 sows were purchased.On the second 
day, the proportion of pigs to sows was even greater, 95,000 to 1,5 0 0. 
Evidently, officials were puzzled by these results, as "no one could 
suggest a reason for the farmers* delay in shipping in their piggy
k-2sows-."—  The major deterrent to the sow campaign was the comparatively 
low price offered. The small bonus and falling sow prices made the 
sow offer far less attractive than the price paid for pigs. Possibly 
a higher bonus on sows would have resulted in a more rewarding campaign. 
When A. G. Black first recommended the emergency sow bonus, he felt that 
"probably a payment of $10 per sow" would be "necessary to secure the 
marketing of a suificient number. During the July 25 meeting of the 
CJom-Hog Committee, a $5 bonus had been considered. By the meeting on 
August 10, however, the bonus had been set at $4, and the Administration 
consistently refused to increase the amount.
Other hindrances to a successful sow removal campaign existed. 
Complaints poured in about the "close inspection" given to the sows by
~^4tes Moines Register, August 2k, 1933, Section A, 9* 
k2Ibid., August 25, 1933, Section A, 10.
43
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prices.
44
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government inspectors. Farmers insisted that inspectors vere taming
down obviously piggy sows. During the early weeks of the purchases,
twice as many sows were offered to the government as were accepted for
the bonus, insisted C. E. Blomquist, manager of the hog department of
Martin, Blomquist and Lee Commission Company. "The Inspectors,"
Blomquist continued, "have been very particular and our firm . . .
daily receiving complaints on account of the close inspection of these
45
sows. All of them must show very close up. " When the inspectors
turned down sows for government purchase, the farmer was forced to sell
the sows to the packer at the regular market price or take them home
with little prospect of improved prices. Hot only did the price on sows
go down during the campaign but also the processors usually docked the
sows for being piggy. Famers who had this sales experience felt
"that they had been tricked into something and that their sows had been
practically stolen from them," said lyman F. Baker of Ohio. Word soon
spread and other farmers were afraid to sell their sows. Baker also
warned that "these kind of tactics, if permitted to continue on the
markets, will soon ruin any plan which the Agricultural Adjustment
47Administration may devise to help the farmer." '
Hog producers could be Just as harsh in their complaints about 
the handling of the sow program as about the pig permit system. One
45
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wrote Wallace that he had sold three sows in Cincinnati, but he had not
received the bonus. He continued:
What I want to know is why I am not intitled to my bonus of 4 
dollars apiece according to your agreement. Your buyer at 
Cincinnati must be doing crooked business or else you are 
gettin money under false pretenses and using the mail to defraud.
You know what would be the consequences if I done business with 
Uncle Sam on these terms. If you expect the farmers to cooperate 
with you you ought to at least cooperate with them.^
Farmers tried to cooperate trith the government, suggesting changes in
the program.
Some farmers blamed the poor response to the brood sow offer 
on the rather high weight minimum. Each tended to suggest the minimum 
be set at whatever level his sows weighed. L, J. Calkins of Missouri 
recommended that the program be changed "to pay a bonus on all piggy
l(.q
sows from-say 150 lbs up according to weight sane eis on pigs." Others 
suggested offering a higher premium to encourage marketing.
In response to the poor reception and to recommended changes, 
agricultural officials made an attenpt to increase the number of sows 
being sold. On September 2 the weight minimum was reduced to 24o 
pounds, but, in spite of continued requests, it was not lowered any 
further. Early in the campaign Chester Davis admitted consideration 
of a boost in the sow bonus "because farmers are not offering enough 
sows."^^ But the Administration decided against any increase in the
48Kenneth Thomas to Wallace, September I8 , 1933, Rational 
Archives, R. G. l4$.
49
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bonus, indicating that it would be unfair to those farmers who had 
already sold. Some pressure was also applied to the inspectors of 
the Bureau of Animal Industry to make them more lenient in approving 
piggy sows. Nevertheless, farmers continued to hold back their sows.
Secretary Wallace suggested that sows were not being sold 
because "farmers like to speculate on the future." Farmers, he said,
"have faith in this program" and are holding their sows for a rise in
5-3
hog prices. The refusal to sell brood sows, to a degree at least,
\Ta.B based on the idea that the pig purchase program would be repeated,
and farmers felt that they needed the raw materials on hand to be
ready to participate in the next purchase program. Clifford Gregory,
member of the Committee of Twenty-five, stated oh September 13 "that
not one farmer in 4o believed that the Administration would not embark
within a few months on another pig purchasing campaign." Farmers, he
added, were getting "ready for it by breeding an extra number of 
54
pigs. " Caie week later Gregory agreed with Black that the farmers
55had not cooperated with the Administration in the emergency program. 
There were other factors which also caused farmers to hold back their 
sows. Many producers probably hesitated to get rid of perhaps their
^^AAA Press Release, No. 521-5^0, National Archives, R. G. I6 .
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only brood sow. Moreover, not all farmers bred sows for fall farrowing 
and, thus, had none available for sale.
Although every possible facility was utilized to warn farmers 
that the program would not be repeated, the sow purchase campaign never 
got off the starting block. ïypical of the attempts to convince pro­
ducers that the purchase project would not be renetred was an editorial 
in Wallaces * Farmer, which stated:
Perhaps the silliest comment made on the emergency hog program 
is that of the stockyards man who said: "Farmers won't sell
their brood sows. They will keep them at home to raise more 
pigs to sell to the government at twice the market price."
Every one ought to have sense enough to know that this offer 
on pigs and brood sows won't be repeated. When the marketing 
period ends, October 1, the offer will never be made again.
It is an emergency program that will help now, but that wouldn't 
be of any use if there were the slightest chance that it would 
be repeated. It won't be. The rules on this emergency program 
were fixed so that nobody could beat the game. Nobody will have 
a chance to breed sows now and sell them as piggy sows before 
October 1. Nobody will be able to hold brood sows, let them 
farrow, and get pigs up to the 25-pound minimum by October 1.
There isn't time.
We hope that no farmer who needs the money from this bonus on 
pigs and piggy sows will cheat himself out of the premium ^  
trying to beat the game by some trick. It can't be done.5°
Such advice had little effect on the producers, however. Hot even warn­
ings from Secretary Wallace that the whole program was endangered had 
any apparent influence. Early in September the Secretary warned that 
his estimate of a hog price rise of 25 to 30 per cent could be realized 
only if the one million sows were sold. If the farmers held back, the 
benefits would be hardly one-half of the estimate. Producers who
^^"Hbg Offer Will Not be Made Again," editorial, Wallaces' 
Farmer, LVIII (September 2, 1$33), 5»
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refused to cooperate, he admonished, "are hurting themselves as well as 
57their neighbors."
The small receipt of brood sows enabled the AAA better to meet 
the drought problem. It became apparent quite early in the campaign 
that farmers wanted to sell many more pigs than had been anticipated. 
This desire could be partially laid to the good price being paid, but 
the basic reason \ras the drought and bad feed prospects. On the same 
day that the program was announced. Secretary Wallace received a tele­
gram suggesting that the drought areas be given special preference in 
the hog purchases. Because the drought-stricken farmers had "no com, 
no small grain ^ ^d theÿ^  pigs are starving," they deserved special con-
cO
sidération. Charles H. J. Mitchell of the Evening Huronite of Huron,
South Dakota, also asked that special attention be given to the drought-
stricken regions. Many farmers, he said, had already been forced to
sell their hogs, with "approximately 75^" of the smaller hogs in his
region already sold. Mitchell concluded that "it is rather tragic but
nevertheless true that farmers in this territory actually sold small
59pigs at .05^  a head." The Administration proved sympathetic to these 
appeals. W. R. Ronald, editor of the Evening Republican at Mitchell, 
South Dakota, reported that one day after he called Director Black to 
report the drought conditions in his district the local abattoir began
57
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purchasing pigs,^ *^  With pleas for additional purchases and continuation 
of the program pouring in from the drought areas, supplementary pig 
quotas were approved during the first vjeek of September. Additional 
allocations of pigs were made on September 6, 7, 8, 12, and 15, with 
"particular attention" being given to the drought r e g i o n s . O n  
September l6 the AAA announced that the number of pigs purchased by 
the government might reach 5*9 m i l l i o n . O n  the same day Black wired 
John Agar of the Agar Packing and Provision Company of Chicago that 
the "reason for extending pig quotas" was to help the farmers in. drought 
areas, and he urged that special attention be given such farmers.
The Department of Agriculture refused, however, to extend the 
time limit for purchases. Black wrote Marvin Jones, representative from 
Texas, that it would "be impossible . . .  to continue the emergency hog 
marketing program after September 29. In a reply to a request for 
continuation of buying from Governor Tom Berry of South Itekota, Wallace 
said that "after a survey of the drought areas, additional purchases may 
be arranged, purely as a matter of drought relief.Actually, one
60
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Texas packer did receive permission to process 4,000 pigs in the first 
Tfeek of October.Even without an extension of the purchase period, 
drought conditions and the holding back of sows led to the purchase of 
more than two million young hogs above the anticipated four million.
Another procedural issue which developed to worry the Adminis­
tration was the role of packers and commission firms in the emergency 
program. Because the processing industry was not too enthusiastic 
about the whole project, some concern existed from the very beginning 
as to.whether or not the processors would cooperate. During the early 
days of the cangaign, about the only problem with the packers was the 
demand of so many small companies to participate. Before long, how­
ever, complaints about commission charges, refusal of packers to co­
operate and excessive profits for the processors began to arrive.
C. A. Randall attacked the commission men for cheurging the same 
to handle a pig as a full grown hog.^ Replying for the Administration,
Claude R. Wickard said that commission charges came under the Packers
69
and Stockyards Act and the Department could not interfere. Others
demanded to know why the government pigs had to go through the hands of 
TOcommission men. To this, the Administration could only answer that
^^FitzGerald, Com and Hogs, 3 5.
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plans intended for the purchases to be handled in the nomal fashion.
Serious charges were throtm at the packers. Sone packers,
critics said, refused to cooperate with the purchase program, and others
were making too much money out of the project. Early in September J. F.
Porter, President of the Tennessee Farm Bureau, reported that the pack-
71ing house at Nashville was "holding out on the pig program." The
Oklahoma Farmer-Stockman insisted "the delay and uncertainty in buying
pigs at Oklahoma City and other southern markets" came from the lack of
cooperation of the packers. "No one is to blame but them," editor
Clarence Roberts added, for "they could have run at maximum capacity
every day from August 15 to October 1 if they had only made formal
request for the necessary allocation of pigs." Instead, from the very
first, Roberts continued;
. . . the packers at Oklahoma City seemed opposed to the plan.
Word first went out that pigs would not be bought at Oklahoma 
City. The order was changed. For the first few days all the 
pigs were bought that could be forced through the tanks. Then 
followed a policy of delay in announcement of quotas. Runs 
were cut down to 2,000 per day, much less than half of plant 
capacity.
When I arrived in Washington on September l4 and called to 
the attention of Dr. A, G. Black the situation at Oklahoma 
City he was surprised to leam that pigs were not being bought 
and handled at capacity. Be at once got busy and quotas were 
increased.
The way the deal worked out in the southwest, the man who tried 
to play fair and cooperate got the worst of it. . . .
Speculators who rushed to the country to buy up pigs before 
word of the plan got around to farmers skimmed the cream from 
the whole deal. It is alleged that some of the commission firms 
bought pigs direct or on order for themselves; also that they
^\»aul H. Appleby; Memorandum on J, F. Porter Call to Glen F. 
McHugh, National Archives, R. G. 1^5-
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gave preference to speculators in issuing permits to ship 
pigs.12
Some of the complaints of this nature were unjustified in that govern­
ment allocations were simply insufficient to meet the demand for permits. 
Some packers ; those at Oklahoma City for example, refused to give full 
cooperation to the program. Although AAA officials pressured some 
packers to work at full capacity and to give permits to farmers rather 
than country buyers, they expressed satisfaction with the cooperation 
of processors in the project. G. C. Shepard, Chief of the tfeat Process­
ing Section, reported an "unfavorable experience" with only one packer
73and that with the processing end of the program. Shepard also 
refuted the charge that packers were getting rich off the emergency 
purchases.
The packing industry, some critics claimed, "got most of the
ih
benefit" from the purchase program. G. C. Shepard, however, main­
tained that he did not see how the packers had "made any profit" from 
the processing of the government purchases. It was an advantage, he 
said, for both the government and packers that the project took place 
when regular processing activities were limited. The program, thus, 
kept the plants busy and allowed the packers to keep their laborers 
employed. But, as for packers profiting from the program, Shepard 
insisted: "I do not consider that any of the charges made in these
72
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contracts would permit of any profit other than an infinitesimal one 
being made. J. Holmes of Swift and Company also denied that the 
packing companies "got rich off the Emergency Program." Holmes sug­
gested that with the additional expenses and problems the packers 
probably lost m o n e y Sy defending the processors AAA officials were 
also defending their decision to handle the matter in this fashion. 
Undoubtedly, Administration desire for packer cooperation in future 
programs further influenced its attitude toimrd complaints about the 
packers.
Obviously most of the dissatisfaction about the operation of 
the government purchase project could have been avoided with only a 
little careful planning and a few modest changes. Instead, the Adminis­
tration was stampeded by the idea of urgency. Government planners 
seemed to consider the necessity of getting money to hog producers so 
important that the methods of doing so were of little consequence. 
Apparently AAA officials believed that if money were provided their 
task was achieved and the troublesome details would solve themselves.
As a consequence, speculators profited at the expense of farmers and 
to the detriment of the reputation of the AAA. Also, the long range 
goal of the program was not achieved. Lessons of the Emergency Bog 
Marketing Program proved very useful to the AAA leaders, and these 
rather expensive experiences were applied in planning similar projects 
which followed.
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CHAPTER IV
AEEA.GKS AGAIIÎST THE TrlAHTCSH WASTE OF FOOD; GOVERHMEMT 
SLAUGEEER OF LITTLE PIGS AMD PIGGY SOWS
Although criticism of the operation of the Emergency Hog 
Marketing Program vh s harsh at times, a more vociferous outcry came 
against the nature of the project. People ranging from humanitarians 
to the lunatic fringe assaulted the killing of helpless pigs, the 
slaughter of expectant mothers and the floating of dead pigs dovn the 
rivers. Some warned that the unnatural act would bring down the wrath 
of a vengeful God upon a sinful nation. The philosophy of controlling 
production to aid the farmer was attacked in protests against the waste 
of food, the attempt to achieve farm prosperity through starving the 
consumer into paying higher prices, and the killing of sows at a time 
when many farmers were without sows to produce pork. While Secretary 
Wallace expected difficulty, the furor created by the purchase program 
probably exceeded even his expectations.
Protests developed even before the official announcement of 
the slaughter project. On August 11 "an admirer" wrote President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt expressing his fear of the food reduction policy 
and warning of its possible consequences. Mature, suggested J. W. 
Bulger, served adequately to eliminate food. "Hunger and revolution,"
90
91
he warned, "are neighbors." With "hungry men . . .  a menace to our
great nation," Bulger objected to the government destruction of food.^
On the same day Prank Moher expressed his astonishment that the United
States vould ever consider following such a policy. "You cannot starve
people," Moher admonished Secretary WeJJace, "into paying higher prices
2
for food commodities if they do not have money to buy. " These early 
complaints were only an advance sample of what was to come.
Carl P. Fiedler, writing to Secretary of Interior Harold L. 
Ickes, introduced the more extreme type of criticism. "Any one serious­
ly advocating such a scheme," Fiedler suggested, "should in the critics 
humble opinion be examined pronto for 'bats in the belfry’ and sentenced
3
to slow starvation. "
After Secretary Wallace announced the purchase program on 
August 18, opposition to the scheme became even more intense. The 
great com-hog growing state of Iowa, home of both Wallace and Com-Hog 
Section leader A. G. Black, developed as a center of protest. Two 
critical lowans claimed to represent the consensus of opinion in that 
state. "General opinion of the people of Iowa," John R. Young told 
President Roosevelt, "is that the man who conceived the idea of 
slaughtering our unbom pigs should be put into the insane asylum and 
that the man who puts that idea into effect is a criminal who should
^Bulger to Roosevelt, August 11, 1933> National Archives,
R. G. 1^ 5.
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be put in the penitentiary for the rest of his life. The basis of 
the Young protest was his fear that the hog reduction would hurt the 
com market, and he was raising a "big crop of com. " Congressman 
Edward C. Eicher of Iowa also objected to the emergency purchase. The 
"concensus /^iç/ of opinion" about the project, Eicher informed A. 6. 
Black, is that the purchase plan 'Sidll not bring results, and that it 
will prove to be another expensive experiment. Although their claim 
to represent the consensus of opinion was based largely on fertile 
imaginations, it cannot be denied that Young and Eicher spoke for a 
large segment of the population. Protests of this type contained more 
validity than fear of divine retaliation. These critics, many of them 
without realizing it, ■vrere simply refuting the theory of reducing out­
put to raise farm prices. Whether the protest was couched in the 
humanitarian terms of wasting food while thousands were hungry or in 
the more selfish considerations of destroying the com market or raising 
consumer prices, the central issue was that of control over production.
A clear expression of opposition to the control theory came 
from Clarence Darrow, who objected; "Kill little pigs and throw them 
out on the prairies to decay while millions are hungry." Hiowledge of 
political economy revealed, Ikirrow insisted, "that sceircity is undesir­
able; that paying farmers not to work, to cut crops, to boost prices is
nonsense." The question of production had been solved, Darrow continued: 
-
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"We can make everyone rich if some are not too greedy. We must leam
to get a fairer distribution of "wealth. We don't "want less. We want
more. The problem is not overproduction. . . .
The most bitter tirades against the purchase plan came over
the "ifanton squandering of food and the expected increase of prices.
Erom Indiana came a most telling appeal to President Roosevelt. After
asking the President for "one minute of your time which is so valuable
to us^" C. G. Ganett continued:
I am coming to you pleading for the tiny pigs that are about 
to be destroyed "wi.thout tasting but little if any hard food, 
while thousands of people in this section hardly know what 
pork taste ^ic/ like.
There are thousands of homes that are cooking green vegetables 
"Without the seasoning of grease or meat.
It is surprising to know how many small farmers, in the small 
farm sections of the country that have not a single pig to be 
fed for met /^ic/ this year and no funds to buy with.
How the pigs would help us if we could only get them to feed 
and kill, if only two thirds of the people who are without meat 
could get ^icj this winter and the coming summer there would 
be but little surplus. Never before have I "written a line to 
the President of our country or even had the slightest idea 
that he would take the tine to consider a few lines from one 
who had only pledged a single vote, but in this case I am only 
asking our leader to consider sparing the flesh and food that 
nature has given us.
Ganett denied that there was a true surplus. "The over surplus," he
insisted, "has been brought about by the people being unable to buy
Y
what they need." With a family of seven and no money to buy livestock 
for his l44 mortgaged acres, Ganett hinted at something which others
6New York Times, July 15, 1934, p. 5.
R. G. 145.
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openly advocated. If the government intended to hiiy millions of hogs, 
many felt the hogs should be distributed to those farmers who had none 
of their own.
D. P. Trent insisted that a distribution of live hogs to needy 
farmers would be no more expensive than the slaughter project. "I 
cannot quite become enthusiastic," Trent stated, "over the slaughtering 
of thousands of brood sows and gilts in this state "when there are so 
many farm families which have no hogs whatever, and which do without 
meat most of the year. ..." "Fundamentally," he continued, "there 
is not a surplus of hogs on the farms of Oklahoma as long as the chil­
dren in 50,000 or 6 0 ,000 farm homes of the state are hungry for meat
g
most of the year." F. C. Jordan of the Farmer's Educational and Co­
operative Union of America requested that some of the pigs be turned 
over to his Comville, Arizona, local of the Union rather than being 
slaughtered.^ The President of the American Association for China 
Famine and Flood Relief suggested that the young pigs be allowed "to 
grow up" and then used as food for Ch in a. Mo st critics, however, 
simply objected to the wastefulness of the program.
A Frankfort, Indiana, resident wired President Roosevelt his 
objection to the tankage of "ninety percent of the pigs." "We protest," 
Claude E. Thompson said, "this action as being unamerican in principle
o
Trent to Hsnry A. Wallace, August 23, 1933, national 
Archives, R. G. 1^5.
^Jordan to Henry A. Wallace, September 6, 1933, National 
Archives, R. G. 1^5.
^^Wirt W. Hal lam to George H. Peek, September 12, 1933,
National Archives, R. G. 1^5.
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in view of the fact that we have thousands upon thousands of under­
nourished men woiæn and children in this country today who are unable 
to procure even a bite of meat." After urging distribution "of every 
pig fit" for food to the hungry, Thompson continued, "there are enough 
of the latter in this country to consume every pound of this meat with­
out interfering with the regular meat business." This action, he 
insisted, would accomplish the goal of the Itepartment and, at the same 
time, would "raise the physical and mental condition of the unemployed 
and rally the country as a whole to support the basic principles upon 
which this great nation of ours was founded. As reports of the waste 
of hogs grew and were exaggerated, demands increased to use the meat for 
relief purposes. "More than fifty-six thousand small pigs are being 
destroyed and wasted in Cleveland this month, " Mayor Bay T. Miller "VTired 
Wallace on September 2. "This meat," Miller continued, "totalling nearly
three million pounds should be used to feed Cleveland’s thousands of 
12hungry families. " The squandering of food was also attacked by the 
Secretary-Manager of the Kansas Retail Grocers Association, who pro­
tested: "Public opinion does not seem to be in favor of such activi­
ties . . . in as much as there are some six thousand families in this
city ^ Icansas City/ out of work, they cannot conceive the idea of de-
13stroying food products."
"^ "^ T^rent to Hanry A. Wallace, August 23, 1933, National 
Archives, E. G. 1^5.
^^Miller to Wallace, September 2, 1933, National Archives,
R. G. l4$.
13C. M. Sandstorm to Charles Brand, September 5, 1933,
National Archives, R. G. l4$.
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The public belief that valuable food was being wasted had 
reverberations on other worthy projects. This caused David Liggett, 
Manager of the Indianapolis Community Fund, to write Wallace on 
September 1^4- that contributors to such organizations as the Community 
Fund "are wondering why this food stuff cannot be used to advantage 
instead of being actually burned. If you can give us the answer to 
this question which tfill satisfy a number of our important and sizable 
contributors, I will be very much obliged to you. Complaints about 
the waste of food were based on the plan to tank all pigs weighing less 
than 8l pounds. Sows and heavier pigs were processed for relief 
purposes, but processing equipment would not handle the smaller pigs. 
Thus it was not feasible to preserve the lighter pigs for food. This, 
however, caused another tempest. Originally the small pigs were to be 
converted into fertilizer, grease and other by-products. But the vast 
number of pigs bought by the government made it impractical to carry 
out that project.
The Associated Press reported on September 10, 1933, that 
during the first nine days of buying at the East St. Louis market the 
government paid out $$10,000 for hogs. Of that sum, approximately 
$332,000 was spent on smal 1 pigs which were "thrown away." Of about 
100,000 pigs purchased, 75 per cent weighed below 8l pounds and were 
not processed for food. The tankage facilities of the packers, the 
article concluded, "were swamped and much meat was thrown into the 
Mississippi Biver or carted to dumps.Reports of the bodies of
^^Liggett to Wallace, September l4, 1933, National Archives,
R. G. Ih^.
^^Kansas City Star, September 10, 1933, enclosure in letter.
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yovmg pigs floating dow the rivers gained vide circulation after the 
first of September.
L. W. Leonard, Ottumwa, lova, wrote the President attacking the
"wanton destruction of underweight pigs." Be protested;
. . . their carcasses first thrown into a vat, then through 
some kind of pressing contraption, after which the carkas /sicj 
is passed into a shoot and cast into the river.
Hundreds are thus disposed of every day there is much comment 
among the workmen at the plant about the matter. Many of them 
have approached me about the matter, they are under the impres­
sion that it is the order of the government, when they were led 
to believe that such meats were to be distributed to the needy.
I have heard them say it was sickening to see pigs too small for 
consumption to be disposed of in this manner. . . . men who 
supported you in the last election say if this is the order of 
things they are through with the ticket. One man said if he 
could possibly get another job he would quit immediately on this 
account, people are fast losing faith in Mr. Wallace. I get 
many letters from ai i over the country, and its all the same 
cry. While reports are being constantly given out that every­
thing is rapidly improving, when every body knows such is not 
the case. We should have facts, and facts only about every­
thing. 1°
The attitude expressed by Leonard was the typical reaction to the rumors 
of rather barbaric methods of disposing of unwanted pigs.
The Administration was without doubt responsible for the prac­
tice of throwing tankage derived from the light pigs into rivers.
Early in the campaign it was decided that there was no need to preserve 
all of this product. On September 6 G. C. Shepard, Chief of the Msat 
Processing Section, issued a memorandum which stated:
Whenever the question is put up to us we are asking processors
J. A. Van Voorhis to Henry A. Wallace, September 10, 1933, National
Archives, R. G.
^^Leonard to Roosevelt, September 8, 1933, National Archives,
R. G. 14$.
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to dispose of the fertilizer tankage in the most economical 
■way. At some points where there is a stream of ■water adjacent 
and where this practice is permitted, this tankage is heing 
dumped in the river. . . . ¥e think you are quite safe and 
■well advised in telling anyone who inquires of you to dispose 
of this fertilizer tankage in the most economical ■way, and to 
save the Government any possible handling charges.
Although rumors of pig bodies floating do^ wn the river were exaggerated,
there can be no doubt that the remains, and in some cases bodies of
pigs, were thrown into the rivers.
In spite of his earlier statement, Shepard on September 18 
denied the rumors in a telegram to Chester J. Brown saying: "Newspaper
reports incorrect. Know of no instance of pigs being thrown in river 
to reduce surplus. Pigs are purchased for government account by proc­
essors who would not be reimbursed for purchase unless government
18instruction for disposition followed." A few days later Shepard ■was 
even more emphatic in his denial of the rumors. Writing to Representa­
tive C. V. Parsons, he said:
In reference to your telephone inquiry as to the truth of rumors 
being circulated in various newspapers, to the effect that under 
this emergency pig slaughter campaign pigs were being thrown in­
to the river, burned up and otherwise destroyed, as compared with 
the ordinary method of slaughter, I wish to say that in my 
opinion these rumors are absolutely absurd. In the first place 
these pigs are being bought for the account of the Government.
The packer purchasing these pigs acts merely as an agent. In 
order for him to be refunded for the amount paid for the pigs, 
he must produce a certificate from an inspector of the Bureau 
of Animal Industry, to the effect that the pigs were bought, 
that they ■were slaughtered and that they were processed in 
accordance with the instructions furnished by the Government. 
Otherwise the packer would not be paid for the pigs, or for his
17Shepard: Memorandum for Dr. U. G. Houck, September 6, 1933^
National Archives, R. G. l4$.
18
Shepard to Bro^ wn, September I8, 1933> National Archives,
R. G. 1^ 5.
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services. In the face of this information, the statement that 
the packer is buying the pigs and throwing them into the river 
is ridiculous. 19
A cynic might say that he "doth protest too much," and the cynic would 
be right. A careful reading of the above letter reveals typical bureau­
cratic evasions of the issue. In this case Shepard was technically 
correct, but at the same time he presented a false picture.
The issue of the disposal of the light pigs remained alive 
throughout the purchase campaign. On September 30 George E. W. 
Luehrmann of St. Louis told A, 6. Black that the "question is still in
ray mind, why do they take so many of these hogs, kill them, and let
20them float down the Mississippi River." Black pointed out that 
light pigs could not be processed and that pigs from the drought areas 
were "literally . . . skin and bones." These were among the factors. 
Black said, which forced the AAA "to turn the light weight animals into 
grease, tankage and fertilizer in order to carry out the demands of the 
Producers' Committee. However, such statements as floating the dead 
pigs down the Mississippi River under Federal Orders are untrue." 
Although the AAA denied any responsibility, it could not escape the 
blame for disposal of the light pigs in the rivers. Senator Elmer 
Thomas of Oklahoma wrote Wallace on October I6 that he had heard that 
at Minneapolis, St. Paul, Sioux City, and St. Joseph after the pigs
19Shepard to Parsons, September 23, 1933> Rational Archives,
R. G. l4$.
20
Luehrmann to Black, September 30, 1933, Rational Archives,
R. G. 145.
21
Black to Luehrmann, October 2, 1933, Rational Archives,
R. G. 143.
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were slaughtered and the fat removed the residue was then "dumped into
the river." If this were true, Thomas stated, "some statement should
be made setting forth the facts and whatever action was taken so that
22the public could be advised prior to the convening of Congress." Qa. 
this occasion, however, Wallace denied the charge and said that only a 
certain amount of wet tankage was dumped.
Other critics were more concerned about the influence of the 
emergency purchase on consumer prices than whether disposal of the little 
pigs met humanitarian standards. "Imagine the preposterous scheme to 
deliberately, wantonly, recklessly do away with FIVE MTT.T.TOW HOGS, " Carl 
L. Fiedler exclaimed, "and make the consumer pay higher prices for pork 
at a time when TOO MAHY of our fellow citizens are almost starving, many 
cannot afford to buy much if any pork at PRBSEŒ3T PRICES, to say nothing 
of still higher prices to be imposed upon all consumers, as above con­
templated,— just to aid recovery?" Fiedler added a warning that al­
though "the city may not be able to endure long without PROSPEROUS 
FARMERS but neither can the farmer long continue to exist when the city
dwellers are artificially impoverished, can not buy the crops and
©•a
products of farm and field." A Texan warned Wallace that the public 
was afraid of the emergency project. "The people," said W. W. Pearson, 
Manager of the Little Rock Tent and Awning Company of Greenville, Texas, 
"are literarly frightened to death at this move. People look at
^^Thomas to Wallace, October l6, 1933, National Archives,
R. G. 1^5.
23
Fiedler to Harold L. Ickes, August l4, 1933, National
Archives, R. G. l4$.
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this move as a crazy and foolish undertaking, one that will cause a
24
great hardship on the buying public of the nation." Similar attacks
continued long after the purchase campaign ended. At a political rally
in November 1934 Mrs. Hannah Durham, ex-vice chairman of the Republican
State Committee of Pennsylvania, attacked the reduction program and,
in passing, took a nasty swipe at Secretary Wallace. "Pork chops,"
Mrs. Durham raged, "are 10 cents higher than they were last year— and
that 10 cents didn’t go to the farmers, it went to those who killed the
hogs and plowed crops under. I’ve heard it said," she continued, "’it’s
a good thing the Dionne quintuplets weren’t bom in the United States--
25or Henry Wallace would have plowed one of them under. ’ "
Although most of the objections to the nature of the hog pro­
gram centered around the general proposition of the waste of food, the 
disposal of light pigs and the attempt to raise prices, a number of 
other protests appeared. Some hog farmers felt that they were being 
discriminated against. One wrote Wallace that thousands of farmers had 
finished hogs but no pigs and asked "how can we exist ifith such discrimi­
nation."^^ Ross E. Peabody of Illinois also felt that some hog growers 
were "being penalized," but "we Eire for you," he told Wallace, and "are
willing to cooperate, and greatly appreciate your efforts, and the
27sacrifice you Eire making for the good of the American farmers. "
24
Pearson to Wallace, August 25, 1933, National Archives,
R. G. 145.
25
New York Times, November 4, 193^, II, 1.
T. Stone to Wallaoe, August 30, 1933, National Archives,
R. G. 145.
27Peabody to Wallace, August 30, 1933, National Archives,
R. G. 145.
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Some of the more sensitive objected to the program on basically 
humanitarian grounds. After Miss Elizabeth Thorsea of Minneapolis heard 
of the sow purchase program, she protested to Wallace: "Personally, I
think it inhumane. Many pigs will be bom enroute to market. There 
■vrLll be a great waste and waste never got anyone anywhere. What I
28protest is for sows to be shipped in that condition." W. E. Behring 
of Nebraska also considered the slaughter program wrong. "Destroying 
pig life," he said, "sure is wicked. Destroying Prospect tothers Pig
pQ
^icy^ life is bad. " Janes L. Houston of Nebraska was critical of
Wallace and the project for another reason:
I don't think that if your father was living he would want to 
give piggy sow meat to the poor of the country to eat. . . .
No animal that has been bred and is two months with pig or 
calf is healthy meat— only profiteering farmers breed sows to 
fatten and market. Do you want your wife or children or your­
self to eat piggy sow meat? The whole thing is wrong. . . .
The wage earner or man or woman out of employment should eat 
pure, healthy meat— not sow who will soon farrow. C!onsult the 
leading physicians and you will find I am right— the health 
department should now ^ ic^ allow such a deeil. Who pays for 
all this bologna? The jokers allow 4o pounds dockage and 
don't want piggy sows.3^
Dan D. Casement writing for the Saturday Evening Post in 1935
summed up the humanitarian objection to the slaughter program. Even
the passage of time had not erased his rage. Casement said:
28Miss Elizabeth Thorsen to Wallace, August 24, 1933; National 
Archives, E. Q. l4$.
29
Behring to Eoosevelt, August 29, 1933; National Archives,
R. G. 145.
30
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I swear that the spectacle of vast swarms of these sleek, 
sturdy, bright-eyed little fellows trotting cheerfully to the 
shambles could not but arouse in any man of normal sensibili­
ties a feeling of pity far more poignant than would be 
inspired by the sight of droves of finished fat hogs on their 
way insensibly to fulfill their highest destiny. personal 
reaction to the scene included always a rush of fierce, 
spontaneous rage against those so lacking in the instinctive 
regard for thrift and propriety as to sanction such a sin.
Casement's "pity and anger >rere too real and deep," he avowed, to be
31"appeased" by the "facetious" explanations of the Administration.
Still another center of opposition to the emergency hog program 
developed among the cattlemen who had refused to have cattle included 
as a basic commodity in the AAA. Although cattlemen, in general, felt 
that "the hog industry should be allowed a. free hand to experiment with 
the processing tax, birth-control, and other expedients," they objected
to any measure, such as the purchase project, which might harm the cattle
32industry. Charles E. Collins, Kit Carson, Colorado, wired Secretary 
Wallace on August 21 protesting the government plan for hog producers. 
"Cattlemen," he advised, "very much alarmed over the high price proposed 
to be paid by the government for pigs and the number." The program, 
Collins feared, would "reflect bank to the cattle feed lots in the way 
of high prices for feeder pigs." The same beneficial results, he 
insisted, could be achieved for the hogmsn at much less expense if an 
"equal amount of tonnage of fresh pork was removed daily from the market
33and distributed through same channels as proposed disposal of pigs."
^^Dan D. Casement, "Beg Latin," Saturday Evening Post, CCVII 
(March l6, 1935), 78.
^Editorial, Producer, XV (August 1933), 13-
33Collins to Wallace, August 21, 1933, National Archives,
E. G. IU5.
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Collins -vrrote a follow up letter to Wallace on August 21, which con­
tained the same objections but gave more details. The sow program, he 
said, should be continued, but the pig proposition should be abandoned. 
In his letter, Collins also emphasized the "bad cattle situation" and
told Wallace that the cattlemen had established a Committee of Five to
34work on the problem.
The most interesting reaction to the hog slaughter program came 
from a group, some of whom might be classed as religious fanatics, which 
carried the idea of its sinfulness to the extent that God would and did 
punish the nation for the unnatural measure. Something of this attitude 
was expressed during the campaign, but the belief was more prevalent 
during the drought of 193^ which vindicated, for many, their belief in 
the wrath of God. G. A, Gurley, writing to Wallace "purely in a confi­
dential and personal way" on September 5, 1933, expressed this view very 
well:
It seems to me that a lot of our God-fearing people might 
believe that the Almighty would not look with favor upon any 
government or any people sanctioning such destruction of food 
under any circvunstances, and that the All Ruling Power might 
strike pestilence or some other calamity as Divine punishment.
I am entirely in sympathy with your objective, but I realize 
that in undertaking such a tremendous task some vital things 
might be overlooked, and I believe I am discussing a very vital 
subject.35
The fears of Gurley proved correct almost immediately. On September 9 
Rosa Uhsworth wrote the Des Moines Register: "I think it is a great
34Collins to Wallace, August 21, 1933, Rational Archives,
R. G. 145.
R. G. 145.
35Gurley to Wallace, September 5, 1933, Rational Archives,
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sin to willingly destroy so many pigs when so many poor souls are
starving to death. I am afraid we will have some great famine sent on
us."^^ By the summer of 193^ the belief that God would retaliate for
the sinful measure had centered on the drought-stricken Plains States.
June 10, 193^; Francis T^ ymond asked:
May not this terrible drought in the west be a rebuke to this 
country for the ruthless destruction and curtailment of food 
products by the present administration? In this country of 
plenty many persons have starved and many thousands more are 
getting barely enough to keep alive, but in spite of this state 
of affairs, the government deliberately destroyed vast quanti­
ties of food instead of conserving and dealing it out to those 
in need.37
In July Morris Markey, reporting on a trip to South Dakota, described 
a feeling there which blamed the government for the drought and sermons 
being preached which warned that "God does not approve" of the pig 
slaughter or other crop reduction measures. By August even the 
Socialist leader, Norman Thomas, was bringing God into the farm problem. 
Control of farm output to bring prosperity "might have worked, " Thomas 
remarked, "if God had not joined the AAA."^^
With the serious drought and the emergency measures of the 
government receiving considerable attention by late summer of 193^  ^the 
thesis of God punishing the farmer reached a crescendo. The Christian 
Herald quoted a city man as telling a farmer:
Des Moines Register, September 10, 1933  ^Section G, 11.
^^Hew York Times, June 10, 193^^ IV, 5*
Morris Iferkey, "Nature the Parmer," Saturday Evening Post, 
CCVII (July 21, 193^), 82.
39
New York Times, August 20, 193^, p. 7*
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This drouth is •widsspreeui. For your personal sin, -whatever 
it mey he, God. would, not afflict your neighbors. God. might 
send, fire to bum your bams, some plague might take your 
stock or even some member of your family, but God. would, never 
punish the farmers in lo-wa for some sin you have committed, 
personally. Bemember, this lack of rain covers "twenty-one 
states; it must be that you farmers have sinned, collectively.
Now take this matter of controlled, production, the killing of 
little pigs and contracting with the government to withhold 
at least 20 per cent of your good, God-given land from culti­
vation . . . . God ^ 11 punish you, if you set yourselves to 
control product ion.
The editor of Wa].].aces ' Farmer answered this gruesome theory, saying:
"when it comes to a choice between knocking a runt pig on the head and
condemning a farm boy to grinding poverty, -we'll knock the pig on the
head and give the boy a chance. To us, a boy is worth more than a pig."
The editor continued that so far as regulating production, he ranked
"Moses as a theological authority considerably ahead of any of the men
who are sent out to spread poison against the farm program in com belt 
kl
homes. " Undoubtedly some who advanced this theory as -well as other
attacks on the control programs -were politically inspired. But the 
Producer felt it necessary to refute the punishment of God thesis as 
late as January 1935* "Pious people," the cattlemen's journal said,
"have advanced the suggestion that a wrathful Deity had chosen the 
drought as an instrument with which to punish our Secretary of Agricul­
ture for interfering -with eternal law." Those who refused to accept 
the theory, however, preferred "to think that nature simply had exhausted 
her reservoirs and was busy storing up another supply of water while the
kp
sun kept grinning.
kQ
Editorial, Wallaces* Farmer, LIX (August l8, 193^), 4-9.
^^ Ibid.
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"The Year of the Drought, " American Cattle Producer, XVI 
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Many critics of the hog purchase program considered it to he
something of a farce. One Missourian felt the whole project "was
handled illegally, hut most of the people think it was handled pretty
much the same as the Volstead Act— just another joke." Grant I.
Flakne, Secretary-Treasurer of the Carroll County farm Bureau of
Missouri, believed that "this Pig-Sow buying 'vras all right for the 'In
and Out' hog raiser, hut a hog farmer raising two litters a year it was
just like a kid sitting in a dentist's office waiting with a toothache
and the dentist gave him a stick of candy to suck on until he got ready
to take care of the tooth. ' flakne, at least, realized the purchases
were of an emergency nature and must he followed with something more
permanent than "a stick of candy." E. B. Savage of Bammon, Oklahoma,
however, regarded the project as a "dismal failure." In a letter to
Wallace, he wrote: "Recently there was an endeavor on the part of the
federal Government to raise the price of hogs by buying and processing
the surplus pigs of the nation. As it turned out it was a dismal
failure, not one hog raiser in one hundred heing benefited. In fact
the only people who profited, it seems, were the packers, and possibly
45
a few of the big hog raisers and speculators."
No explanation offered by the control advocates would have 
satisfied most opponents of the hog purchase project. Beyond pointing
1^ 3
L. W. Burton to A, G. Black, October 2, 1933> National 
Archives, R. G. l4$.
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flakne to Wallace, October l8, 1933  ^National Archives,
R, G. l4$.
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to the miserable state of the hog producers and declaring that the re­
duction eainpaign -would leave ample supplies of pork for the domestic 
market, the Administration could do little to counteract the vicious 
attacks. Wallace attempted to do this in an address at Des Moines, 
stating: "I can not say it too strongly: Nobody -will starve if we
reduce hog production; but farmers -will go -without the necessities of 
life if -we don't. George N. Peek later attempted to ans-wer the 
"thousands of letters " which denounced the " ' slau^ter of the innocents. ' 
At first," he admitted, "it does seem shocking to kill these small hogs.
But, on second thought, is it any less shocking to kill them some months
hy
later -when they are in the prime of youth?" In a later reflection,
Wallace acknowledged that "it was a foregone conclusion that the public
would not like the idea of slaughtering baby pigs." He then continued
-ifith a surface facetiousness but an underlying seriousness:
Doubtless it is just as inhumane to kill a big hog as a little 
one, but few people would appreciate that. They contended that 
every little pig has the right to attain before slaughter the 
full pigginess of his pigness. To hear them talk, you would 
have thought that pigs are raised for pets. Nor would they 
realize that the slaughter of little pigs might make more 
tolerable the lives of a good many human beings dependent on 
hog prices. We simply had to make up our minds to face an 
unfavorable public reaction.^
Wallace probably had the pigs in mind when he declared that "no one has
ever characterized the Agriculturial Adjus-taaent Act "as a bed of
"Nobody to go Hungry," Wallaces* Fanner, LVIII (November 25,
1933), 5-
hi
George N. Peek, as told to Beverly Smith, "The Fanners on 
Your Payroll," American I^asine, CXVII (January 193^), 72.
1^ 8
Henry A. Wallace, New Frontiers (New York: Reynal and
Hitchcock, 1934), 180.
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.49roses.
It should, not be construed that no one approved of the emergen­
cy hog measure. Many people who hoped to profit from the project were 
ecstatic about the program. A typical reaction of this nature was a 
communication from the Salem Equity Exchange. "This pig proposition, " 
the Irriter exclaimed, "is the best and quickest relief that can possibly 
come to them ^ armer^ and how badly they need it. " To partly detract 
from his praise, the writer continued: "We are in position to handle
these pigs for you and I hope we can get the work. A far greater 
indication of approval of the purchase program came in the tremendous
sale of pigs. D. A. FitzGerald estimated that as many as four or five
51hundred thousand farmers participated in the project, and many more 
were hopeful of doing so when the purchases ended. Although many 
farmers continued to oppose controlled production, most of them were 
too practical to allow their principles to hinder participation in a 
profitable proposition. The buying of pigs demonstrated that when 
offered twice the market value farmers could quiet their moral objec­
tions long enough to eagerly take part in the program. Although
FitzGerald believed that some producers sold hogs merely to cooperate
52
with the government program, farmer reaction to the purchase plan made 
49Henry A. Wallace, "As Farmers Plan for the Future," Wallaces * 
Farmer, LIX (February 17, 1934), 3*
W. Long to Henry A. Wallace, August 21, 1933, Rational 
Archives, R. G. l4$.
^^FitzGerald, Com and Hogs, 36.
A. FitzGerald, Notation on "Report Meeting between Admin­
istration and Sub-Committee of National Com-Hog Committee," Chicago,
September 20, 1933, National Archives, R, G. l4$.
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it obvious that their major interest was in profit. Their refusal to 
sen sows while demanding enlarged purchases of pigs made this clear.
A sampling of farm opinion by the Mew York Tines revealed that where 
government checks had been received from such programs as the emergency 
hog purchase and the cotton plow-up farmers were on the whole "rather 
happy and satisfied." But in areas where cash had not been paid out 
farmers were discontented and talking of farm strikes and other radical 
action. The major interest of fanærs, according to the report, 
centered on cash and "higher prices--much higher, if possible," and 
they did not care what methods were used to achieve that goal: "If
the slaughter of hogs meant higher pork prices, the farmer is for that 
too."53
That profit mald.ng was the prime basis of hog producers support 
of their emergency relief measure should be neither surprising nor de­
rogatory to the reputation of farmers. In spite of the tendency to 
glorify the agricultural segment of the nation, famars always have 
been more practical than theoretical. They could see, appreciate, and 
eagerly grasp the price margin in the pig offer. The miserable economic 
state with the drought situation helps to explain but does not mitigate 
the farmer's reaction. That few hog producers were willing to support 
the program because of a deep faith in production control was conclu­
sively demonstrated by the poor result of the sow program, which was 
the main control aspect of the project. In reality, this merely vindi­
cated the traditional individualism of farmers, with each looking out
Mew York Times, October 29, 1933, VIII, 8.
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for his awn interests and being relatively nnconcemed about his fellow 
agriculturalists.
The response of hog producers to the Emergency Bog Marketing
Program revealed that farmers held a very pessimistic opinion of the
future. The farmer's refusal to sell sows and demands for greater pig
purchases forced the government to abandon the original plan of buying
4,000,000 pigs and 1,000,000 sows. By October 7, 1933; the Department
of Agriculture had acquired 6,188,71? pigs and 222,149 brood sows at a
54
cost of $30,643,102. Although producers eagerly sold their pigs to 
the government, AAA officials realized early in September that the 
campaign would not accomplish its basic purpose. Dissatisfied with the 
lack of farm cooperation, the Administration joined the National Oom- 
Hog Committee in consideration of more fundamental measures to benefit 
the C o m  Belt.
During the course of the purchase campaign, relief, in the 
sense of cash for hog producers, became the most vital portion of the 
program. The shift of emphasis from control of future pork supplies to 
cash relief was further emphasized by the demand for greater purchases 
from the drought areas. Wien Secretary Wallace reported to the Senate 
on the emergency project, he placed great importance on the distribution 
of well over $30 million^^ to farmers in 4l states. The program Wallace 
maintained, had given "timely relief" to producers in those states where 
the drought had "materially reduced feed supplies." Many of the pigs,
54
FitzGerald, C o m  and Bags, 35-
55FitzGerald estimates that farmers actually received, after 
subtraction of marketing costs, approximately $24 million. Ibid., 4o.
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Wallace continued, "would have starved to death since fanners were with­
out money to purchase feed and the pigs were not in salable condi­
tion."^^ Before the end of the purchase period, the Department of 
Agriculture apparently decided that the control phase of the project 
had failed and that the major emphasis of the publicity and defense of 
the measure should be placed upon the getting of money to hogmen, pro­
viding drought relief and supplying needed meat to the urban needy.
While the emergency program removed approximately one billion 
pounds of pork from the market, this removal had no immediate effect on 
hog prices. Indeed, this, other than some expectation of a psychologi­
cal influence, had not been expected. Pigs purchased by the government 
would not have gone to market for some months. The sow removal, since 
most of those bought would probably have gone to market anyway, seemed 
to keep sow prices higher than, they would have been without the program. 
But it would have no real effect on hog supply for some months. Wot 
until the late spring of 193^ was there any noticeable rise in hog 
prices, and this very definitely could not be attributed solely to the 
emergency purchases. A number of other factors, the acts of nature as 
well as government, also exerted influence on the swine market. There 
was a marked reduction in market supplies of hogs after the first 
quarter of 193 ;^ but the degree of responsibility of the purchase 
project for that reduction cannot be determined.
Indeed, if the economic advisor to the Com and Bogs Section
^^Letter from the Secretary of Agriculture, "Emergency Hog 
Marketing Program," Senate Doc. l4o, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington:
U. S. Government Printing Office, 193^)>
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was correct, the emergency program may have increased rather than
decreased pork supplies for 193^- On September 26, he \nx>te: "a
decrease of 10 to 20 per cent was in prospect for farroifings in the
spring and fall of 1934 had there been no emergency pig and sow program.
The effect of that program is to reduce this prospective reduction to
575 to 10 per cent ne%t spring." As early as September 2 C. F. Sarle,
AAA economist, noted that the bred sow program was "backfiring. " Higher
prices during the winter, Sarle felt, were "likely at least partially
to offset the influence of this season’s short feed grain crops in
5>8reducing hog supplies for the 1934-35 season." From past e^perienee 
hog experts expected the short com crop of 1933 and resulting higher 
prices to bring about an automatic reduction in hog production. If 
the emergency purchase caused hog prices to rise too early, AAA econo­
mists obviously feared that the program would defeat its own objectives.
The National Com-Hog Committee had promised to have a perma­
nent control program ready by October 1. Plans were studied throughout 
the purchase campaign. On September 2 the Committee report and recom­
mendations for a permanent program were presented to the Administra­
tion. The com-hog representatives felt the pig project meule a long­
term program feasible, if further surpluses were diverted and if a 
reduction plan were established for 1934-35* The Committee, therefore,
57Economic Advisor, Com and Hogs, "Economic Analysis of Plan 
Submitted by the National Com-Hog Committee," Confidential; September 
26, 1933, National Archives, R. G. 14-5.
^C. F. Sarle, "Suggestions for Hog-Com Production Adjust­
ment Program for 1934-35 and Later," Confidential; September 2, 1933  ^
National Archives, R. G, l45*
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suggested a three point program. First, it wanted the establishment of
parity prices for hogs by November 1, 1933, and not less than parity
price maintained until June 1934. This price setting was to be
accong)lished through agreements between the Secretary of Agriculture
and the processing industry. Second, the government should continue to
purchase surplus hogs. The pork could be "reduced to sausage" and
diverted from regular market channels by distribution to the unemployed.
Third, the Committee recommended a program for reducing com acreage and
hog production. Contracts would be signed with producers granting $1 on
each hog sold weighing less than 220 pounds. Also, a com acreage
59leasing program should be instituted.
Essentially, this was a preliminary report used as a basis of 
discussion. A number of different suggestions and possibilities came 
under consideration. The Committee probably even discussed some varia­
tion of a recommendation which had been made a number of times. Sone- 
what humorously Jay 0. Hbrmel of the Hormal Packing Company reported a 
scheme to have the government "conscript" all boars. Under the plan, 
"the boars could be made available to farmers at a service fee which 
would move up or down in order to encourage or discourage breedings." 
Although Hormel did not back the conscription idea, he had suggested a 
birth certificate plan which someone in the Administration had called 
"birth control." Hbrmel remarked that the boar conscript plan was 
birth control "in the raw."^^
59"Report and Recommendations of the National Com and Bog 
Committee for a Permanent Program," September 2, 1933, Rational 
Archives, R, G. l45.
^^Hormel, "A Suggestion on Hog Control," August 12, 1933,
National Archives, R. G. l4$.
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Discussion of a program to replace the emergency project con­
tinued into the latter part of September. On the 13th a sub-committee 
of the Rational Committee of Twenty-five met in Chicago. Here the atti­
tude of Secretary Wallace and the disappointment of the producer repre­
sentatives with the purchase project became clear. Boswell Garst told 
the sub-committee that Wallace did not see how it would be possible to 
control the production of com and hogs alone. The Secretary felt,
Garst stated, that the law needed to be changed to allow the Administrai- 
tion to "control all feed crops and all l i v e s t o c k . T h e  drive of the 
Department of Agriculture to broaden the coverage of the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act to take in beef cattle was very strong at this time; how­
ever, any immediate program had to be designed for c o m  and hogs alone. 
Although Clifford V. Gregory of Illinois criticized the producers 
because they were not supporting the purchase project and were expecting 
another government bonus scheme, he joined the other representatives in 
requesting continued government aid for the C o m  Belt. The reporter of 
the meeting recorded: "The attitude of the whole group meeting during
the day however, was that all other groups had raided the Treasury at 
other times and they felt that it was quite logical for the com-hog 
belt farmer to get hd.s share from the pork barrel for a change. By 
September 20, when Administration representatives met with the Com-Bog 
Sub-Committee, price-fixing had become the center of attention.
A. G. Black, Chief of the Com-Hog Section, spoke for the price-
"Notes, Meeting Subcommittee of Production Committee of Twen­
ty-five," Chicago, September 13, 1933, National Archives, R. G. l4$.
^^ Ibid.
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fixing advocates:
The very-long-time program should not be the one to receive 
our consideration at the present time except as it is tied up 
with the emergency and can be developed from any emergency 
program put into effect in the near future. The real problem 
to face now is that of a price-fixing venture tied up and 
made contingent upon the signing up to reduce production in 
the future. This would involve a stabilization program for 
the purchase of a certain amount of hogs or hog products by 
the government. The stage is all set now for an immediate 
price-fixing program and by spring or early summer could 
gradually be worked into a long-time reduction program.
Black’s statement indicated the extent which the attitude of the govern­
ment had changed since the announcement of the purchase program and to 
which the Administration was now preparing to go. Bo longer, it seemed, 
was the plan to replace immediately the purchase project with a permanent 
com-hog control program. Instead, the purchases might be followed by 
other emergency programs which would involve price-fixing and future 
reduction of output. Perhaps the motivating factor here was the belief 
that cattle would be placed on the basic commodity list, making possible 
the long desired general control pmgram. In any case, the AAA leaders 
appeared ready at this point to go along with the committee suggestion 
of immediately establishing parity prices on hogs and making further 
large scale government purchases.
On September 21 the Com-Hog Committee agreed on a plan to fix 
hog prices. The committee asked that hog prices be pegged in Chicago 
at a minimum of $8 a hundred from November 15 to June 193^* Sugges­
tions for reduction in production included the leasing of 20 per cent 
of the normal com acreage and a proportionate cut in pork output. The
Meeting of Administration and Sub- Committee of the Com-Hog
Committee," Chicago, September 20, 1933; National Archives, R. G. lk5.
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group also asked that hog prices he estahlished $1 per hundred higher 
on al 1 hogs weighing less than 220 pounds sold hy farmers contracting 
to reduce produce. To maintain the parity price the committee requested 
further large government purchases of surplus pork. The program would 
he financed hy a processing tax.^^ The heart of the plan and the most 
important to producer representatives was the hope of establishing 
parity prices on hogs at an early date.
Economic advisors in the Department of Agriculture, however, 
opposed the producer plan of immediately fixing hog prices. In an 
economic analysis of the committee plan, the economic advisor of the 
C!om-Hbg Section insisted that the purchase program had reduced hy 5 or 
10 per cent the prospective reduction in farrowing for the spring of 
193^* "Further price increase for hogs contemplated hy the Producers 
Committee Plan, " he said, "is likely to result in no decrease whatso­
ever in the 193^ spring pig crop end a fall crop in 193^ possibly 5 
per cent larger than this fall. Thus, the emergency purchases 
already had exerted exactly the opposite of the desired effect and the 
price-fixing demand of the producers would even further the unwanted 
trend.
The Administration abandoned the price setting plan of the 
producer group. It was felt, however, that the idea of further govern­
ment purchases of hogs had some merit. Although doubtful that such
6h
J. S, Russell, "Agree on Plan to Fix Hog Prices," Des Moines 
Register, September 23, 1933> P* 1-
"Economic Analysis of Plan Submitted by the National Com- 
Hbg Committee," Confidential; September 26, 1933  ^National Archives,
R. G. 1^ 5.
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buying could be used to peg prices, officials of the AAA believed that 
purchases could be used to support hc-g prices -whenever it seemed sup­
plies -would be most excessive and likely to result in price declines. 
Thus, vhile rejecting the scheme of government purchases to fix prices, 
the Department of Agriculture continued to buy hogs in subsequent 
programs as a means of aiding swine producers.
^^FitzGerald, C o m  and Hogs, 66.
CHAPTER V
THE FEDERAL SURPLUS RELIEF CORPORATION
The most lasting and in many ways the most important result 
of the Emergency Hog Marketing Program was the creation of the Federal 
Surplus Relief Corporation. This organization represented one of the 
wisest and at the same time most radical departures from tradition 
taken by the first Roosevelt Administration. It successfully combined 
the two goals of supplying the needy with food and other staple goods 
and reducing surplus agricultural supplies. In the most simple way 
ever attempted, the national government sought to solve the "paradox 
of want in the midst of plenty."
As Henry Wallace declared; "Not many people realized how 
radical it was,— this idea of having the Government buy from those who 
had too much, in order to give to those who had too little. So direct 
a method of resolving the paradox of want in the midst of plenty, doubt­
less could never have got beyond the discussing stage before 1933 « 
Although earlier proposals had suggested the purchase and use of pork 
products for families on relief rolls, the Federal Surplus Relief 
Corporation developed immediately out of the hog purchase project. The
^Henry A. Wallace, New Frontiers (New York: Reynal and
Hitchcock, 1934), 183-184.
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plan finally recommended by the National Oorn-Hbg Committee included 
the use of meat products for relief purposes. Even before the Adminis­
tration approved the purchase scheme, relief agencies vere contacted
2
about using the pork. Early in August Secretary Wallace began negotia­
tions on this matter iriLth Harry Hopkins, head of the Federal Emergency 
Relief Administration. Wallace announced on August 1$, 1933, that he 
was then "cleaning up the last details" with Hopkins. When the possi­
bility of selling the meat abroad fell through, there remained no ques­
tion about the desirability of providing all edible pork to the needy. 
Determined to keep the product out of the normal, domestic consumption 
channels, producer representatives and AAA authorities eagerly turned 
to the relief agencies. They emphasized, however, that this meat
should not be substituted for meat already in the allowances but should
k
be added to the regular relief supplies. Showing great concern for 
the unemployed, AAA officials and hog producers insisted that consump­
tion of meat was pitifully low and that this pork would be a welcome 
and needed addition to the meager diets of those without jobs.
Wallace remarked later that giving meat to the needy was the 
only real justification for the government program of reducing food 
supplies. "The paradox of want in the midst of plenty, " he claimed,
"was constantly in our minds as we proceeded with schemes like the
2
Claude R. Wickard to Wayne Coy, August 5, 1933, Rational 
Archives, R. G. l4$.
3
Press Conference, Transcript, August 15, 1933, National 
Archives, R. G. l6.
If
Claude R. Wickard to Wayne Coy, August 5, 1933, National
Archives, R. G. 1^ 5-
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emergency hog slaughter. . . .  To many of us, the only thing that made 
the hog slaughter acceptable was the realization that the meat and lard 
salvaged would go to the unemployed. At the same time relief authori­
ties desired to increase the amount of meat in the diet of needy citi­
zens. With the great agricultural surpluses, the idea of buying excess 
farm supplies and giving them to the unemployed seemed natural. The 
feeling that this tms desirable "%fas so general in Administration 
circles" that the FSRC was created. "At last," Wallace rejoiced, "we 
had a mechanism through which the surplus could reach the hungry.
Harry L. Rapkins, chairman of the new corporation, also emphasized the 
impoartance of the emergency purchase project in the founding of the 
FBRC. "Obviously pork," he said, "was its first commodity, since pork 
was in a way the corporation’s reason for being." Thus, the necessity 
of handling the meat procured from the emergency bog slaughter program 
and the desirability of improving the diet of indigents caused the 
government to establish the FSRC. But additional motivations existed 
for the Administration's decision to create this radically new agency.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt announced on September 21 that
seventy-five million dollars had been set aside to purchase surplus
8agricultural supplies to feed the needy. Some observers immediately 
assumed that the surplus-relief purchase project was "the administra-
^Wallace, New Frontiers, l83-l84.
^Ibid.
7
Harry L. Hopkins, Spending to Save; the Complete Story of 
Relief (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1938), 156.
8Des ttoines Register, September 22, 1933, P- 1*
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tion's answer to a growing criticism of the destruction, of food while
thousands of people are hungry. Without doubt that consideration
did influence government action. Although the Administration had
expected opposition to the reduction programs, the widespread and often
violent outcry against the wanton waste of food was surprising. The
Wallace attitude revealed clearly that this influenced the Department
of Agriculture in its backing of the ïSRC. He emphasized that the new
corporation made it easier to carry on control programs;
So far as the AAA was concerned, it could now proceed with its 
task of adjusting production to the needs of the American 
people, rather than merely to the buying power of the American 
people. It became possible to attack the surplus problem from 
both top and bottom, treating it as a result of both overproduc­
tion and under consumption, the degree of each varying widely, 
to be sure, with the commodity. The new Corporation could not 
absorb all of our farm surpluses, but it could give us new 
assurances that no one would go hungry or ragged because of 
any of our adjustment programs.
The FSRC through its bnying and distributing food to the relief families, 
therefore, allowed the AAA to continue its food reduction projects with 
at least a clearer conscience. Wallace further indicated that the double 
purpose of the coiporation, to feed the needy and to relieve the farm 
commodity surplus, gave the AAA every reason for both morally and finan­
cially supporting its activities.
The FSRC had tremendous responsibilities and powers. As far 
as the future of the AAA control programs were concerned, however, the 
main value of the coiporation lay in its ability to remove agricultural
Q
Richard Wilson, "U. S. to Support Farm Prices," Des Moines 
Register, September 2k, 1933, Section G, 1.
^^Wallace, Hew Frontiers, 183-181»-.
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surpluses. According to its Certificate of Incorporation, the agency’s 
povers to participate in the agricultural control projects were:
(a) To relieve the existing national economic emergency by 
expansion of markets for, removal of, and increasing and 
improving the distribution of, agricultural . . . com­
modities. . . .
(b) To purchase, store, handle and process suiplus agricul­
tural . . . products. . . .
(g) In general, to carry on any and all other business neces­
sary or convenient to the attainment of the foregoing 
objects or purposes. . . .
(j) To enter into and encourage farmers, producers and others
to enter into marketing plems and agreements and to co­
operate in any plan which provides for reduction in 
acreage or reduction in the production for market of 
agricultural commodities;
(k) To engage in any activity in connection with or involving
the production, carrying, shipping, storing, exporting, 
warehousing, handling, preparing, manufacturing, process­
ing and marketing of agricultural . . . commodities. . . .
(l) To borrow money and to draw, make, accept, endorse, war­
rant guarantee, transfer, assign, execute, and issue 
bonds, debentures, mortgages, promissory notes, bills of 
exchange, acceptances, warrants and all kinds of obliga­
tions and nonnegotiable, negotiable or transferable 
instruments without limit as to amount, and for the 
security of any of its obligations to convey, transfer, 
assign, deliver, mortgage, and/or pledge all or any part 
of its property or assets. . . .
(q) To enter into, make, perform and cany out contracts of 
every kind and description for any lawful purpose without 
limit as to amount, with any person, firm, association, 
corporation, municipality, country, state body politic, ^  
territory or government or colony or dependency thereof;
^Itederal Surplus Relief Corporation, Incorporated Under the
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Obviously the FSRC had very broad powers to aid the AAA in dealing with 
the farm siiip>lus problem. For this reason the Department of Agriculture 
was ifilling to cooperate with the FERA in establishing the corporation 
and to share with the Relief Administration in financing the FSRC pro­
grams. The AAA contributed through processing taxes on farm commodities 
to the purchase of surplus agricultural products. With the precedent- 
shattering Emergency Hog Marketing Program serving to set the FSRC on 
its feet, it rapidly developed into a major operation. On September 21 
the President announced that money taken from AAA and FERA funds would 
be used to purchase surplus agricultural commodities for the needy. On 
October 4 the IBRC was chartered with Harry Hopkins at its head and 
Henry A. Wallace and Harold I. Ickes as the other two directors. Almost 
immediately plans for large scale purchases of pork, beef and other farm 
commodities were revealed. Since producer for either further
or new surplus purchase programs were inqoressive, the agricultural 
authorities saw the corporation as basically a surplus removal agency.
Requests for government purchase programs cams from several 
farm commodity groups. The hog industry, having experienced the advan­
tages of selling to the AAA, simply requested the continuation of the 
emergency project. Thus, Governor Tom Berry of South Dakota wired
Secretary Wallace requesting the purchase of additional thousands of
12pigs in his state. The Cooperative Shipping Association of Ksnmare,
laws of the State of Delaware, Amended Certificate of Incorporation, 
National Archives, R. G. 145.
12
Berry to Wallace, September 30 and October 9, 1933  ^National
Archives, R. G. l45.
125
North Dakota asked that the "pig buying program" be extended through
l'a
October. From Texas cams the report that scarcity of feed would
prevent farmers having their pigs ready for sale by the end of September
l4
and the request that buying be continued through October 15- F. S. 
Rickard, in charge of granting pig shipping permits in Omaha, reported 
that, although he had permit requests for almost 300,000 pigs, none of 
them could be granted because his quotas were conrpleted.^  ^ Similar 
backlogs of requests existed throughout the country especially in the 
drought areas and probably several million pigs were waiting for govern­
ment buyers when the program ended. Throughout September the National 
Com-Hbg Committee of Tv/enty-five discussed the establishment of parity 
prices on hogs and the continued buying of hogs by the government to 
maintain that p ri ce .E ar l G. Smith, chairman of the producer commit­
tee, strongly recommended on October 2 that a "substantial portion" of
the money set aside for unemployment relief be used for surplus remov- 
17al. Smith naturally wanted the continued purchase of hogs. Obviously 
hoping to get away from the much criticized emergency hog project, the 
Agricultural Department refused to continue pig purchases. Secretary
13Kenmare Cooperative Shipping Association to Wallace,
September 25, 1933; National Archives, R. G. 1^5*
11l
S. W. Norwood to Marvin Jones, September 11, 1933; National 
Archives, R. G. 1^5.
^^Des Moines Register, September 27, 1933; P* 9*
^^Report and Recommendations of the National Com-Hbg Commit­
tee, September 2, 13, 20, 1933; National Archives, R. G. 1^5.
17Smith to C. C. Itevis, October 2, 1933; National Archives,
R. G. 1^ 5.
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Wallace suggested to Governor Barry, however, that "additional purchases
3.0
may he arranged," but purely as a relief measure.
Other farm commodity groups also requested government purchase 
programs to grant farmers relief and to remove surplus stock. Some 
spokesmen for the dairy industry proposed in August that a processing 
tax be used to purchase and slaughter "low producing dairy cows" and
19
to remove surplus dairy products. More insistent in demanding aid 
were the once proudly independent beef cattle producers who had opposed 
including cattle as a basic commodity in the Agricultural Adjustment 
Act. Before the end of June some stockmen professed repentance for 
their opposition and pleaded for government help. Late in June Itolph 
Briscoe, President of the Texas and Southwestern Cattle Baisers Associa­
tion, admitted that cattle should have been included in the farm program
20and asked Wallace to aid the ranching industry. On July 12 Briscoe 
again stressed the seriousness of the cattle situation and asserted
21that only government action could "save the beef producers from ruin." 
Although Briscoe was ready for the ranchers to come under the AAA, most 
cattlemen merely expressed a desire for federal help, justifying their 
plea by emphasizing the drought conditions and declining cattle prices.
After the purchase project for hogmen was announced, cattlemen
18Wallace to Perry, October 5, 1933, National Archives, R. G.
1^ 5.
19J. S. Russell, "New Deal Bringing Radical Changes to Feirming 
in Com Belt," Des Moines Register, August 20, 1933, Section L, 5.
20Briscoe to Wallace, June 29, 1933, National Archives, R. 6.
1^ 5.
^Ibid., July 12, 1933-
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seized on the idea of selling their product to the government. PoUov-
ing the middle of August^ petitions for a beef purchase program poured
into Washington. Jesse E. Short of Tennessee recommended that the
Administration pay "ten cents a pound" for "all calves between 200 and 
op
hOO pounds." Similar requests cams from Texas, Mississippi and a
number of other states. The Advisory Board of the Spearfish Livestock
Association, Spearfish, South Dakota, passed a series of resolutions
on September 3, one of which "resolved that the Federal Government,
through the extraordinary powers granted the President, buy 2,000,000
she cattle at a price comensurate /^ic/ debts generally holding
against said cattle, and that said cattle be slaughtered and their
23food products delivered to the poor through the Red Cross order." 
AgricultureuL Adjustment Administration officials almost eagerly reminded 
cattlemen that their own action prevented the AAA from doing much to
2hhelp the cattle industry. Although the Department of Agriculture used 
the desire of stockmen to get industry support for the inclusion of 
cattle as a basic commodity, agricultural officials were willing for 
cattlemen to be aided in the meantime. The Producer, voice of the 
cattle industry, maintained that the American National Livestock Associ­
ation played a leading role in getting the government to organize the 
surplus relief corporation, because:
22Short to Wallace, August 26, 1933> National Archives, R. G.
145.
23F. S. Thomson to Franklin D. Itoosevelt, September 5, 1933; 
National Archives, R. G. l4$.
2k ,
C. C. Itetvis to Thonas J. Poole, August 4, 1933; National
Archives, R. G. 1^ 5.
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Pronrpt action by the government has repeatedly been urged. In 
a telegram to the Secretary of Agriculture dated September 26, 
Secretary Mollin suggested that $25,000,000 of the $75,000,000 
be used for the purchase of 75,000,000 pounds of margarine 
. . . and that al1 of the remainder, or the major part of the 
whole amount, be allotted to buying up large quantities of the 
lower grades of beef.^5
Although the claim of importance for the livestock organization was
extravagant, the demands of cattlemen for aid did not go unrecognized
by the Administration.
Agricultural officials eagerly welcomed the FSRC as a way to 
satisfy the demands of the hog, dairy and cattle industries id.thout 
undertaking new AAA energency purchase programs. They also hoped that 
through judicious buying the FSRC could help control surplus production, 
could soften the blow of the processing tax on the hog market and, 
possibly, could be used to fix prices on farm products. One agricultural 
official was reported to have admitted that 'Vhere you are not control­
ling production there is one way of fixing the price and that is to buy 
the product. In any case, some farm observers regarded the buying 
program as the "key to hog prices" in the winter of 1933-193^*^ As 
the Itepartment had virtually committed itself to an attempt to fix hog 
prices, it seems evident that some authorities intended to use FSRC 
purchase for that purpose.
Quite naturally, livestock was not the only farm commodity
^^Producer, XV (October 1933), 16-17.
^^Richard Wilson, "U. 8. to Support Farm Prices," Des Moines 
Register, September 24, 1933, Section G, 1.
27J. s. Russell, "Buying Food for Reedy Seen as Rew Way to 
Farm Aid," Des Moines Register, October 1, 1933, Section G, 1-2.
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purchased by the FSRC. In addition to hogs and cattle, the corporation 
bought or received from the A M  such diverse products as butter, cheese, 
cereal, apples, sugar, syrup, potatoes, flour, coal, blankets, and cot­
ton to distribute to relief families. The organization also purchased 
over 13 million bushels of feed and over I6 million pounds of seed for 
farmers in the drought states. In general, the corporation gained 
control of farm commodities in three "ways. With money derived from 
processing taxes, the AAA often purchased and donated surplus commodities 
to the relief corporation. In other cases, the ISRC used relief funds 
to buy the needed supplies outright. Finally, the ÎERA at times granted 
funds to the state relief administrators to purchase local crop sur-
28
pluses. . The pork procured from the AAA emergency project, however, 
vas the first commodity handled by the FSRC, and the purchase of hogs 
or pork products constituted a major part of the activity of the coipora­
tion during its first eight months.
By dropping processing dovn to 7I pound pigs during the last
29veek of the purchase campaign, the AAA procured almost 100,000,000 
pounds of pork to distribute to families on relief rolls. Harry Hopkins 
started preparations for meat distribution before purchasing ceased.
On September l4 he informed Thad Holt, Director of the A].abama Relief 
Administration, of an agreement vith the AAA to distribute between 50 
and 100 million pounds of pork. He reiterated the AAA determination 
that this product vas not to supplant the regular relief meat allow-
28
Hopkins, Spending to Save, I56-I5 7.
29
Henry A. Wallace to the Institute of American Meat Packers,
September 23, 1933> Rational Archives, R. 6. 1^5.
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30ances. By October 19 nineteen million pounds of the emergency product 
had been ordered shipped to relief agencies, and orders for two million 
more were in sight. G. C, Shepard, Chief of the Meat Processing Sec­
tion, engshasized, however, that the remaining 8 0 million pounds "must 
be cleaned up not later than December 15." Other^ fise, the success of 
the long time com-hog program "in bringing about an early advance in 
the price of light hogs" would be endangered. Shepard also believed 
that the purchase and distribution of additional hogs must "immediately 
follow, and continue at the rate of fifty million (50,000,000) pounds 
per month." He further insisted that "Mr. Hopkins* plans should be
coordinated ■vri.th those of the long time com-hog program, so that we
31can proceed right along as outlined above."
In November 1935 M. L. Wilson, acting Secretary of Agriculture, 
explained the transference of the emergency pork. Writing to Hopkins, 
Wilson noted that the AAA had officially offered the edible product on 
September l6, that it had been accepted on the 22nd and that the AAA 
had donated and delivered 97^064,159 pounds of pork with a value of 
$1 1,229,326 .2 8 to the FSRC.^^ Well before the relief families had 
consumed the emergency meat, the government began additional purchases 
of hogs and pork products.
During October 1933 the organization for purchasing surplus
^^Eopkins to Holt, September l4, 1933; National Archives,
R. G. 1 4 5.
31Shepard: Memorandum for A. G. Black, October 19, 1933,
National Archives, R. G. l45.
“"^ilson to Hopkins, November 22, 1935, National Archives,
R, G. 16.
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agricultural products and the relationship betiseen the AAA and the 5SRC 
was being developed. On October 9 the AAA created a Special Commodities 
Section, headed by Major Robert M. Littlejohn. The agency was to ex­
plore and recommend methods for removal of surplus farm commodities 
and to act as agent between the AAA and the FERA in the sui-plus removal 
projects. On October 2k Secretary Wallace and Harry Bbpkins agreed 
on the relationship between the îBRC and the Department of Agriculture. 
The task of the relief coiporation was to "transfer basic farm sur­
pluses from the open market to relief families."
In performance of this responsibility, the ISRC would purchase, 
as the agent of either the AAA or the FERA, farm products in a ■VTay to 
achieve the greatest possible price for the farmer and to reduce price 
depressing surplus supplies. The Secretary and Hopkins further agreed
that processing and distributing expenses would be paid by the FERA,
3kand the FSRC operating expenses would be met by the AAA. Six days 
later Wallace emphasized to Hopkins what the AAA regarded as one of 
the most important tasks of the relief corporation. Agricultural
officials, he declared, were particularly anxious to use the relief
35purchases of pork "to pad the blow" of the processing tax on hogs.
33George N. Peek: General Office Order Wo. 6, October S,
1933; Rational Archives, R. 6. 12k.
3k ,
Hopkins to Wallace, October 2k, 1933; Rational Archives,
R. G. Ik5.
35A processing tax on hogs had been a matter of concern for 
several months. The processing industry maintained from the first that 
consumers were paying all they would for pork. The processors, there­
fore, wanted a very low tax and warned at the same time that the pro­
ducers would pay the tax through lower hog prices. Some economists in 
the Administration had agreed from the first that the producer would
132
For this reason, he requested the purchase of 50 million pounds of pork 
on December 1 to counteract the first advance in the tax.
On November 4 the Administration announced plans to purchase 
up to 300 million pounds of pork, equalling approximately 3 million live 
hogs, by July 1934. At this time, government officials planned to make 
monthly purchases from the packers, with the packers offering bids on 
commercial cuts to the relief corporation. Although the FSRC had no 
intention of paying over the market price for these purchases, AAA 
planners anticipated a marked reduction in future hog tonnage and 
resulting price benefits because specifications established a maxiTmiTn 
weight on hogs processed for the coiporation. The maximum varied in 
different purchases between 200 and 235 pounds. During the develop­
mental stage, the relief administration and the AAA, using the hog 
processing tax, intended to divide fairly equally the expenses of the 
relief purchases. When Jacob Baker, assistant to the president of the
pay at least a part of the tax. Two problems thus existed. There was 
the fear that producers would be forced to pay the tax and the belief 
that a major rise in pork prices to the consumer would cause a shift to 
beef or other replacement products. The National Com-Bog Committee, 
fearing such a shift, also recommended a low processing tax. The Ad­
ministration planned a graduated tax, to steurt at 50 cents a hundred on 
November 1 and with 50 cent increases scheduled for December 1, January 
1 and February 1. This was changed in December with the January and 
February juaps being postponed a month. The sudden and sharp drop in 
hog prices starting in October was viewed by many as an effort of the 
processors not only to pass all of the tax back to the producer but also 
to increase their own margin of profit. Wallace charged, apparently 
correctly, that the processors were telling the farmer hog prices were 
low because of the tax and at the same time telling the consumer pork 
prices were high because of the tax. In any case, the producer was pay­
ing a major part, if not all, of the tax, and the Administration wanted 
to use FSRC purchases to prevent further declines in prices.
Wallace to Hopkins, October 30, 1933; National Archives,
R. G. 145.
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FSRC, informed Wallace of the plans for the first pork purchases, he 
emphasized that the FSRC had not made any commitment as to the exact 
amount of money the organization would spend on removal of surplus 
pork. The relief corporation intended, he assured the Secretary, to 
spend about the same on this "smplus removal program that the Agri­
cultural Adjustment Administration" does, but there would be no matching
37of funds. The first of the regular pork purchases by the relief 
corporation caused a revision of many of these early plans.
The FSRC officials had planned to buy 75 million pounds of pork 
in November. This amount, agricultural officials estimated, would re­
sult in the removal of 750,000 of the lighter hogs from the market.
As this would equal about l6 or 17 per cent of the normal marketing 
during the last two weeks of November and the first two ■vreeks of 
December, the AAA hoped for a marked improvement in hog prices. When 
bids were opened on November 17, however, the FSRC discovered that 
packers had offered only 4$ million pounds, and the corporation agreed 
to buy only 30 million pounds. Deducting the normal processing costs 
from the bid price, the processors should have paid an average of $5*50 
per hundred for the live hogs. Instead, the packers were able to pur­
chase the hogs at an average of about $3*50 per hundred. Hog prices 
declined steadily in the month following November 17. Since the first 
FSRC pork purchase was less than half of the planned acquisition, the 
anticipated effects on prices were not achieved. Indeed, the 3(X),000 
hogs purchased for the relief corporation did not make a significant
37Baker to Wallace, November 1, 1933, National Archives,
R. G. 145.
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dent in the total marketing for the period. In addition, hog receipts 
increased around 20 per cent over the same period in 1932. As a result 
the packers made about $2ra hundred or approximately $3 per hog more
Q Û
than had been expected. A government observer in Chicago reported 
that after the FSRC contracts of October 17 were ai-mrded prices on 
light weight hogs declined 50 to 75 cents per hundred. It xms apparent, 
this observer felt, that the packers had "out traded" the PSRC.^^ Al­
though it is doubtful that the packers wlio received relief contracts 
had anticipated such a leirge margin of profit, the unfortunate experi­
ence with the purchase of commercial cuts of pork plus additional 
problems brought about a change in the method of relief purchases of 
pork. In future buying the FSRC relied largely on purchases of live 
hogs with selected processors acting as purchasing agents for the govern­
ment .
Even before the November 17 purchase of commercial cuts, the 
relief corporation had gained some experience in buying live hogs. In 
an abortive effort to set hog prices, the FSRC bought several thousand 
hogs at well above the market price after November 10. The price 
pegging attempt began immediately after the hog processing tax went 
into effect on November 5* A sharp price decline caused commission men 
in Chicago to set a minimum price of $4.50 per hundred on hogs. The 
packers refused to buy at that price, and on November 10 more than
D. A. FitzGerald, Com and Hogs Under the Agricultural Ad- 
justment Act; Developments Up to Marck 1934 (Washington: The BroôEïngs
Institution, 193^), 51-53-
39V. E. Foster, "Market Conditions and Comments— Chicago,"
National Archives, R. G. 124.
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22,000 hogs remained unsold. The packing houses persisted in their 
obstinacy. On November 11 Commander Robert W. Clark in Washington 
talked on the telephone to a government agent, E. H. Cope, in Chicago. 
Clark informed Cope that $200,000 had been deposited in the First 
National Bank of Chicago in the name of the Ifermers Grain Corporation 
for him, and that he was to buy hogs on the open market. X’Jhen Cope 
declared that hog prices were quite low, Clark responded that this 
situation had prompted the purchase orders and that Cope iras to buy 
about 10,000 head paying the $^.$0 asking price of the commission men.^^ 
In a later conversation on the same day, the Chicago representatives 
reported that they had bought 19,700 hogs, "those remaining on hand," 
paying $4.W per hundred.Thus the îBRC began its first and totally 
ineffective purchase of live hogs. By paying well above the price 
packers were willing to offer, the government made this a definite and, 
although not so desired, open and publicized effort to peg hog prices. 
Government purchases continued and spread to markets outside Chicago, 
although that city remained the major center of activity. Needless to 
say, the endeavor proved both expensive and absolutely ineffectual.
On November l4 Jacob Baker, assistant to Qopkins, received a 
report on the price setting effort. Hog buying continued, it was 
reported, and the "major part" of the $300,000 provided for Cope had
koMemorandum on Telephone Conversation between Commander 
Clark, Captain Cope and Captain Parsons, November 11, 1933> National 
Archives, R. G. 124.
"^^ Trans cript of Telephone Conversation between Commander Clark
calling Captain Cope and Mr. Baxter— Chicago, November 11, 1933; Na­
tional Archives, R. G. 124.
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been expended. It vas recommended that another $500,000 be provided
k-2
for the purchase program. The same day another conversation was held
between Washington and the Chicago agents. Cope received orders to buy 
another 9,000 hogs, but he was not to pay more than $4.60 a hundred.
The officials in Washington suggested that Cope get someone else to do 
the buying "in order to keep it quiet that the Government was the pur­
chaser of the hogs." Cope responded that it had been virtually impos­
ing
sible to keep it unknown. The next day Cope reported difficulty with
the buying and expressed doubts about the efficacy of the endeavor to 
peg prices. Packers, he declared, had cancelled their purchase orders 
and were shipping hogs to Chicago for the government to buy. ïSRC 
purchases, he warned, were not influencing prices anywhere except in 
Chicago. Cope concluded with the recommendation that the corporation
kkcease its price setting canpaign. In recognition of its failure,
and undoubtedly because of the awards to be made on November 17, the
government ended the live hog buying project. D, A. FitzGerald reports,
however, that price fixing purchases continued into December and that
k-3
the FSRC bought a total of 130,000 hogs. FitzGerald apparently 
included in this total some 9^,000 hogs purchased by the relief corpora­
tion in December, which properly should not be included in the price
h2
Joseph Simon: Memorandum for Mr. Baker, November 14, 1933,
National Archives, R. G. 124.
43Transcript of Telephone Conversation between C. E. Parsons 
and Cope, November l4, 1933, National Archives, R. G. 124.
44Memorandum on Telephone Conversation between Cope, Parsons 
and Clark, November 15, 1933, NationeQ. Archives, R. G. 124.
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setting attempt of ITovember.
The government's experience with the meat processors during 
November brought a sharp conflict between the Department of Agriculture 
and the Institute of American Meat Packers. In addition to the problems 
with the FSRC purchases. Secretary Wallace found it difficult to reach 
a marketing agreement with the processors. There had been suggestions 
of possible friction even before the formation of the FSRC. Late in 
September, Norman Draper, director of the Washington office of the 
processors organization, offered a number of suggestions to the Depart­
ment of Agriculture on any possible future purchases either by the AAA 
or for relief purposes. The best policy. Draper told C. C. Davis, would 
be for the government to ask the Institute what was available and the 
approximate price the packers would want. Draper implied rather strong­
ly that the processors wanted and should have considerable influence in
k6deciding when, how and what the government bought. The Department's 
reaction to the Institute's desire for power might be found in a memo­
randum from A. G. Black to Secretary Wallace early in October. When 
you see the President, Black suggested, you might keep in mind that 
J. 0. Bbrmel has declared "that he and the other independent packers 
would be delighted to, and able to, do the processing of hogs purchased 
by you out of processing taxes in the event that the large packers 
refused to be cooperative." Hormel had further suggested that if the 
"hogs were purchased direct from the farmer and processed, the cost 
would be considerably less than if purchase of meat were made upon the
Draper to Davis, September 29, 1933, National Archives,
R. G. 124.
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open wholesale market. " That method of operation would also "mean that
the farmers would get all the necessary benefits, and at the same time
Hopkins' organization would be getting hog products at lower
47
prices." 'dthough keeping Hormel's suggestions as a possible alterna­
tive, the Administration determined to follow the original plans in the 
November 17 purchases. This resulted in exorbitant profits for packers 
who received contracts. Actually, the fortixnate packers were probably 
as surprised as anyone at the size of their profit. Hog prices at the 
time bids were drawn up were about per hundred and many, including
government economists, were forecasting future increases. 1-Jhether the 
packers expected the great profit or not was unimportant, as the atti­
tude of government officials was undoubtedly influenced by the occur­
rence .
Other developments sûLso served to create ill will toward the 
packing industry. On November 25 G. C. Davis, Director of the Produc­
tion Division of the AAA, warned George N. Peek that veiy low hog 
prices were to be expected through December unless the government went 
into the "market immediately" and made "large purchases." Davis further
noted the rumors that packers were attempting to force hog prices 
48down. Public response also probably contributed to the rift between 
government officials and the processors. Letters, such as that written 
to Wallace by Mrs. Ralph Lawson of Silver City, Iowa, must have created
4-7
Black: Memorandum to Secretary Wallace, October 9, 1933;
National Archives, R. G. l45.
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some uncomfortable moments for the Secretary. Mrs. Lawson warned 
Wallace:
. . .  I have always had good words to say for you in the face 
of rumors to the effect that you have become like the rest of 
the politicians and are simply making use of your position to 
further your own interests. . . .
But here is the trouble,— since that time this business with 
the packers has created the most serious doubts any of us have 
ever had. We can not help wonders whether they have you 
fooled, scared, or bought. . . .
. . .  if those of us who have been conservative and taken the 
side of the government give up hope of a fair deal youll /^ic/ 
leam the meaning of righteous indignation because of confidence 
betrayed.^ 9
Although Wallace took no action against the processing industry at this 
time, the uncooperative attitude of the packers continued, probably even 
increasing early in December when the government changed its purchase 
system.
A serious discussion now developed between the relief corpora­
tion and the agricultural planners over the method of removing surplus 
pork. The difference of opinion was caused by the relatively small 
purchases made up to the end of November. Also the first advance in 
the processing tax on hogs would come on December 1, and the Department
of Agriculture was anxious that large pork purchases be made to prevent
a depressing effect on hog prices. Obviously disappointed with the
small purchase on November 17 and with declining hog prices, C. C.
Davis declared that the AAA was not receiving the "cooperation and
50support" from the relief organization that "had been anticipated."
ko
Mrs. Ralph Lawson to Wallace, November 22, 1933  ^National 
Archives, R. G. 1^ 5*
^^Woodbury Willoughby: Reminder to George N. Peek, November
23, 1933, National Archives, R. G. 124.
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Davis later insisted that "large purchases" of pork must he made by 
the government immediately to save the hog market from even lower 
prices
A further delay in large scale buying now developed over
changing the method of buying pork. Because of its earlier experience
with the packers, the FSRC cancelled its planned purchase on December 1
and proceeded to develop a new purchasing system. To partially make up
for the cancellation and to offer some protection to hog prices, how-
52ever, the corporation began purchasing live hogs on December k. 
Nevertheless, AAA officials regarded that project as merely a temporary 
expedient and obviously became somewhat disgruntled with the FSRC 
during the period devoted to the development of a new program. Although 
agricultural officials were probably as dissatisfied with the processing 
industry as the FSRC, they were evidently so eager to continue purchases 
at any cost that they were willing to go on buying commercial cuts from 
the packers.
Robert M. Littlejohn, Chief of the Special Commodities Section 
of the AAA, informed Peek on December 5 that hog prices in Chicago had 
declined $1.30 a hundred since the FSRC had awarded contracts for the 
November 17 purchase of pork. Littlejohn then discussed the various 
proposed methods of purchasing. Although agreeing that direct purchase 
of live hogs assured the farmer fair prices, he did not favor the idea
51Davis to George N. Peek, November 25, 1933, National 
Archives, R. G. lk-5.
52C. E. Parsons to Bureau of Animal Industry, Department of
Agriculture, December 5, 1933, National Archives, R. G. 12k.
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because it would force the government to establish purchasing machin­
ery. Littlejohn also considered the plan of using the packers as 
buying agents for the government unpromising. This method was too 
complicated as it would require a larger staff and would, he felt, make 
it necessary for the government to audit the books of the packing 
houses. Besides, he doubted that the packers would cooperate with the 
plan. Littlejohn maintained that the method of purchase used by the 
corporation had a "direct bearing" on the "mission" of the AAA. He 
admitted, however, that agricultural officials could not "dictate until 
AAA funds are being used." He wanted, therefore, to speed up as rapidly
as possible the contribution of AAA money to the surplus relief buying
5-3
p r o g r a m . O n  the next day A. G. Black informed Littlejohn that, in
spite of his objections, a plan was under consideration for buying live
hogs which avoided a complicated government buying organization. Little-
5k
John, Black insisted, should study the idea. This plan called for 
using designated packers as buying agents.
The FSRC retained the final word in purchasing methods at this 
time. Harry Hopkins directed Commander Clark on December 13 that in
the future all hogs would be bought live by the government or its
55agents. The corporation would not buy emy more finished pork. Some 
of the AAA officials continued, nevertheless, to urge the surplus relief
53Littlejohn: Memorandum for George N. Peek, December 5,
1933, Rational Archives, R. G. 12k.
5k
Black: Memorandum for Littlejohn, December 6, 1933j Rational
Archives, R. G. 12k.
55
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corporation to buy at least some commercial cuts from the processors.^
The A M  evidently hoped such action vould win the friendship of the
packers. In spite of this attitude, on December 20 Secretary Wallace
authorized the î^RC to pay not more than $10,000,000 for approximately
571,350,000 live hogs, to be purchased for the AAA. This renewed the
drive for large surplus relief purchases of pork.
With the new system of purchasing came a different method of 
financing, Starting with the purchases in late December the packers 
bought the.hogs and billed the government for their price, receiving a
58
small fee for acting as buying agents of the corporation. Under the
new program the AAA, using the processing tax funds, paid for the live
hogs and the relief agency, using FEEIA money, paid processing charges 
and distributing costs. Although this was the general method of financ­
ing, there were exceptions. At various times the A M  paid for some
purchases of commercial cuts, and the PSRC bought some live hogs and
59also paid for some of the purchases of commercial cuts and lard.
Prior to the start of the new system the ISRC had purchased 
in the two weeks after Itecember 4 some 94,000 live hogs at eight mar­
kets Evidently the relief corporation began this project on its own
C. Davis to Jacob Baker, December 20, 1933, Rational 
Archives, R. G. 124.
57Wallace to the FSRC, December 20, 1933, Rational Archives,
R. G. 124.
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59FitzGerald, Livestock Under the A A A , 77-
^^Administrator's Report, Surplus Itelief Operations, Rational
Archives, R. G. 124.
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in an effort to replace the discontinued purchases from the packers and
to pacify the AAA. By December 12, hovever, Bbpkins reported to Wallace
that the AAA had agreed to take over payment for the "daily purchase of
live hogs." Hopkins further declared that an agreement had been worked
out to continue hog purchases, under which the AAA bought ].ive hogs and
the FSRC paid al1 other e x p e n s e s . 0. G. Davis later offered to
Hopkins the appreciation of the AAA for the Itecember purchases which
"served to bridge the gap" between the purchase of commercial cuts and
the new live hog buying program. Davis also advised Hopkins that the
AAA had "set aside" five million dollars to pay for the hogs.^^
The major live hog buying project by the FSRC was proclaimed
on December 22 when the corporation announced plans to start daily
purchases at many markets throughout the country. Under the new
system, packers acted as agents of the corporation and were paid a
"small buying charge per head." The processors were paid separately
for processing the hogs. This method of buying and the distribution
of amounts and sites of purchases were designed to give more aid to
the producer and to best sustain markets. The December project called
for purchasing to begin late in the month at a rate of about 20,000
64
hogs per day, five days a week, over a period of three weeks.
^^Davis to Hopkins, January 10, 1934, National Archives,
R. G. 124.
^^Hbpkins to Wallace, December 12, 1933> National Archives,
R. G. 124.
FSRC, Press Release, December 22, 1933, National Archives,
R. G. 124.
64Administrator's Report, Surplus Relief Operations, National
Archives, R. G. 124.
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Under the live hog buying project, the disgruntlement and un­
cooperative attitude of the meat packers obviously increased. With the 
first scheduled purchases ending and nev purchase awards to be made, 
the differences between the Administration and the processors came into 
the open. On January 21 Secretary Wallace wrote William I-Jhltfield 
Woods, President of the Institute of American Meatpackers, expressing 
his dissatisfaction. He was disappointed, Wallace declared, with the 
way packers were cooperating with the AAA purchases of live hogs through 
the FSRC. There was no need, he insisted, for the failure of the proc-
65essing industry "to give real cooperation in this progiram. "
Officials of the packing organization immediately asked to meet 
with the Secretary to discuss the misunderstanding. On January 29 
Wallace met with the packer representatives. As a result of the confer­
ence, a recommendation committee consisting of members from the AAA, 
ISRC, and a packer representative was established.^^ Evidently the 
processors satisfied Wallace as to their willingness to cooperate with 
the hog program, for not only were live hog purchases continued, but 
they were also increased by an additional 10,000 head per day. This 
expansion lasted only seven days and was quite obviously dictated by 
the 50 cent jump in the hog processing tax effective on February 1. In 
addition, the reconciliation was affirmed by a renewal of the purchases 
of commercial cuts which was designed to give relief to the packing 
i ndustryAfter the creation of the joint committee, relations
R. G. l4$.
66,
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"between the government and the processors remained satisfactory and 
purchases of both live hogs and commercial cuts continued off and on 
into September of 193^-
After the start of the live hog buying program, the agricul­
tural officials exerted considerable influence over the purchase policy. 
This was obvious both in the timing of the larger purchases and the 
resumption of the commercial, cut buying. In January the relief corpora­
tion reemphasized its surplus removal role. The PSRC tos purchasing 
hogs not only to feed the needy but also "to assist in the stabiliza­
tion of the hog mai'ket through the purchase and utilization of pork in 
excess of the normal requirements of the customary trade channels."
The corporation continued to demand the lighter weight hogs, buying
68only those weighing bet\reen 100 and 200 pounds. This, of course,
carried out the idea of the AAA that the removal of light hogs would
result in a greater reduction of future hog tonnage. Further use of
the FSRC by the AAA came whenever the processing tax on hogs was
increased. Although purchases were heavier in January than in any
other month, buying increased sharply after Januaiy 1 to meet the
February 1 tax advance and again purchases were greatly expanded to
69
offset a further tax increase on the first of tferch. Total purchases 
in March were rather small, however, as hog prices began to go up.
Since hog prices were rather good throughout the spring months 
of 193^, the FSRC found it unnecessary to make large surplus removal
^FSRC, Schedule No. 32, January 22, 193^> National Archives, 
R. G. 124.
^^FitzGerald, Livestock Under the A A A ,  75-76.
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purchases. Indeed, there were some periods when buying ceased complete­
ly. At last the removal of the six million pigs bought by the govern­
ment In August and September 1933 was causing higher hog prices. Hot 
until the drought conditions In late spring forced large numbers on the 
market did the relief organization resume large scale buying. On May 
11 C. C. Davis authorized the FSRC to buy on the AAA account 15,000 
hogs per day for 15 market days. He suggested that the country be
divided Into four buying regions to add greatest support to the hog
70market. On May 23 W. R. Gregg, acting Secretary of Agriculture,
transferred five million dollars from the AAA to the FSRC and authorized
71the purchase of 700,000 live hogs. Obviously the Department of Agri­
culture was very concerned about the hog market situation at this time. 
The problem, however, was not as serious as officials feared. During 
June the last of the extensive buying took place when live hog and pork 
product purchases totaled the equivalent of 256,7^9 hogs. Between June 
and September the hog tonnage removed from the market by the government 
declined steadily and rapidly. In July the equivalent of only 17,000
were purchased, and In September, the last month of activity, the amount
72taken equalled only 750 hogs.
In all, the AAA paid for 1,236,399 hogs weighing 213,823,0^5 
pounds live weight as Its contribution to the surplus relief operations. 
The cost of live hogs was $8,225,906. Also, the AAA bought for the
R. G. 124.
70
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relief corporation, some 33,338,846 pounds of pork products vhich cost 
73$2,790,7 2 0. The total cost to the Department of Agriculture In Its 
support of the îBEC surplus pork removal operations m s  slightly over 
$11 million. It should he remembered that the ÎSEC bought sone hogs, 
both live and commercial cuts, as well as paying for both processing 
ançi distribution of the relief meat. In all the surplus relief opera­
tions removed the equivalent of 2 million live hogs, averaging 380  
pounds, from the regular market supplies between November 1933 end 
September 1934.^^
In the reRC's pork operations the removal of price depressing 
supplies from the market was more Important than the need of obtaining 
extra meat for the needy. During the months of December, January and 
February of 1933-1934, when the largest purchases were made, the ISRC
still had on hand some of the pork procured from the Emergency &»g Mar-
75ketlng Program of the previous August and September. The relief 
organization was further used In trying to pad the price depressing 
Influences of the processing tax on hogs. Whenever the tax was In­
creased, purchases were expanded. The objective of setting hog prices 
proved Impossible. Other than the abortive November trial no reeO. 
attempt was made to set prices or pay above the current market price 
for hogs. The policy, A. G. Black declared, was to have the packers 
buy hogs for the government "at prices In line with the prices they are
73Philip G. Murphy: Memorandum for C. C. Davis, April 18,
1935, National Archives, R. G. 124.
74FitzGerald, Livestock Under the A A A , 7 8.
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paying for hogs of corresponding weight and grade bought for their o\m 
account. Some producers believed that the government could and
should force up commercial prices and were disappointed that the FSRC
77
did not pay above the market price in an attempt to do so.
In contrast to the pig purchase project, however, the hog buy­
ing programs of the Federal Surplus Relief Corporation aroused very 
little criticism. There are, of course, obvious reasons for the better 
reception received by the relief operations. Not only were the pur­
chases, ostensibly at least, made solely for the sake of the poor but 
also there was no basis for humanitarian objection to the program. In 
addition, politically inspired opposition to feeding the needy might 
well have been dangerous. There were, however, some political attacks 
aimed at the great powers enjoyed by the ÎBRC. Obviously the relief 
corporation ' s activity could draw support from a much broader base than 
could the emergency hog purchases. The FSRC operations were not designed 
to aid only one farm commodity group, but would instead benefit the pro­
ducers of a number of agricultural commodities as well as the hungry. 
Since the purchases of the relief corporations were not aimed directly 
at reducing production, this type of government program avoided most of 
the critical areas which had brought so much opposition to the previous 
project. Equally important, perhaps, the procedure of the FSRC evaded 
most operational problems confronted in the AAA hog buying program.
R. G. IU5 .
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CHAPTBE VI
GAÎH?LE RANCHERS GAPITüLAa?E TO THE AAA; THE DEMAND FOR 
FEDERAL AID BRINGS A PRODUCTION CONTROL PLAN
Thé vaunted Independence of cattle ranchers, displayed as 
recently as the Congressional hearings on the Agricultural Adjustment 
Act, temporarily capitulated before low prices and spreading drought 
in the summer of 1933* Within a few weeks after the passage of the 
farm relief bill which had omitted cattle as a basic commodity, stock­
men throughout the nation began to appeeil to Washington for aid. The 
nature of the help desired by beef producers remained unclear until 
after the announcement of the eiærgency hog purchase project. In 
August, however, cattlemen started to advocate a similar government 
buying program. While some petitioners admitted that ranchers had been 
wrong to stay out of the farm program, many others attacked the govern­
ment for trying to destroy the most important industry in the country 
and demanded immediate large-scale relief measures.
Dolph Brisco», President of the Texas and Southwestern Cattle 
Raisers Association, was one of the first to repent and ask federal 
assistance. "Personally," Briscoe wrote Secretary Henry Wallace on 
June 29, "I wanted cattle left in the Farm Bill recently passed." Only 
the opposition of members in his association, he said, had caused him
149
150
"to ask that cattle he excluded." But, Briscoe advised, "I believe to­
day they ^ cattlemen/ are favorable to including cattle in your program 
for raising prices and curtailing production." The cattle situation 
was "serious and must have immediate action," he insisted. "There is 
no time to call meetings or hold conferences," Briscoe contended. But 
"someone with courage and foresight like you and Mr. Morgenthau must 
take the matter in hand if any help is had. Most cattlemen did not 
bother to either commend Wallace for his "courage and foresight" or 
hint at participation in control programs. They simply demanded govern­
ment help.
Early in July Briscoe wired the Secretary to reemphasize the
serious cattle situation and to renew his plea for federal assistance;
Cattle prices considerably lower than at this time year ago but 
price of feed and other commodities necessary to cattle produc­
tion greatly increased and advancing daily. Drouth situation 
will at an early date necessitate the feeding of cattle on the 
range to prevent serious death loss. The high price of all 
kinds of feed due to recent advances is going to make it extreme­
ly difficult for herds to be preserved. Western range states 
largely dependent on cottonseed cake as feed. . . . Reduction 
of cotton acreage is causing daily advance. Unless some cheaper 
method of preserving the herds than at present apparent producers 
of beef animals will be ruined. Peel there is no more serious 
situation in America today than this and none that warrants your 
thought and immediate action more. . . . Only federal action 
can bring relief.^
By emphasizing the drought and the advancing cost of production, Briscoe 
hit at two of the most common grievances of cattlemen. After June 1933 
the feeling that the cattle industry was suffering as a result of New
"^ iBriscoe to Wallace, June 1933; National Archives, R. G.
1^ 5.
^Ibid., July 12, 1933-
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Deal recovery measures was frequently expressed. Although Briscoe
recognized that the ranchers had remained outside the program at their
own request, others did not.
With the heat of July irritation of the stockmen increased.
"I am a rancher and farmer," a Texan wrote, "and I feel that we are
being discriminated upon in-as-much-as feed stuff and dressed meat have
advanced, and live stock are getting cheaper everyday, and in some cases
•a
it is impossible to make sale." J. Jamas Hollister of Caviota,
California insisted the beef industiy had been betrayed by the "big" 
ranchers who kept cattle out of the farm relief act. "They are reac­
tionary, " Hollister declared, "they are followers of the Hbover- 
Coolidge policies. Today they ridicule the Agriculturel Relief Act and 
I believe are going to be a great obstacle in putting it over." Be 
continued that the "rank and file of cattlemen must be assisted today 
by the government and if they were given a chance to declare themselves
would emphatically elect to come under the control of the Agricultural
l^.
Adjustment Act." Sons of the "big" cattlemen were also requesting 
government action.
F. E. IfoUin, Secretary of the American National Livestock As­
sociation, wired Wallace on July 31: "May I refer to my wire of July
fourteenth in which recommendation is made that conference be held early 
date Kansas City between producers, packers and your Department to work
3
Bose Reader to Wallace, July ik, 1933, National Archives,
R. G. 145.
^Hollister to Wallace, July l6, 1933, National Archives,
R, G. 145.
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out relief plan. Appreciate your advising if you have made decision as 
to this suggestion."^ The only cattle program possible under the AAA 
\ms some type of marketing agreement, and Wallace was unenthusiastic 
about that. He had already suggested to MoUin that the conference be 
delayed until the middle of August. that time, Wallace declared, 
the feed situation, which his department considered more important than 
the marketing problem, would be more clear.^ Although the cattle organ­
izations were very insistent about making agreements for fairer treat­
ment with the processing industry, the Administration remained indif­
ferent to their pleas. Wallace admitted that there was "a great deal 
of interest in the development of a program," but he insisted that the 
leaders of the cattle industry hold a conference "at which the entire 
problem might be discussed, and suggestions made which will assist us 
in meeting the peculiar situation that surrounds the cattle problem."
At the same time AAA officials were expressing hope that something 
might be done to relieve the serious cattle situation, they were adso 
reminding cattlemen that "cattle were eliminated ^ rom the Agricultural 
Adjustment A c ^  at the request of livestock men in various parts of the
g
country." Undoubtedly agi-icultural officials were hopeful that the 
^Mollin to Wallace, July 31, 1933, National Archives, R. G.
1^ 5.
^Wallace to MoUin, July 25, 1933, National Archives, R. G.
1^ 5.
7
Wallace to ffervin Jones, August 2, 1933, National Archives,
R. G. 145.
g
C. C. Davis to Thomas J. Poole, August 4, 1933, National
Archives, R. G. l45.
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worsening cattle state and the drought would influence stockmen to ask 
for the inclusion of heef cattle as a basic commodity. By early August 
cattlemen had yielded to Administration pressure for a conference of 
industry leaders. Representatives of several major cattle organiza­
tions were called together in Denver on August l4 and 15 where the
9Department of Agriculture and the AAA were also represented.
A movement developed during August which might well have been
foreseen. A. Mills of Harrison, Mississippi, inquired of C. If.
Warhurton, Director of Extension Service, why the emergency hog program
was not extended to calves and cows A few days later Wallace
received the same suggestion.^ The standard answer to petitions of
this nature emphasized that because stockmen were not under the
12Agricultural Adjustment Act the AAA could do nothing for them. Gov­
ernment representatives stressed this point at the Denver conference, 
which resulted in a unanimous resolution in support of a marketing
agreement and the appointment of a Committee of Five to work with the
13Administration and the packers to that end.
On August 26 Victor Christgau, one of the AAA representatives
Q
Victor Christgau to John Costello, August 12, 1933  ^National 
Archives, E. G. l45.
*^^ Mills to Warhurton, August 20, 1933, National Archives,
R. G. 16.
u Jesse E. Short to Wallace, August 26, 1933, National 
Archives, R. G. 1^ 5.
12
C. W. Warhurton to A. Mills, August 28, 1933, National 
Archives, R, G. l6.
Dolph Briscoe, "Report of the Committee of Five,"
Producer, XV (February 1934), 17*
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at Denver, reported on the cattle situation. He emphasized the great 
number of excess cattle and the "serious trouble" confronting the in­
dustry because of drought conditions extending from the Dakotas to 
Texas. Christgau suggested a number of possible relief measures. Some 
cattlemen, he felt, needed direct help, but others would profit from 
liberalized credit. Belief agencies might help by providing feed in 
some of the drought areas. Another possibility was for the Itepartment 
"to cooperate in a program of taking surplus beef off the market for 
food distribution by relief a g e n c i e s . B y  late August, therefore, 
the idea of relief purchases of beef to reduce the surplus cattle 
situation had been presented to the office of the Secretary of Agri­
culture. With the government pig buying project putting thousands 
of dollars into the pockets of hog raisers, the demand from cattlemen 
for equal attention increased.
At a meeting of the Northeast Oklahoma Cattlemen's Association 
it was pointed out that cattle prices were $2 per hundredweight less 
than at the same time in 1932. The Oklahoma stockmen declared that it 
was "imperative that something be done at once." The cattlemen, there­
fore, called upon "the President of the United States and the Secretary 
of Agriculture . . .  to devise means of rescuing the industry from the 
disaster with which it is threatened. . . Albert Cambell of New
Meadows, Idaho expressed confidence that the Committee of Five would 
develop some "emergency plan" to remove the price depressing surplus
l4Christgau: Memorandum to Paul Appleby, August 26, 1933>
National Archives, R. G. l6.
^^Producer, XV (September 1933); l4.
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stock. But he felt that "we cattlemen must see to it that we do not 
again find omselves facing the same problem of overproduction."
Cambell suggested, therefore, "that the cattle-growers . . . work out 
an agreement with the governmental agencies which are loaning money on 
cattle, whereby the borrower would be required either to spay or to 
sell for slaughter a certain percentage of heifer calves and yearling 
heifers before they reproduce. This . . . would keep the production 
nearer in line with the demand.
Either Texas suffered more from the 1933 drought than other 
states or the Texas ranchers were more willing to abandon their vaunted 
principles than those of other regions, for Texas led the way in demand­
ing federal relief. From Cuero, Texas came a suggestion that the
government buy canner cows and have them canned for relief families, a
17program which would give "great benefit to all concerned." On 
September 2 Dolph Briscoe, perhaps the leading representative of the 
Texas cattle industry, wrote Victor Christgau; "I am still of the 
opinion that we should use a plan with cattle similar to the hog plan. 
The money to do this could be advanced by the Treasurer and paid back 
with a processing tax after Congress meets in January. Please consider 
this plan and talk it over with Mr. Davis and, if you both think it will 
work, I will put it up to our Committee and endeavor to get them to 
adopt it. Unlike many stockmen Briscoe favored adding beef cattle
^^Albert Cambell to the Producer, August 28, 1933, published 
in XV (September 1933), 19*
17Newton M. Crain to Wallace, August 29, 1933, National. 
Archives, R. G. l4$.
18
Briscoe to Christgau, September 2, 1933, National Archives,
R. G. 145.
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to the basic commodity list and approved, a processing tax on beef.
R. L. Wiley, a "life-long Democrat" who helped, elect Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, agreed with Briscoe. Those who caused cattle to be left out 
of the farm act, he wrote, were "either fools or traitors" to the beef 
industry. "Does the Department of Agriculture," he demanded, "mean to 
sit idly by and witness this fearful cataclysm work its fury on the 
hapless cattlemen without an effort to save t h e m ? W i t h o u t  any doubt 
most of the stockmen who objected to cattle being exempted from the 
basic commodity list did so not because they wanted controlled produc­
tion but because they saw money-producing programs put into effect for 
those farm groups whose commodities came under the AAA. This is made 
most obvious by the constant emphasis of cattlemen on the harm done to 
their industry by the federal price-raising projects instituted for 
other commodity groups.
By September the theory that Administration recovery measures
were a major cause of the deteriorating cattle situation had become
extremely attractive to stockmen. The attacks took in all recovery
activity but especially centered on farm programs such as that for
cotton which raised the cost of production for beef producers. An
editorial in the industry trade journal, the Producer, expressed this
view very well;
The "New Deal" is on everybody's tongue. HRA banners are 
posted in the windows of every business house; they are hang­
ing in many homes; they adorn automobiles that dash past you.
But so far the live-stock industiy, instead of sharing in this 
national recovery which is being so widely advertised, finds
^^Wiley to A. G. Black, September 4, 1933, National Archives,
R. G. 145.
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itself between the horns of a dilemma, in part created by the 
varions business-recovery moves.
How long tlie live-stock industry will be asked to hold the bag 
remains to be seen. Patient and long suffering though it be, 
there is a limit to human endurance. Today NBA to the live­
stock industry appears to mean "No Relief Allowed." Let us 
pass the "New Deal" around, and make its benefits apparent to 
all, instead of permitting it to be ing>roperly used to add to 
burdens already too heavy to bear.
In reality, cattlemen proved to have a very small portion of the "pa­
tient and long suffering" character which their journal claimed for 
them. Although, it must be admitted that the constant reiteration of 
the USDA that little if anything could be done for cattlemen partially 
justified their feeling of being ignored, if not that of being perse­
cuted. W. A. Paddock, among many, demonstrated very well the impatience 
of the stockmen. On September 13 he asked Secretary Wallace:
I wonder if your Department is giving any attention to the 
interests of an industiy which is suffering from . . . govern­
mental activities; in fact, a continuation of present policies 
would put them entirely out of business. I am speaking of the 
large livestock industries who have for ages been producing 
beef on the ranges of this country.
Just why your Department should presume to destroy an industry 
as large a portion as this, is beyond my understanding. Perhaps 
beef is not a proper food for human beings, but it has always 
been so recognized.
The Nephi Four-Mile Creek Cattlemen's Association of Utah expressed the
same view in a meeting on October 20. Pointing to the beef cattle price
decline and to the drought conditions, the Association declared that
since "relief has already been given by the United States government to
20
Producer, XV (September 1933)> l6.
21
Paddock to Wallace, September 13, 1933, National Archives,
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other industries in no greater financial distress" the Administration
should grant "immediate relief which will enable the stockmen to 
22survive." Cattlemen later used the argument that Administration pro­
grams had raised the cost of cattle production and thus had caused 
injury to the industry as a justification for their desire that federal 
grants rather than a processing tax be used for relief of the ranchers. 
At this time, however, the thesis was simply added to the price decline 
and the drought as another reason for a government relief program.
Well before the cattlemen of Wephi, Utah asked for relief the 
Administration had taken action which promised some aid to the beef in­
dustry. As mentioned earlier, on September 21 President Franklin D. 
Eoosevelt ordered the purchase of surplus food and staples for families
on relief rolls. A total of $75,000,000 was taken from the funds of
23
the AAA and the FERA for this purpose. Almost immediately representa­
tives of the beef industry requested that aii of the money be used for
2k
relief of cattlemen. Although this, of course, was not done, the
Administration assured stockmen that they might expect to benefit from
the action. Christgau stated on October 3 that some of the $75,000,000
would be used to purchase beef, "and we are in hopes that it will result
25in some improvement of beef cattle prices." By this time, however, 
the Federal Surplus Relief Corporation was being chartered to purchase
22
Producer, XV (November 1933 ), 11.
^3pes Moines Register, September 22, 1933, P* 1*
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Producer, XV (October 1933), 16-17.
25Christgau to Brinton F. Ball, October 3, 1933, National
Archives, R. G. 1^ 5.
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surplus agricultural products for distribution to the needy. This 
agency, m t h  the support of the AAA and the FERA, was not limited to 
the expenditure of $75^000,000.
Announcement of the planned purchase of beef for relief pur­
poses was warmly greeted by cattlemen, but it did not fully satisfy 
their desire for aid. Petitions for a government program similar to 
the Emergency Hog Marketing Program continued, but the AAA insisted 
that there was little it could do. Dan E. Hughes of the Uncacpahgre 
Cattle and Horse Gro\fers Association at Montrose, Colorado wrote Peek 
on October  ^that the "only suggestion we have to make is that there 
be an immediate purchase of canner cows under a program similar to that 
of the pig purchase." Hughes added that "we are perfectly willing that 
a sales tax be placed on meat for the purpose of financing the purchase 
of old cows and the control of production. Even though cattlemen 
were not in conplete agreement, the Administration did consider levying 
a compensating tax on beef, permitted under the Agricultural Adjustment 
Act to protect competing commodities r Such a tax, contended AAA
officials, would provide the revenue to finance "an emergency beef 
27cattle program." Although a compensating tax was never levied, Harr^ "
Hopkins, President of the FSRC, expected one. The relief organization
would put up $10,000,000 to purchase beef, Hopkins declared, and he
28assumed the cattle producers would "duplicate this amount." Even 
^^Hughes to Peek, October 9, 1933> National Archives, R. G.
145.
27
Victor Christgau to Thomas B. Glascock, October 10, 1933, 
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28
G. C. Shepard: Memorandum on Emergency Beef Purchase,
National Archives, R. G. 124.
l6o
without the tax the FSRC prepared to go ahead with beef purchases, but
some source of funds other than the FERA was essential to any major
beef buying program.
On October l6 Hopkins announced that "pending perfection of
plans by the Farm Administration, " the FSRC would purchase "substantial
quantities of range cattle of cutter and canner grades," By buying
primarily cows the purchases would accomplish the two goals of feeding
29
the needy and reducing future beef surpluses. Tifo days later AAA 
officials agreed with the FSRC that the "plan for the removal of low 
grade cattle" should resialt in@"some price improvement for better
grades of beef." The officials also recommended the removal of 500,000
30
cattle by the end of 1933* The Department of Agriculture was hopeful
31that the relief purchases would bring quick price relief to stockmen. 
However, agricultural officials undoubtedly knew that the aid would not 
be enough to satisfy the cattle industry and hoped that dissatisfaction 
would lead the industiy to support adding cattle to the basic commodity 
list. Officials constantly reminded cattlemen that Department of Agri­
culture funds were not available for the relief of the livestock indus- 
32try. The AAA also resumed talk about the desirability of a "general
29
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OO
live stock relief program.' Ifeairwhile, the FSRC project for purchas­
ing canned beef encountered difficulties.
The first relief purchases of beef were planned for November 
10. Plans called for the buying of 15,000,000 pounds or the equivalent
34
of about 50,000 cows between two and five years of age. The pankers 
evidently regarded the requirements as too rigid and submitted bids for 
only approximately one-third of the total. Even so, the FSRC regarded
OC
the bids as too high and made awards for only 400,000 pounds of beef.
It ifas at this time that C. C. Davis remarked that the FKRA. was not 
giving the "cooperation and support" to the A M  in regard to the buying 
of beef and pork that "had been anticipated." Since no compensating 
tax had been levied on beef and the A M  was not contributing to the 
funds for buying cattle, there was little the farm officials could do 
to influence FSRC policies. The age limit eind other requirements, how­
ever, were relaxed on the bids for 25,000,000 pounds on November 27. 
Although the bids submitted by the I6 bidding packers were considered 
too high, A M  official, Robert M. Littlejohn, advised against rejecting 
the bids as it would have a "bad psychological effect" on the beef in-
37dustry and would slow up the program for removal, of surplus beef stock.
33Victor Christgau to Thomas B. Glascock, October 10, 1933, 
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In spite of Littlejohn's objections the FSRC rejected all bids as being 
too high. Confronted with problems in the purchase of processed beef 
similar to those with pork, the FSRC revised its purchase program.
Early in December the ISRC begem to explore the idea of state relief 
organizations purchasing live cattle within the state and converting
■30
the beef to local relief use. December 19 all state relief
administrators had been contacted about the project. Prior to this 
an experiment in buying live cattle and using relief staffed canning 
plants to process the beef had been initiated in Texas.
On November 3 Barry Bbpkins contacted Colonel Lawrence 
Westbrook, Director of the Texas Rehabilitation and Relief Commission, 
about a state purchase and processing program. The objective of the 
project, Bbpkins stated, was to utilize sui-plus cattle, to provide voca­
tional training in canning and to obtain beef for local relief. 
Westbiook was made an agent of the FERA and received $500,000 to carry 
out the p rogram .H e later reported that he purchased 21,068 cattle, 
mostly cows. When it proved impossible to supply fresh meat, he estab­
lished 19 canning plants which employed about 7,000 persons on relief
rolls. The operation lasted only about a month and was ended with the
42
e%3)enditure of the allocation. The Texas project proved quite popu- 
^^Froducer, XV (January 1934), 21.
^^Henry A. Wallace to Mark Wilson, December 9, 1933, National 
Archives, R. G. 124.
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lar, and W. P. H. McFaddin, President of the Southeast Texas Live Stock 
Association, considered the experiment a tremendous success. In addi­
tion to buying surplus cattle, he stressed, the canning "plants employed 
a large number of people, relieving the unemployment problem in the com­
munities vhere they were operated. The beef was put up at a saving over 
commercial products, and the needy were given food. This looks like 
sensible relief to us." McFaddin emphasized that the program "gave 
relief to three sources, the cattlemen, the unemployed and the
ilQ
hungry."
McFaddin also believed the Texas experiment demonstrated a
practical method of helping the whole cattle industry:
We ^attlemenj have not been selfish enough to try to horn in 
and take the front of the stage in the program. But we feel 
that the time has come for our industry to be included. . . .
If an adjustment program is worked out for the cattlemen we 
hope it will include some arrangement as the Texas Relief 
Canning program, which, as already stated, gives relief where 
relief, is needed, and does not destroy in order to give re­
lief.^
A few days later McFaddin again praised the Texas program. It had, he 
said, increased cutter and canner prices in Fort Worth more than fifty 
per cent while purchasing directly from the farmer assured the producer 
maximum benefits. If such a program to remove three or four million 
cattle, he continued:
R. G. 124; Louis H- Bean: Memorandum to Paul Appleby, January 22,
1934, Rational Archives, R. G. 124.
43McFaddin to Henry A. Wallace, January 30, 1934, Rational 
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. . . could be inaugurated in every cattle growing area in the 
Nation, it would remove the surplus cattle in less than 90 
days, employ thousands of people and supply a market for a 
class of cattle that have not been possible to sell through any 
other sources; and, at the same time, supply food for the
needy
Although the successful Texas project provided some practical and use­
ful experience in the later and larger drought purchases, that method
of relief was not broadly used in the winter of 1933-3^• A program to
46supply 100,000 pounds of fresh beef monthly was developed in Arizona. 
During January and February the West Virginia itelief Administration used 
$1 5 4 ,0 0 0 supplied by the FSEC to purchase and distribute fresh beef in
4tthat state. Funds for such programs, however, were too limited to 
make any real dent in cattle surpluses.
Direct purchases by the FSEC were renewed January 5> 1934. On 
that day awards to purchase and process 44,100 cattle into fresh-roast 
canned beef were made to packers in a program similar to that developed
with hogs. About 2,205 cattle a day were to be purchased at markets in
49
4610 states. Similar awards by the relief corporation for the purchase
of live cattle were made to extend the buying activity into most states. 
Early March, however, saw the end of live cattle purchases. During this
45
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period the FSRC bought ll^ -;260 head of largely canner class cows, a very
50small part of the total slaughter. Purchases ceased because the cat­
tle buying fund of the FSRC had been exhausted.The relief corpora­
tion continued, however, to purchase some canned beef from processors
52
for relief distribution. Government purchases of beef, either live 
cattle or canned, were never large enough to have a material effect on 
surplus supplies or price. This was obvious to stockmen who continued 
their agitation for a more adequate aid program.
From October 1933, when relief purchases of beef were an­
nounced, until the late spring of the following year the dissatisfaction 
of cattle producers with government measures to aid their industry 
increased to a fever pitch. The cattle industry, the most deserving 
in the nation, not only was not receiving help, stockmen insisted, but 
was eüLso being actively persecuted by a government willing to aid every­
one but the cattlemen. Basic to their persecution complex was the claim 
of cattlenen that although cattle prices continued to decline the price 
of everything cattlemen had to buy had been raised by federal aid pro­
grams for other industries. With this spirit, stockmen criticized most 
federal recovery programs, the relief purchases, the importation of 
beef, the processing tax, the failure to develop marketing agreements 
and anything and everything else that came to mind. While syngpathetic,
A. FitzGerald, Livestock Under the A A A  (Washington:
The Brookings Institution, 1935); 1Ü0.
^^Barry Petrie to Tex Condon, May 3, 193^, National Archives,
R. G. 145.
^^hilip G. Murphy to Congpton I. White, Ife.y 21, 1934, National
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the Administration simply insisted that so long as cattlemen stayed out 
of the AAA there was nothing the Department'of Agriculture could do to 
relieve their plight.
Pressure from cattle ranchers for federal assistance continued 
unabated in spite of the projected relief purchases of beef. Late in 
October 1933 Jay Taylor, President of the Panhandle Livestock Associa­
tion, appealed to Marvin Jones, United States Representative from Texas, 
for help:
Something must be done and done immediately ^bout the cattle 
situation^, or this country v/lU certainly be faced with a 
revolution among the cattlemen and farmers. We can't possibly 
go on with these prices. We are still paying high interest 
rates, high taxes and good wages on all the ranches, and if xre 
are to stay in business and continue to live we must have more 
for our cattle, and we must have immediate relief.
All of us are short on grass and feed for the "winter and our 
calves must be weaned within the next 30 days. A lot of them 
have already been "weaned emd no buyers have been found for them 
at any price.
Can't you do something to keep the industry that is the back­
bone of this country from going broke?53
By this time the glorious pride of the ranching industry had been re­
duced to the belief that theirs "was the most important industry in the 
nation. Because he could not make his mortgage, interest or tax pay­
ments, W. F. Illig of North Dakota asked the government to buy cattle
slj.
paying the regular market price, plus a $5 bonus per head. A. A. 
Voltmsr, President of the St. Joseph Livestock Exchange, wrote Secretary
53Taylor to Jones, October 25, 1933, National Archives, R. G.
1^5.
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Wallace that the cattle market was "never in worse condition" and asked
55
for a large scale government buying program.
The Producer justified the demand of stockmen for expanded 
relief and pointed to one of the constant complaints of the cattle 
industry:
Agriculture continues to be the sick man in our economic house­
hold. The blessings of the Hew Deal have stopped at the door 
of the man who feeds the nation, and on whose rehabilitation 
the welfare of the country most depends.
As to the live-stock, and more particularly the cattle, indus­
try, things have gone from bad to worse. In sending out our 
call for the 1933 convention, we gave expression to the belief 
that bottom had been struck. Well, it had not. We are still 
groping for it. Prices on most classes of cattle have today 
dropped to levels never before recorded. . . .  In the face of 
this, we are continuing to inport large quantities of both 
canned beef and cattle hides from South A m e r i c a .56
Almost invariably cattlemen preferred blaming almost anything rather 
than themselves for their sad plight. Although inportation of canned 
beef in 1933 was more than double that of 1932, it only totaled an in­
significant 39 >000,000 pounds. When the Civilian Conservation Corps 
was established there was almost no American canned beef available.
Thus, the increased importation.
In October, however, an executive order prohibited "the use of 
foreign canned meats by the Army, the Havy, and the C. C. C. Camps.
This order not only prohibited importations from these sources, but also
57prohibited the use of that which was already on hand." This was a 
55Voltmer to Wallace, November 22, 1933, National Archives,
R. G. 124.
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rather foolish but, perhaps, politically wise move. In any case, the 
Department of Agriculture acted as a sturdy watchdog against such un- 
American actions. In May 193^ Secretary Wallace chastised Secretary of 
War George Dem because the Department of War had purchased two million 
pounds of beef in the Philippine Islands. Because of the American sur­
plus, Wallace declared, he wanted no foreign purchases made. If there 
was a great difference between the price of the American and foreign 
beef, he continued, then Item should contact him before buying the
58foreign product. Although a tempest in a teapot, blaming the importa­
tion of canned beef for their troubles was typical of cattlemen in the 
winter of 1933- They also sought to blame the packers and the dairy 
industry.
Mrs. H. B. Price of Beading, Kansas expressed a common antago­
nism of cattlemen toward the processing industry:
With ai 1 the other things that the "New Deal" is attempting to 
do, why don't they try to help the cattle industry— the greatest 
industry in the United States, reaching out so far and doing so 
much good for all? Why don't they try to reach the packers in 
some way, forcing them to pay what they should for the cattle 
that are shipped to market? It is because the packers control 
the price of cattle, and pay so little for them, that the people 
who are in this business are having such a hard time even to 
keep their land.
My heart goes out to each one, man or woman, who has cattle and 
land. How brave and courageous they always are, never expect­
ing to have but what is right for their stock, or for that which 
they raise on their land! But they do not receive it. They 
have been robbed for years of that which belonged to them and 
for which they worked so hard. Why can't the government do 
something to reach the few men who control the price of cattle 
every day they are sold?59
^^Wallace to Item, May 16, 193^, National Archives, E. G. 12U.
59Mrs. E. B, Price to the Producer, November l4^ , 1933; pub­
lished in XV (December 1933); 22.
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Mrs. Price accepted and repeated all of the traditional agrarian myths 
about the integrity and independence of cattle ranchers. It was, and 
is, common to picture ranchers on the side of the angels, independent, 
unselfish and desiring only what their back-breaking labor produced.
This grand character was somewhat tarnished by the insistent demands of 
the cattlemen for higher prices and federal aid. Eanchers justified 
their demand for greater prices by claiming that the packers were taking 
an unfair portion of the profits. E. J. Lewis of Qnaha, Nebraska com­
plained to President Roosevelt about the low cattle prices. The packers, 
he insisted, were taking everything away from the farmers. Why, he 
asked, doesn't the government take over and run the processing indus- 
try?^^ Late in December a mass meeting at Superior, Nebraska demanded 
"regulation of markets so that producers in 193^ do not have to operate 
at a loss while packers income show huge profits. The Administration 
was having trouble with the processors at this time and undoubtedly some 
of the AAA. officials appreciated the sentiments expressed by E. M. 
Lonabaugh of Sheridan, %roming who, on January 10, 193^; wrote:
Oar people here feel that the Government should take super­
vision of the packing industry just as it has taken control of 
the railroads of the country; that it should fix a limit to 
the salaries paid to officers of the packing companies, and 
should fix prices so that the stockgrower could realize a 
reasonable profit on his livestock over and above the cost of 
production. . . . Until supervision of the packing industry 
is undertaken by your ^ allsuj^ Department^ we have little hope 
for early restoration of livestock p r i c e s .
6o
Lewis to Roosevelt, December 14, 1933, National Archives,
R. G. lit-5.
^^Dorsey Worden and others to Wallace, December 23, 1933, 
National Archives, R. G. l4$.
62
Lonabaugh to Wallace, January 10, 193^, National Archives,
R. G. 114-5.
170
Although the drive to reform the processing industry did not succeed, 
the cattlemen remained interested in the government fixing the price of 
cattle.
Late in October 1933 H. N. Jensen demanded that Wallace peg
cattle prices "at once,"^^ The refusal of the FSRC to pay more than
market price for beef was one of the major reasons for dissatisfaction
with that organization. The relief corporation turned doTrm bids on
processed beef which it considered too high. During the Texas project,
it required that not less than $1.75 per hundred pounds be paid, but
made no effort to pay over the market price. When considering a similar
program in Colorado, the FSRC declared that the cost must not exceed
$2 per hundredweight. Thus, the corporation refused to try to raise
cattle prices. This caused F. E. Mollin of the American Rational Live
Stock Association to send a raging telegram to Harry Hopkins:
Several press reports within last few days refer to proposed 
plan to buy good-quality cows weighing from nine hundred 
pounds up, at price of two dollars per hundred. Proposed 
price would be bearish even on present depressed markets. Our 
industry entirely unable to understand insistence of your 
organization that beef for relief puiposes must be purchased 
on basis of present distressed prices and your unwillingness 
to allow such purchases even normally to advance the market.
Hence, although much publicity has been given to proposed 
plans for purchasing beef during the past three months, when 
it would have been of great help, as that is regular shipping 
season, actually practically no beef has been purchased. In 
civil-works projects now under your care you are paying 
generous wages for common labor. Why do you insist on buying 
cows at the bottom of a distressed market.^
Dolph Briscoe, reporting for the livestock Committee of Five, seconded
^^Jensen to Wallace, October 31; 1933, Rational Archives,
R. G. 16.
64
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Moilin's attack on Hopkin's corporation.^^ In reality, cattlemen had 
regarded the relief purchases of beef as only a stopgap measure. Never­
theless, they were disappointed that the FSRC had done nothing to help 
the industry. Many cattlemen blamed the AAA for the limited surplus- 
relief purchases of beef, and thus for the lack of any aid for ranchers.
The ISRC required in its projects for the removal of surplus 
farm commodities that the benefited industry contribute a matching sum 
of money. Early in the campaign the AAA obviously intended to levy a 
compensating tax on beef to provide revenue for the purchase program.
The only legal justification for the tax was to provide protection for 
pork, which \ra.s on the basic commodity list, from competition with 
lower-priced beef products. Declining hog prices in the fall and early 
winter of 1933, however, removed any need for protecting pork and thus 
any excuse for a compensating tax on beefRepresentatives of the 
cattle industry insisted they were prepared to accept the conpensating 
tax to support removal of excessive supplies. Actually, however, their 
willingness to accept the tax was never more than a half-hearted one. 
After admitting that the use of the tax to purchase surplus beef for 
relief purposes would be a good thing, F. E. Mollin declared: "but it
is my firm conviction that the greater portion of the burden of feeding 
the unemployed should rest upon the federal government, and that the 
funds advanced by the Federal Emergency Belief Commission for the 
purchase of surplus commodities should considerably exceed the amounts
^^Dolph Briscoe, "Report of the Committee of Five," Producer, 
XV (February 1934), 17.
^^ Ibid.
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which the producers tax themselves for a similar purpose." Mollin 
justified his position %fith the claim that in spite of its distressed
condition agriculture was already "voluntarily doing more than its
67
fair share" in providing relief food for the needy. Although dis­
couraged with the limited purchases of the FSRC, spokesmen of the cat­
tle industry were more distressed by the failure of Secretary Wallace 
to reach a marketing agreement with the processors.
Dolph Briscoe, Acting-Chairman of the Committee of Five, in­
sisted that AAA officials had advised the cattlemen at the Denver meet­
ing that the "main avenue of relief open to us was through a marketing 
agreement." The Committee had worked toward this goal, but had received 
little cooperation from the Department of Agriculture.^ Cattlemen 
never made it exactly clear how they expected to benefit from a market­
ing agreement. From the emphasis cattlemen put on the unfair percentage 
of the consumer dollar the processors and distributors were taking, they 
obviously hoped an agreement would increase and, perhaps, fix the pro­
ducer's share of the consumer dollar while restricting the portion of 
the middlemen. Achievement of such a worthy and, in many ways, just 
objective was extremely unlikely. But this was about the only thing 
cattlemen could hope for from an agreement. The more efficient opera­
tion of the processing and distributing activities, which a marketing 
agreement might have forced, would have profited the rancher little if 
any. Regardless of Administration doubts, Mollin insisted the marketing
^^F. E. Mollin, "Agricultural Adjustment Program as Cattle- 
Producers View It," Producer, XV (November 1933)  ^8 .
68
Dolph Briscoe, "Report of the Committee of Five," 17»
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agreement was basic to improving the cattle situation. According to
Mollin, the producers and processors reached an understanding on the
agreement in September: "I am glad to say that the packers agreed to
most of the changes we had suggested. A fine spirit of co-operation was
s h o w n . T h i s  was of little importance, however, since the agreement
must be between Secretary WaJLlace and the processors, and the Secretary
70continued to doubt the practical value of marketing agreements.
In December Mollin complained to President Roosevelt about the
lack of action. Secretary Wallace, he said, had been asked for help in
July. In August the Department had suggested a marketing agreement, but
nothing had been done. The FERA had announced in October plans to make
big purchases of canned beef, but, Mollin emphasized, only nominal pur-
71chases had been made. Briscoe correctly understood the delay in sign­
ing an agreement with the packers. Every effort, he said, had been 
"blocked by the unfortunate deadlock existing in the AAA. . .. " Al­
though the producers and processors had reached agreement, "the two
T2schools of thought," Briscoe continued, "in the AAA, diametrically 
opposed to each other as to the advisability of making marketing agree-
69
F. E. Mollin, "Agricultural Adjustment Program as Cattle- 
Producers View It," 8 .
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Wallace, Transcript of Press Conference, December 6 , 1933, 
National Archives, R. G. 1 6.
■^Hfollin to Roosevelt, December 10, 1933, National Archives,
R. G. 1^5-
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Briscoe may have underrated the divisions within the Depart­
ment. Wallace had never regarded the marketing agreement as being a 
useful method of farm relief. Whereas, Administrator Peek believed it 
very important. In addition, some members of the AAA wanted to use the 
agreement to reform if not control the packing industry, demanding the 
right to check company records and so forth.
n h
73ments, preveuted our reaching an. agreement." The real block had 
developed over the demand of some AAA officials that the marketing 
agreement be used to reform the packing industry. In spite of the 
failure to get a marketing agreement and the relief purchases to really 
help, stockmen had other remedies which they preferred to controlled 
production.
Like hog producers, cattlemen became very interested in the
sale of their product to Russia. On November 10, 1933, R. L. Heflin
commended Roosevelt for negotiating with Russia and suggested the sale
75of surplus cattle, especially cows, to the Soviet Union. On November 
20 F. E. Mollin endorsed the idea. In a wire to Wallace, Mollin said 
that, since the President had recognized Russia, Wallace should take 
"prompt steps" to explore that outlet for surplus cattle. The execu­
tive committee of the New Mexico Cattle Growers Association "appeeiled
to Secretary Wallace to expedite the financing and sale to Russia of
77three or four million young cows. "
A similar painless solution was found in the attempt to blame 
al 1 cattle problems on other meat producers. Mollin held that the beef 
cattle situation had been "aggravated by the crisis in meat affairs
73Dolph Briscoe, "Report of the Committee of Five," 17.
7^ nFitzGerald, Livestock Under the A A A , 177-178 •
75Heflin to Roosevelt, November 10, 1933, published in the 
Producer, XV (December 1933), 22.
^^ollin to Wallace, November 22, 1933, National Archives,
R. G. 16.
77
Producer, XV (December 1933), 11.
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brought about by continued heavy production of hogs, in spite of the
loss of export trade, and by persistent overproduction of dairy pro-
78ducts.' Hog products made up a much larger percentage of the total 
meat produced in the early 1930's than in the period before 1920. In 
addition a large part of the great increase in cattle numbers could 
justly be laid at the door of the dairy industry. Out of a total 
increase of 8,428,000 cattle between January 1, 1928, and January 1, 
1933, the beef men had contributed much less than the dairy men. Since 
January 1, 1914, the total increase in cattle had been 6 ,3 9 2 ,000 head,
of this, Mollin declared, "6,206,000 is in milk cows alone, to say
7 9
nothing of other dairy animals. The cattlemen were right in their 
claim that low grade dairy cows depressed beef cattle prices. There 
was, therefore, some justice in their desire that dairy men reduce 
their numbers rather than beef ranchers. But none of the easy solu­
tions could .solve the cattle problem, and by December 1933 some cattle­
men were turning to the AAA and production control as their only answer.
F. E. Mollin indicated the change in attitude of the cattle 
industry in November:
Six months ago we thought we could see our way out unaided.
Ne could not foresee that, agriculture having been thoroughly 
deflated, similar deflation would not be forced on many indus­
tries that had stubbornly held to practically a normal level 
of charges. . . .  We could not know that the ERA would sharp­
ly enhance the cost of all supplies needed in ranch operations; 
that the practical fixing of the cotton price at 10 cents a 
pound through the recently announced loan plan would strengthen 
cottonseed-cake prices; that the advancing labor costs would
78
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Producers View It," 6.
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so disturb the already wide differentials that today live cattle 
are selling for less than they were six months ago. . . .
Traditionally independent though he be, whether he likes it or 
not, the cattleman today is very much in the "new deal," entire­
ly unable to cope single-handed with forces that, on the one 
hand, widen the spread between himself and the consumer, and, 
on the other, increase his costs of operation.
Although Mollin insisted that the traditional independence of 
the rancher was being destroyed by actions of the government, he urged 
Roosevelt in December to "insist that the Government enter the markets 
now and make substantial beef purchases. As the livestock situation 
became worse, the demand for aid intensified in December and January 
193 ,^ and a greater willingness to submit to the AAA was demonstrated 
by cattlemen. E. A. Phillips, Secretary of the Montana Stockgrowers 
Association, declared that stockmen were not "requesting a relief dole 
or a gratuitous gift of money"; instead, he said, "they are simply ap-
82
pealing to the Administration to purchase their products. " On 
December 29 the Arizona Livestock Conference concluded that the "major 
problems of the industry can be solved only through the agencies of the 
federal government." The Arizona cattlemen also advocated the develop- 
ment of a production control program under the AAA. Representatives 
at the American National Livestock Association meeting in Albuquerque 
were less certain. The New York Times reported that the conference of
^^Ibld., 6-7.
^^Mollin to Roosevelt, December 10, 1933, National Archives,
R. G. 14$.
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1500 cattlemen accompli shed nothing. The stockmen demanded a higher 
protective tariff and larger sales of beef. But the Times reported 
only that cattlemen were angry and baffled. They did not know what
they wanted. The ranchers were against any new program and felt that
Sig­nature and the AAA. were against them. The Texas delegation, however,
reported Tom Connally, wanted to make cattle a basic commodity, with 
40 out of the 45 present voting approval.
îfeny others also felt that beef cattle must come under the AAA. 
The Grayson County Virginia Agricultural Board :*nsisted that "beef cat­
tle should, by all means, be included under the Agricultural Adjustnent 
Act. . . . The AAA reported that "the majority of communications 
received . . . favor the inclusion of cattle as a basic commodity.
"87
Without doubt the attitude of the Administration influenced
the cattlemen to ask Congress to add them to the Agricultural Adjustment
Act. Throughout the fall and winter the AAA emphasized that "had beef
been included as a basic commodity in the Agricultural Adjustment Act
the problem . . . would have been much more sinqple and relief to cattle- 
68
men more rapid." On January 2, 1934, Barry Petrie, Chief of the Cat-
Oj,
Mew York Times, January 21, 1934, Section IV, 7*
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U. s.. Congressional Record, 7 3 d  Cong., 2d  Sess., 1934, 
LXXVIII, Part 4,
"Suggested Legislation to Aid the Beef Cattle Industry," 
Legislative Committee of the Grayson County Virginia Agricultural 
Advisory Board, January 1934, National Archives, R. G. l45.
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tie and Sheep Section, sent out telegrams advising ranchers that; 
"Secretary Wallace Is hopeful of having cattle Included as basic com­
modity In Agricultural Adjustment Act. Is also hopeful of an appropria­
tion two hundred million dollars for relief of beef and dairy Industries 
at next session of Congress after which the way will be cleared for
Oq
helpful measures." This campaign continued until Congress added beef 
to the commodity list. In February Petrie promised that "the bill now 
before the United States Senate when passed will provide the machinery 
whereby It f^lll become possible to produce a beneficial program for the 
cattle I n d u s t r y . H e  also warned: "You no doubt realize there Is
no possibility of helpful measures being exercised as far as beef cat­
tle Is concerned until H, R. 7^78 making cattle a basic commodity becomes 
a law. With the full approval of the Department of Agriculture and 
the somewhat regretful acceptance of the cattle industry. Congress placed 
the rancher under the protective wing of the AAA. The Jones-Connally 
Relief Bill, which passed on April 7, 193^, made cattle a basic commodity 
and authorized the appropriation of $200,000,000 for Secretary Wallace 
to use for the benefit of the beef and dairy industries.
Considerable controversy developed over the large appropria­
tion. Wallace at one time "anticipated that at least $150,000,000 of 
the above amount would be returned to the Treasury out of future proc-
^^Petrle to Philip A. KLipsteln, January 2, 193^> National 
Archives, R. G. 1^ 5.
^^Petrle to Brinton F. Hall, February 13, 193^, National 
Archives, R. G. 1^ 5*
^^Petrie to Samuel Fischer, îtebruaiy 19, 193^, National
Archives, R. G. 1^ 5.
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92essing taxes." Cattlemen and many of their congressional representa­
tives -were so opposed to the processing tax, hovever, that it was left 
very unclear whether the grant would be repaid or not. Most cattlemen
felt that they deserved a free grant, and many observers regarded the
93authorization as such. Wallace gave the idea credence by promising,
said Richard Mifflin Kleberg, representative from Texas, "that for the
immediate future no processing tax would be" levied on the beef indus- 
9^try. In any case, the way was now clear for the development of that 
beneficial program the agricultural officials had been promising cattle­
men.
Well before cattle were made a basic commodity planning began 
for a production control program. The Itepartnent of Agriculture called 
a conference of beef and dairy representatives to meet late in January 
in Washington. Barry Petrie reported that "the consensus of opinion" 
of the cattlemen held that there was an "extreme surplus of cattle, the 
number being something like ei^t or ten million head." The representa­
tives, Petrie said, recommended a reduction program of three million 
cows and one million heifers. The cows would be killed with the edible 
used for relief. There were two ideas on the heifers with one group
suggesting a "graduated spaying program" but Petrie prefeired a moderate
95bonus purchase plan. There was, therefore, semiofficial agreement on
^Sfallace to H. D. Smith, February 15, 193^, national. Archives, 
R. G. 145.
Oklahoma Famer-Stockman, XLVII (June 1, 1934), 8.
S., (Congressional Record, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1934, 
LXXVIII, Part 2, I953I
^^Petrie to Terry M. (Carpenter, February 15, 1934, Rational
Archives, E. G. l45.
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the need, for a cattle red,uctlon program by the end. of January, and. the 
Administration Immediately began a search for canning facilities for
96such a project. At this time plans for a cattle program resembled 
the Emergency Hog Marketing project.
Between the late January meeting and early May the Department 
of Agid.culture wrked energetically to secure a cattle reduction program. 
Secretary Wallace admitted in March that: "We will probably have to
resort to the removal of beef from commercial channels for relief pur-
9Tposes Just as we did In the case of hogs. ... " The drive for a 
reduction-control program Intensified after the passage of the Jones- 
Connally bill on April 7• Agricultural officials called a beef cattle 
conference In Chicago on April 26. It was obvious that cattlemen were 
still not fully committed to a control plan. C. C. Davis, now the AAA 
administrator, emphasized the necessity of both reducing and controlling 
the cattle population: "Substantial increases have occurred In both
kinds ^^Iry and beefj of cattle during the past six years. . . . The 
average annua], crop of calves of the past six years could be produced 
with 6 ,500 ,000 fewer cows than are on the farms and ranches at the 
present time." No "Immediate elimination" of that number should be 
attempted, however, because there was no possible outlet for that 
amount. Ite,vls concluded by throwing the problem Into the lap of the 
cattlemen: "The development of an actual beef cattle program logically
^^Petrle to Philip A. KUpsteln, February 5, 193^, National 
Archives, R. G. IÀ5 .
97Wallace to Louis Murphy, Iferch 6, 193^> National Archives,
R. G. 145.
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■belongs to the group meeting here today. You represent cattlemen in 
A.11 parts of this country. Those of us in the Administration desire 
to see you proceed immediately to develop a sound program suited to 
the needs of the industry, just as did the c o m  and hog producers of 
the Middlevest.
G. B. Thome, AAA economist, also told the cattlemen that they
must reduce cattle numbers to prevent production of "record beef sup­
plies." Although "liquidation of surplus cows would no doubt occur in 
the next few years, regardless of an adjustment program," it would be 
a very painful process and would further depress cattle prices. It 
would be wise, therefore, to work out a less disastrous method of reduc­
tion and "to take steps to prevent a repetition of such an unfavorable
supply situation in future years, and to reduce the sharp fluctuations
99in cattle production." Davis and Thome thus warned the cattle 
representatives that a planned reduction-control program to meet the 
surplus problem would be far less painful than the otherwise inevitable 
unplanned and chaotic liquidation.
Barry Petrie, who acted as chairman of the congress, backed 
up the statements of Ite.vis and Thome, emphasizing that the source of 
the cattle "producers' trouble is chiefly due to a surplus of dairy and 
beef cows." More important Petrie summed up the suggested proposals 
and warned the stockmen that there was no easy way out. The "exclusion
90
Davis, "Address to Beef Cattle Congress," Chicago, April 26, 
193^, National Archives, R. G. l4$.
99
Thome, "Address to Beef Cattle Congress," Chicago, April 26,
193^, National Archives, R. G. 1^ 5*
182
of imports and removal of diseased cattle" TJas good, he admitted, but 
offered no solution. Government buying of cows and heifers for relief 
purposes was limited, he warned by "the amounts of beef that could be 
consumed by people who are not able to buy it with their own funds." 
Perhaps, "15,000 to 20,000 head of cattle a month" could be consumed 
by the needy. But removal of some of the surplus cattle flooding the 
market "would not get d o w  to the root of the problem, " Petrie declared, 
for "it would not prevent the birth of excessive calves. It would do 
but little good to relieve the market today if we flooded it again to­
morrow . Thus, according to Petrie, the removal schemes would be of 
only temporary value, just as was the emergency hog purchases, for the 
real necessity was the development of a more permanent production con­
trol program. Cattlemen were prepared to go along with temporary reduc­
tion proposals as they offered cash, but they were less willing to accept 
a long-term curtailment plan.
Petrie also expressed doubts about the value of the popular 
control schemes. The plan, he said, of spaying heifers and offering 
premiums on cows and heifers marketed had a number of drawbacks. Un­
doubtedly, Petrie agreed, the payment of a "substantial sum" would en­
courage stockmen to sell their females. "If it were made profitable, 
however, for a stockman to market female cattle," he warned, "it would 
at the same time be profitable for him to raise more." None of the 
plans advanced, Petrie felt, reached the heart of the cattle problem, 
permanent control of the number of breeding stock;
*^^ *^ Petrie, "Address to Beef Cattle Congress," Chicago, April
26, 193^, National Archives, R. G. 1^5.
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In order to attack the cattle industry's key problem at its 
roots, we must not only reduce the number of females on hand, 
but provide some means whereby the number of females can be 
kept at the new or lower level to which it is reduced. If 
producers decide in a general way that they want a cattle 
production control program, it will be up to them to determine 
the point at which control should be exercised.
Thus, Petrie also left the development of a long-term curtailment pro­
gram up to the cattlemen. He warned the stockmen, however, that unless 
a definite control plan were adopted immediately "there will be plenty 
of trouble ahead.
In spite of the appeals and warnings of Administration repre­
sentatives about the necessity of developing both reduction and control 
programs, the cattlemen remained basically uninterested especially in 
the control aspect. About the only thing the stockmen could eigree on 
was the opinion of Charles A. Ewing, President of the National Livestock 
Marketing Agency, that: "No other great basic business— and t6is is the
biggest, most extensive and most important business in the country, and
I think always will be— is more deeply in distress with its dollar at a
102less parity price, than the livestock industry." Petrie later ad­
mitted that there was "much opposition to any program being undertaken 
as many of those present thought there was nothing wrong with the cattle
business." The only thing accomplished by the conference, Petrie de-
lOHdared, was the creation of a Committee of Twenty-five. This was a
*^^ P^etrie, "Address to Beef Cattle Congress," Chicago, April 
2 6, 1934, National Archives, R. G. 1^ 5.
102Charles A. EvrLng, "Statement Beef Cattle Congress," Chiceigo, 
April 26, 1934, National Archives, R. G. l4$.
103Petrie, "Report on the Chicago Meeting," National Archives,
R. G. 145.
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more significant achievement than he indicated, for Petrie vas permitted 
to choose the members of the committee. The committee agreed on a re­
duction and control program almost immediately, recommending a 20 per 
cent reduction dn breeding females by January 1, 1937 » The group even 
accepted a processing tax, but asked that it be kept low. They also
suggested immediate institution of the disease eradication and relief
,  ^ 104purchase projects.
The acceptance of a reduct ion-curtai1ment program did not mean 
that cattlemen favored the idea. Many, if not most, simply submitted 
to the cash inducement which came with the reduction portion. H. J. 
Baker, Director of Extension Service in New Jersey, in expressing the 
attitude of dairy men in his state summed up quite well the attitude of 
cattlemen. "They," he said, "would like to see dairy farmers in other 
parts of the country reduced but they do not want to do any reducing 
themselves. Others might accept reduction, but they did not like 
it. One humorous critic asked Wallace not to use the piggy sow method 
to reduce beef cattle numbers. Instead, he suggested that Wallace 
"instruct the farmers to allow the bulls and cows run together, but put 
roller skates on the hind feet of ai i the bulls.
In spite of the somewhat unwilling attitude of cattlemen, a
104"Resolutions Adopted by the Production and Reduction Control 
Committee of the Committee of 25 Representing the Cattle Industiy," 
National Archives, R. G. l45.
^^^Baker to C. W. Warburton, April l6, 1934, National Archives, 
R. G. 145.
^^^Rollin B. Organ to Wallace, April 27, 1934, National
Archives, R. G. l6.
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cattle program had been developed by early May- On the 9th G. C. Davis 
informed a Congressional appropriation committee of the plan, which in­
cluded the paying of $25 per head for 2,000,000 cows for relief puipioses.
The project also called for $6,000,000 for the "purchase and distribution
107of cattle from drought stricken area-s. • . . " This last provision 
foretold the joker which interrupted and finally destroyed the tortuously 
developed control program. For, nature, through the most disastrous 
drought in American history, was prepared to wreak destruction on a far 
grander scale than the New Deal planners, even in the nightmares of the 
most severe critics, ever contemplated.
107Tentative Estimate of Expenditures, by objects, of $150,- 
000,000 if appropriated for carrying out sections 2 and 6 of Public 
No. 1^2 73d Congress, approved April 7, 1934: Davis to J. P. Buchanan,
May 9, 1934, National Archives, E. 6. l45-
CHAPTER VII
THE EMERGENCY DROUGHT PURCHASE PRCGRAM
The disastrous drought of 193^ which centered in the Dakotas 
and Minnesota in early May was merely the climax of a downward trend in 
precipitation extending over the previous decade in parts of the West 
North Central States. The lack of rainfall first became pronounced in 
1929 and precipitation was again very light in 1933 with feed crops well 
below average. This meant that feed resources in the spring and summer 
of 193  ^were very limited and that farmers were ill prepared to meet 
the "most disastrous and farreaching drought, according to the Weather 
Bureau, during approximately seventy years of weather-recording." During 
the first four months of 193^, rainfall in the Dakotas was the lightest 
on record and was only 5^ per cent of normal in Minnesota.^ Although 
the situation was most serious in those three states, drought conditions 
were spreading with varying intensity throughout most of the area west 
of the Mississippi River and to some regions east of the river. By the 
first week of Ifey there was ample indication of severe damage "to crops
^"The Drought of 193^-35: A Record of Programs of Commodities
Purchase Section Agricultursil Adjustment Administration and Related 
Activities in Drought Stricken Areas," Prepared in the Statistical and 
Historical Unit, Unpublished Manuscript in National Archives, R. G. l4$, 
p. 7. Hereafter cited as "The Drought of 193^-35•"
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and shortage of water supply affecting the lives of animals, as well as 
2
human beings."
Even before a beef cattle curtailment program had been agreed 
upon, appeals for help in meeting the spreading drought conditions had 
begun to arrive in Washington. On April 30 the Minnesota State Relief 
Director remarked that "it is possible to feed people and keep them 
alive in the Drought stricken regions, but I can't see where it is
•3
humanly possible to keep the stock alive." About the first of May 
Anna Dickie Olesen, of the Minnesota National Emergency Council, warned: 
"I fear blood-shed and riots out there ^he drought region^ and loss of 
life. A meeting held in Montevideo, Minnesota late in April may have 
led to the expression of concern about riots and bloodshed. In discuss­
ing the drought situation considerable bitterness was voiced about past 
failures and the lack of a federal relief plan. J. J. Heimark raged:
"We have had promises from one administration and another. . . . Roose­
velt's policies have not been lived up to. . . .  the American people 
are getting to the end of their patience. They will not tolerate these 
conditions.
As hot dry days were followed by others even worse, the short
tender of the American farmer was quickened to the boiling point. But
^ I b l d ., l4.
^ I b i d ., 22.
h
Anna Dickie Ole sen to Frank Ward, quoted in Fred A. Ironside
to C. C. IteLvis, May 3, 193^^ National Archives, R. G. 124.
5
Remarks of J. J. Heimark, Records of Meeting Montevideo,
Minnesota, April, 1934, National Archives, R. G. l4$.
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often anger and sturdy resolves dissolved into a sense of despair, and
then pleas for government help. Although many people seemed to lose
all spirit in the face of the great natural disaster, others managed
to maintain a sense of humor, even while asking for assistance. In the
great "show me" spirit of Missouri, Albert Kuhn of that state put the
situation to Henry Wallace in a rather cynical fashion: "We need more
rain, everything is drying up; why in hell don’t you see to that !
Evidently Kuhn doubted that the Secretary could handle the problem.
But the realization that everything was "drying up" and that something
must be done weighed heavily on the minds of AAA officials. Although
there was no real hope of making it rain, that and many other projects
came into the discussions of ways to deal with the drought.
The mention of buying and distributing cattle from drought
stricken areas in the C. C. Davis communication to President Roosevelt
on May 9 vas the first apparent recognition of a possible federal relief
purchase program induced by the weather. On May 11 Economist Nils A.
7
Olsen was appointed to head a drought study committee. Three days 
later Secretary Wallace received a report on the parched areas with 
recommendations for federal action. The cattle situation, the report 
indicated, was "very critical" and a program to reduce the cattle popu­
lation by 25 per cent might be necessary. Such a reduction project 
would involve the purchase and FSRC relief usage of cattle "principally 
in drouth stricken areas at prices sufficiently higher than prevailing
^Kuhn to Wallace, May 27, 193^, National Archives, R. G. 1^ 5.
7Paul H. Appleby: Memorandum for Nils A. Olsen, May 11, 193^,
National Archives, R. G. l6.
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market prices to induce . . .  a reduction of from 20 to 30 percent in 
areas where cattle numbers are too large in relation to available feed 
supplies." The FSRC experiment in Texas the previous winter served as
Q
a "precedent for this policy," it was suggested. The AAA announced on
I&y 15 that plans for cattle purchases and other measures were being 
9
developed.
The report indicated no real conception of the seriousness of 
the drought situation. The reservation of only $6 million in the Davis 
outline and the apprehension on May l4 that cattlemen would need an 
inducement to get rid of their livestock revealed an unfortunate opti­
mism. Evidently, the AAA was thinking of the purchase project as a part 
of the curtailment program rather than as an emergency measure. In 
reality, farmers for some time would need to be discouraged from dis­
posing of their foundation stock rather than to be encouraged to sell. 
Faced with a feed shortage during the spring, and continued dry hot 
summer days, cattlemen were more than eager to reduce the size of their 
herds. Perhaps, the government purchases would prove to be a too popu­
lar solution to the drought crisis.
After deciding that weather conditions had created an emergency 
situation, the USDA officials became very active. But, after announcing 
that plans were under consideration for drought purchases and for relax­
ation of production control contracts limiting feed crop acreage and 
pasturage, officials appeared at somewhat of a loss as to what to do
8
Memorandum for Wallace on Recommendation for Federal Action 
on Drought, May 11, 193^, National Archives, R. G. l6. 
o
AAA Press Release, Ifey 15, 193^, National Archives, R. G. 1^5.
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next. Indeed, Washington remained quite uncertain about either the 
nature or extent of a drought program and for some time many AAA offi­
cials regarded the purchase project as primarily an emergency extension 
of the cattle control plan.
During the third veek of May representatives of the AAA, the 
FERA and the Farm Credit Administration met in attempts to work out the 
details of a government p ro gr am .I n addition to the difficulty of 
estimating the possible need, the Senate delay in approving the authori­
zation of the Jones-Connally appropriation of $150 million for relief 
of the dairy and beef industries hampered any estimate of the funds 
available for a purchase project. The AAA officials could say only 
that relief purchases of cattle would be "a part of the larger program 
and that they would be 'substantial.'"^ Ch May 21, however, C. C.
Davis announced the appointment of E. W. Sheets of the Bureau of Animal 
Industry to head the Emergency Drought Relief Service. Sheets was
given charge of all drought relief activities of the AAA and the Depart-
12ment of Agriculture, including the proposed buying project. On the
13same day the Drought Relief Service was created as a part of the AAA.
The AAA had already prepared to draw back from the production 
control plan for beef cattle. On May l8 Barry Petrie, head of the
*^^ George E. Farrell to Gerald P. Nye, May l8 , 193^, National 
Archives, R. G. 1^ 5.
~^~^ ew York Times, May 19, 1934, p. 3 .
12AAA Press Release, May 21, 1934, National Archives, R. G.
1 6.
13C. C. Davis, General Office Order, No. 4l, îfay 21, 1934,
National Archives, R. G. l45.
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cattle and sheep section, reported that representatives of the cattle 
industry had agreed on a control program, but the AAA. would make no 
decision on it until the extent of the drought could be determined.
The necessity of removing 1,500,000 starving cattle from the Dakotas
lA
and Minnesota presented, he declared, the most pressing problem, 
later, Petrie admitted that any plan to restrict livestock output was 
now "impracticable," and that the cattle reduction brought on by the 
drought would determine "to an uncertain degree" any future control 
program.It was virtually impossible, however, for some of the AAA 
planners to abandon their long sought limitation program. Indeed, 
some, Petrie among them, continued to believe the emergency purchases 
could be made a part of the over-aXL livestock control plan. But there 
was a realization that it would be unwise to talk about a special govern­
ment program for restricting production. Petrie now even refused to 
allow a representative of the Department to discuss cattle control or 
reduction plans before a meeting of the Colorado Stockgrowers and 
Feeders Association. Since nature had stepped in to make "more drastic" 
reductions than any the planners had contemplated, the interest of the
agricultural officials, he stressed, must be one "solely of relief 
„l6measures.
On May 23, 121 counties in Minnesota and the Dakotas were
^^Petrie to Walter P. Smith, May l8, 193^, National Archives,
R. G. 145.
^^Petrie to R. C. MeChord, May 22, 1934, National Archives,
R. G. 145.
^^Petrie to B. F. Davis, May 22, 1934, National Archives,
R. G. 145.
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designated as the emergency drought area. The cattle removal program,
17it was declared, would begin in these counties. The Area signâtion 
Committee, as it was later called, used two classifications. In the 
emergency counties all types of drought relief were granted, but the 
purchase program was not in effect in the secondary counties. This ac­
tion did not mean, however, that either the objectives or plans for 
cattle purchases or the other drought relief measures were in final 
form.
On May 25 the General Committee of the DES reported on things 
the government could do to aid the stricken farmers. The committee 
called for relaxation of production control contracts to allow the 
planting of hay and forage crops, modification of restrictions to permit 
pasturage on contracted acreage, and direct relief to farmers through 
supplying feed for subsistence stock. Liberalization of credit by the 
Farm Credit Administration and a request to the railroads for reduced 
freight rates on cattle shipped out or feed moved into the drought areas 
ifere also recommended. The purchase and shipment of cattle from the 
distressed area was the final suggestion. At this time Chester Davis 
reported to the President on the drought situation and on government 
measures taken or planned to meet it. Cattle purchases, designed to 
remove the "weakest and poorest condition animals first," would be made, 
he said, in the drought counties where the feed situation seemed most
17Emergency Drought Counties Designated, May 23, 193^,
National Archives, R. G. 1^ 5.
18îfeeting of General Committee of DBS, May 25, 193^, National
Archives, R. G. 1^ -5•
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acute. The removal project could be financed, Davis declared, by the 
$150,000 ,000 made available by the Jones-Connally appropriation, and 
he optimistically declared that "further legislation does not appear 
necessary.
Davis also outlined the administrative system for the emergency
program. A state and local organization was being created to cooperate
with the DBS. State directors had been appointed for the IteLkotas and
Minnesota, and would be named elsewhere when needed, to oversee the
federal relief activities. The cattle would be purchased on the farm
by local committees f^orking with inspectors from the Bureau of Animal
Industries and the Farm Credit Administration. After the cattle had
been bought for the AAA, they would be turned over to the FSRC. The
Relief Administration planned to process most of the edible animals
for distribution to families on relief rolls and hoped to return some
to farmers of "'subsistence* cattle units." Those cattle which were
diseased or Judged unfit for food were to be condemned and disposed of 
20on the farm.
Although methods varied, the condemned animals were usually 
shot and buried in long trenches. This became more complicated when 
buying became so large, but the same methods of burial or burning were 
used. Because it seemed so wasteful to kill and bury thousands of cows 
and calves, this was one of the most severely criticized parts of the
19Davis to Roosevelt, Ifey 25, 193^, National Archives, R. G.
1^5 .
20Detailed Report on the Emergency Drought Situation and 
Measures which have been taken or are recommended by the Federal 
Agencies, May 25, 1934, R. G. l45.
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drought program. Actually it was less wasteful than it seemed. Only
the diseased and the severely emaciated were to be condemned and even
these, at least the undiseased, could be saved by the o>mer and the
relief workers who participated in the purchase program as food for
their families. Enforcement of the restrictions on the use of condemned
meat for food depended upon the section and the people in charge. In
some areas, the officials permitted anyone who needed meat to salvage
enough for his family.
Representatives of the AAA, FSRC and the packing industry also
met on ]V fa,y 25 to discuss the purchase program. Special attention -ije.s
given to the hope of the Drought Administration to buy 50,000 cattle per 
21week. The next day the President of the Institute of American Meat
Packers notified members of his organization of the project and esti-
22mated that the government would buy one million cattle. Thus, by the
last week of May the Administration was prepared to begin its cattle
buying program. Very quickly, therefore, plans had been developed and
an organization started to buy cattle in the drought stricken region.
Furthermore, the effects of the drought were spreading. On May 29 the
northwestern comer of the Texas panhandle was added to the emergency
list and restrictions on the planting of feed or forage crops on con-
23
tracted acreage were relaxed in the drought area. By this time some
^^Hîemorandum on Meeting, AAA, FSRC and Packers, Ifey 25, 193^, 
National Archives, R. G. 124.
^^illiam Whitfield Woods to Ifembers, Institute of American 
Meat Packers, Bulletin No. 225, I#y 26, 1934, National Archives, R. G. 
124.
145.
23
AAA Press Release, May 29, 1934, National Archives, R. G.
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of the states were considering sons rather drastic actions on the state 
level, hut the federal forces were now moving in and the national pro­
gram overshadowed any possible state measures.
E. W. Sheets moved to St. Paul at the end of tfey to begin 
federal buying. At the very last minute the government agreed on a 
two payment price schedule. The farmer would receive a purchase price 
of from $1 to $1^ per head, plus a benefit payment of from $3 to $6 per 
head, with both prices based on the age and condition of the animal.
All who sold cattle were required to sign an emergency cattle agreement
ok
pledging to participate in any future adjustiænt programs.Thus, $20
was the maximum combined payment possible under the schedule, and the
average would be considerably less than that. Although the maximum
price was not much above the average farm price for cattle, the drought
schedule was actually quite generous. A great many of the cattle sold
were of the low-grade or cull variety and many of them were so starved
and emaciated that they could not have survived a shipn^nt to market.
In addition, it was obvious that if the govemnent had not bought cattle
many would have been forced on the regular market and thus have depressed
prices even further.
The first cattle appraisals were made on the last day of May
and the initial purchases were completed on June 6. Six days later,
checks totaling $1091 were issued to ten farmers from Traverse County,
25Minnesota, in payment for the first 70 drought cattle.
ok
Oklahoma Fanner-Stockman, XLVII (June 15, 193^); The 
benefit payment was not subject to the interests of lienholders but was 
reserved for the producer alone.
25
C. C. Davis: Memorandum for Wallace, June 13, 193^, National
Archives, R. G. 1^5.
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Even before the first appraisals began. Sheets indicated a 
need for more money. On 30 he declared that "the most imperative 
action required is . . . appropriation by Congress of not less than 
$250,000 ,000 . . . for agricultural drought relief." Otherwise, he 
believed, it would take the livestock industry twenty years to recover 
from the severe loss to foundation h e r d s . O n  June 9 President Roose­
velt told Congress that the drought situation continued grave. There­
fore, he asked for an emergency appropriation of $525 million with $75
27million to be used in the purchase project. Congress agreed that a 
general drought relief program of nmjor proportions was necessary and 
promptly appropriated the requested money.
îfeanwhile, the Drought Plans Committee was working out the 
major objectives to be accomplished under the purchase program. The 
project was to offer relief to owners of drought stricken cattle, it 
should conserve feed, preserve the better type of foundation stock, and 
remove as many low-producing and diseased animals as possible. In 
addition, it was hoped that the program would provide meat to the needy, 
relieve pressure on the beef market and, finally, reduce the total 
number of cattle. With these aims in mind, the Committee emphasized 
that the program should be pictured as a voluntary measure for those 
farmers who wanted to sell their cattle and sign the Emergency Cattle 
Agreement. The Plans Committee further pointed to the need for, and
^^Philip G. Murphy: Jfemorandum for C, C. Davis, June 1, 193^> 
National Archives, R. G. I6 .
27The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt:
The Advance of Recovery and. Reform, III (New York: Random House, 1933),
293-295.
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responsibilities of, the state and local organizations under the DES. 
îhe community committees were not only to oversee the details of the 
buying but should also perform an educational function by explaining
28
the character of the project to farmers.
The DES continued to develop the details for selling and buy­
ing cattle. Those famers in emergency counties who wanted to sell 
their cattle should apply to local drought relief representatives for 
permission, assemble them at a designated time and place, try to have 
any lienholder or landlord present for the appraisal, sign the required 
agreements, deliver the accepted animals to the $SEO representative, 
and dispose of the condemned cattle. Local representatives were respon­
sible for appraising, \diile inspectors from the BA.I examined the prof­
fered animals, selected those suitable for food purposes and condemned 
those diseased or suffering from malnutrition, (kily the minimum purchase 
price and benefit payment could be offered on those judged unfit for 
food, but the farmer had the ri^t to reject all appraisals. Too, the 
farmer could salvage the hides and any of the carcass of a condemned 
animal for his own use. A further ruling declared that payment could be
PQ
made only on those animals still alive when inspected. Obviously these 
aims and regulations were presented to meet and, hopefully, to curtail 
conplaints similar to those which developed during the hog buying of 
1933; to answer some criticism already proffered, to provide a basis
28
Drought Plans Committee; Memorandum for Philip Muiphy,
June 21, 1934, National Archives, E. G. l4$.
29
Drought Plans Committee; Menorandum for Philip Muiphy,
June 21, 1934, National Archives, E. G. lh$.
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for an educational or publicity campaign^ , and to develop a more orderly 
administration of the program.
By late June the most pressing problem vas that of a more ef­
fective handling of the purchases. After the AAA bought the cattle, it 
immediately donated them, except the condemned, to the FSRC for disposal. 
At first the FSRC either assigned the animals to state or local relief 
agencies or sent them elsewhere for processing, but cattle vere also 
being shipped to non-drought areas for pasturage vhile awaiting process­
ing. The relief corporation could now dispose of the drought purchases 
by distributing suitable cattle as subsistence stock, shipping them to 
commercial packers for immediate processing, donating them to state 
relief administrations "for processing in plants operated as work relief 
projects or in commercial packing plants, " or shipping them out of the 
drought area to await slaughter or redistribution.^^ Although a "cattle 
movement and quota" committee was created on June 23 to coordinate the 
buying and selling operations,no changes were made in the administra­
tion of the relief project.
The drought levied its heaviest toll during July. Continued 
lack of moisture and intense heat brought an "enormous increase in the
QO
number of cattle" offered to the AAA. Counties had been classified
^^Philip Murphy: Memorandum to Wallace, June 25, 193^;
Rational Archives, R. G. l6.
31Conference on Correlation and Coordination among the differ­
ent Departments handling the purchasing, processing and distributing of 
livestock from the drought states, June 23, 1934, National Archives,
R. G. 145.
^^"The Drought of 1934-35," p. 55-
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as either emergency or secondary in all states west of the Mississippi
River, except Washington, and in three states east of the river. Seven
counties in Florida also received the emergency designation, with all
33of its benefits, because of a serious flood situation. VJhen the Area 
Designation Committee ceased its activities on October 24, 1934, 1,187
emergency and 270 secondary counties in 25 states remained on the
34drought list.^
Paralleling the rapidly expanding drought area was the greatly 
increased rate of buying. Originally the DBS had contemplated purchas­
ing 50,000 cattle per week, but in the second week of June it bought 
over 125,000 heeui and in the week ending on June 30 purchases totaled 
262,0 0 9. The rate almost doubled in the next month as the DBS purchased 
506,273 cattle in the week ending July 28. Although buying declined 
sli^tly the next week, purchases totaled about 588,779 in the week
ending on August 11 and remained at or above that level through the
35second week of September.
By mid-July it was obvious that the purchase project would be 
much larger than anyone had anticipated and Washington was being sub­
jected to pressure from an increasingly panic-stricken public. The 
drought office in Missouri reported that "telegrams, telephone calls, 
letters and personal visits by county agents and fanners are becoming 
more numerous each day and indicating that farmers are on the verge of
^^ Ibid., 35, 59.
^^Ibid., 68.
^^Ibid., table 10, p. 78.
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getting panicky.' Confronted with such reports. Secretary Wallace 
estimated that the DRS would buy between three and five million cattle 
and declared that other purchase programs were being considered.-^ ' By 
the third week of July the far greater offerings than eapiected, finan­
cial limitations, difficulties with shipping and processing, and largely 
uncontrolled buying all contributed to what verged on chaos.
With an expanding purchase area and Increasing demands for 
government buying, purchase restrictions were lifted In some areas and 
new programs were developed during the last week of July. Although 
an attempt was made at this time to establish "dally purchase quotas" 
and to limit buying to the areas In the "most distressed condition, 
the opposite seemed to result. D. A. FitzGerald declared that "state 
officials almost seemed to be vying with one another to see who could 
purchase the largest number of cattle." Cattle were purchased "so 
rapidly and so promlscuously, " he said, "that no one had an accurate 
estimate of the number of head being bought from day to day or of what 
the total commitment" of the government was. Indeed, It was later dis­
covered that about 50,000 more cattle had been purchased than had been 
reported, and the drought authorities were forced to revise their plans 
accordingly. At the same time plans for Instituting new purchase
R. R. Thomas son to Sheets, July 17, 193^, Rational Archives,
R. G. Ih^.
37Wallace to Roosevelt, July 1 9, 193^, National Archives,
R. G. 1 6.
gO
G. D. Lowe to 0. B. Martin, July 28, 193^, National Archives,
R. G. 114-5 .
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4o
FitzGerald, Livestock Under the A A A  (Washington: The
Brookings Institution, 1935), 202-203.
201
programs were being completed. As a result of constant appeals "from
indlTidual producers, local and state sheep and goat organizations and
the National Wool Growers’ Association," a general sheep and goat pur-
in
chase project was developed. On July 30 E. W. Sheets declared that 
it was necessary to buy pure bred cattle to preserve good breeding 
stock. Although buying in the new programs did not start until 
September, their development tended to con^licate the general relief 
operations.
Under the weight of a steadily growing program and continuing 
serious drought conditions, it was decided to reorganize the drought 
relief administration. The President's Drought Relief CJommittee made 
up of Wallace, Davis of the AAA, Hopkins of the FERA, and William I. 
%ers. Governor of the Farm Credit Administration, had been created to 
give over-all guidance to federal policies. The Livestock-Feed Commit­
tee, headed by Calvin B. Soover, coordinated the drought relief meas­
ures. Harry Petrie was sent to Denver to oversee the field operations,
lio
and E. W. Sheets was returned to his "old job" with the BAI. The 
reorganization was announced on August 20, but had been under considera­
tion for some time as the Live stock-Peed Committee met on that very day 
and considered the pressing need for purchasing as well as shipping
hi
Harry Petrie: Report on Sheep and Goat Purchases by AAA
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ment of Agriculture, Library Division.
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Sheets: Memorandum for C. C. Itevis, July 28, 193^, National
Archives, R. G. l4$.
43
Victor Christgau: Memorandum for C. C. I&vis, August 20,
193^j National Archives, R. G. l4$.
202
quotas.
The shake up in drought leadership came from the need for a 
more adequate organization to mset the much larger than anticipated 
emergency, to develop weapons other than purchasing to fight the drought, 
and to bring more effective control to the purchases. But the change 
also removed the center of some resentment, for Director Sheets was not 
popular with some of his co-workers. This may have been based as much 
on his non-AM origin as on his handling of the purchases. Years later
Henry Wallace agreed that "there was some conflict with Sheets," but
th
M
he did not "remember its n a t u r e . I n  any case, sone members of e
AAA seemed pleased that Sheets had been sent "back to his bureau."
With the dismissal of Sheets, a complex organization was 
created to direct the drought relief activities. A Commodities Purchase 
Section was established to handle the actual buying of livestock, and 
a number of new committees were created to deal with specific phases 
of the activities. The Drought Plans Committee, which recommended action 
within the USDA and supplied information and policies to the President's 
Drought Committee, and the Livestock-Purchase Committee dealt directly 
with the buying project.
From the first the new organization demonstrated a determina-
Transcript of Meeting of the Livestock Feed Committee,
August 20, 193^f National Archives, R. G. 1^4-5•
J 4 .5
Wallace to author, July 30, i9 6 0.
^^R. C. Me Chord to E. L. Potter, September 6, 193^  ^National 
Archives, R. G. l4$.
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tion to regulate more carefully where and from whom cattle were pur­
chased and immediately began an analysis of the drought and feed situa­
tion. The drought officials also resolved to limit the total number 
of cattle bought and to develop facilities to feed and conserve the 
remaining stock. As the American Cattle Producer later editorialized:
Suddenly, early in September, all was changed. The question 
of additional purchases was turned over to a committee of 
economists and theorists--all duly qualified by virtue of the 
fact that they knew nothing about the actual situation. This 
committee proceeded to scare itself as to the condition which 
would exist if 14,000,000 cattle were purchased . . . /êjoA. 
joined by the packers lamente^ the situation which might exist 
if they bought more cattle than anybody intended they should. 
Thereupon the committee solemnly decided that a halt should be 
called, com fodder and sirup shipped to rescue the starving 
animals, and the herds saved from further depletion.^
Allowing for the evident bias of the cattlemen's journal, Washington 
had obviously become frightened by the possible effects of its pur­
chases . Publicity about the expense and size of the project bothered 
agricultural leadership, and Davis suggested to Wallace that future 
allocations for expenditures out of emergency funds be made by letter
rather than executive order since the orders were "given publicity
kg
which a letter will not receive.
The Administration also changed the emphasis on aims of and 
reasons for buying. No longer did anyone talk of reducing the total 
numbers of cattle. Instead, heavy enphasis was placed on the relief 
and conservation goals. In reply to a request from William W. Woods 
that the number of cattle purchased be restricted, Davis insisted that
48American Cattle Producer, XVI (December 1934), l4-l$.
4g
Davis: Memorandum for Wallace, August 24, 1934, National
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only the "minimum  number" would be bought to allow the remaining to 
survive on the available feed supplies. Otherwise, "death from starva­
tion " would complete the removal process. The program, Davis declared, 
"is aimed at conserving maximum amount of meat possible while making at 
least minimum provisions for feeding remaining livestock.Basis for 
government fears could be found in cattle purchases totaling between 
three and one-half and four million head by August 21 and with no end 
in sight. Although previous estimates had ranged from one to 10 million 
head, R. C. Me Chord admitted late in August that the ultimate total of 
purchases could not "be accurately forecast at this time. Spokesmen
for the AAA, however, talked "officially" about buying around seven 
52million head. Into this confusion the new drought committees coura­
geously flung their regulations and restrictions.
On August 30 the Drought Plans Committee declared an end to 
unrestricted buying. Henceforth, the government would buy only in the 
"most distressed" section, from farmers who demonstrated an inability
to feed their stock, and only enough from each producer to enable him
53to feed his remaining stock. The Live stock-Purchase Committee later 
declared that, prior to its appointment in late August, "practically 
no limitation had been placed on the volume of purchases and it was
*^^ Davis to Woods, August 20, 193^> National Archives, R. G.
145.
^^cChord to Laurel Johnson, August 27, 1934, National Archives, 
R. G. 145.
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quite evident that many cattle were heing purchased in areas and from 
producers not in acute distress." An analysis of available funds, past 
expenditures, and the general livestock and feed conditions revealed 
"quite clearly that it would be impossible to purchase as many cattle 
as would be offered for sale in the drought areas." In September, 
therefore, limits were placed on purchases through state quotas. Iftien 
the first allocations were made by the Committee, state drought direc­
tors were instructed to check carefully the need of those wanting to 
sell and "that priority be given to those cases in most acute distress." 
The Committee further emphasized that there simply was not enough money 
to buy all of the cattle being offered and that the purchase restric-
54tions must be observed.
Administration concern about the potential size of the purchase 
program, both the large expenditures and the possible threat to the 
future of the cattle industry, led to the attempt to impose restrictions 
on buying. Also, agricultural leaders had evidently decided that the 
drought program was the cattle program, at least its reduction phase. 
Although this was not officially stated, tkChord admitted that "it seems
probable . . . that a formal reduction program will be unnecessary, at
55least for the present." The reorganization was an endeavor to make 
the purchases strictly a relief portion of a much larger and longer 
range drought program.
5^ Livestock Purchase Committee: Memorandum to C. C. Davis,
November 8, 193^, National Archives, R. G, 1^ 5*
55Me Chord to Laurel Johnson, August 27, 193^, National
Archives, R. G. 1^ 5-
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To facilitate the reorientation of purchases the Purchase Com­
mittee declared that buying would be stopped in eight states and sus­
pended in others on September 19 pending a check of funds, the feed 
situation and cattle numbers. Allotments were made to continue buying 
through the 29th in only nine s t a t e s . O n  the 19 th Me Chord indicated 
that "cattle purchases in all areas have been suspended." 'When buying
was resumed, he declared, it would be carried out only under the new
57stringent restrictions. The period of transition was hampered by 
pressure groups who wanted buying to cease and from others insisting 
on a continuation and expansion of the project. The situation was 
further complicated by a state of confusion that resulted for a con­
siderable time, "due to the uncertainty of the organization in various 
states as to where their orders from Washington should originate." 
Nevertheless, the Purchase Committee issued what it considered its 
final allocations on October 10.
The authorizations called for the buying of enough cattle to
59bring total purchases to about 7,737,000. The committee expected 
these purchases to be completed around the middle of November. Such an 
easy termination of government buying, however, was not possible. Not
^^Minutes of Livestock Purchase Committee, September 1 5, 193^, 
National Archives, R. G. 124.
57McChoi^ to A. L. Brown, September 1 9, 1934, National 
Archives, R. G. 145. Actually buying did not stop, but allocation of 
funds for further purchases was suspended.
^M. T, Morgan: Memorandum for G. B. Thome, June 24, 1935,
National Archives, R. G. l45-
__________59 ___________________________________________________________
AAA Press Release, October 10, 1934, National Archives,
R. G. 145.
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only vas there opposition within the AAA hut there was also a public 
demand for continued large-scale purchases. Early in September MeChord 
noted that his section had "a great deal of correspondence to take care 
of and it looks as though I hardly get rid of a bunch of hot ones that 
I get that many more. Politics seem to be playing quite an inç)ortant 
part and must be reckoned with. Although Me Chord was not talking 
only about the demand for buying, the necessity for reckoning with 
political considerations became more essential than ever as Washington 
sought to end purchasing.
Farm journals, state drought officials, cattle associations, 
and individuals all insisted that the cattle industry would be destroyed 
if the government did not continue its purchase project. This demand, 
which was not new, became more emphatic as soon as the more stringent 
restrictions were imposed. Cattlemen had been promised by men "in the 
field" that they would have an opportunity to sell their cattle and the 
government, many of them insisted, was obligated to give them a chance. 
By October, with the drought administration obviously driving to termi­
nate the buying project, opposition became more vigorous.
Barry Petrie, head of the cattle and sheep programs, now as­
sumed leadership of the drive to continue purchases. Early in October 
J. L. Wright, district agent of the Extension Service in Little Bock, 
wrote to county agents in the emergency drought counties. Wright quoted
"^^ McChord to E. G. Potter, September 6, 193^, National 
Archives, R. G. 1^ 5* The last sentence was crossed out in the draft 
of this letter and probably did not go out.
^^ 13.vestock^Purchase Committee: Memorandum for C. C. Davis, 
November 8, 193^, National Archives, R. G. 1^ 5*
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a letter from Petrie warning that the purchases were about to end and 
suggested that one last effort be made to show Washington that the 
"emergency situation still exists.Throughout these weeks, Washing­
ton was inundated with an almost unbelievable flood of letters and 
telegrams pleading for continuation of the program. The pleas came 
largely from the Mountain States and the Southwest, with petitioners 
from Texas outnumbering those from any other state and, probably, those 
from a11 other states. Although some of the requests obviously were 
prompted by organized campaigns, many of them were honest appeals for 
help.
Typical of the October petitions ims a letter from J. W. 
Merrill, chairman of the cattle committee in Fort Davis, Texas. Merrill 
wrote Congressman R. M. Kleberg pleading for continued government pur­
chases. At first he had sold only his culls, he said, but now he wanted 
to sell out. A large proportion of the cattle in the western states 
would be dead by spring, Merrill warned, if the government did not buy 
them. A. J. Luna, Mount Pleasant, Texas, declared that cattle were 
not worth enough to feed on the federal loans for feed. Therefore, he 
asked for continued buying:
It will be remembered that the Government gave no instructions 
as to the conduct of the program and the cattle were taken up 
by the authorities as they came to them and in the case of this 
county, only about one-half of the farmers received any relief 
whatever, and it has left the other half in as bad condition as 
can possibly be.
^^right to County Agents, October 10, 193^, National 
Archives, R. G. l£h.
Merrill to Kleberg, October 25, 193^; National Archives,
R. G. 145.
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May ve insist that you, as our Senator Connally/, take the
proper steps before our Government to see that the people re­
ceive some immediate assistance
Hundreds of such requests from Texas caused Wallace in November to tell
Kleberg that no more funds were available for Texas. That state, he
said, had already been allotted more than any other state, a total of
about 20 per cent of all funds expended. Wallace suggested, therefore,
that the Texas cattlemen turn to the feed and forage programs which
were available.
The American Cattle Producer continued its campaign for pro­
longed government buying. Cîoncemed that the "future of the cattle- 
buying program is now in doubt," the Producer framed that "there are 
two or three million more distressed cattle . . . many of which will 
die on the range if not handled soon. It would be doubtful economy to 
do a good job of buying seven million cattle and then quit just when 
the program could be properly rounded out with a little more time and 
money.Further demands came from cattlemen’s associations. The 
^oming-îtontana Livestock Protective Association objected to the plan 
to terminate buying "when so many animals still remain on the ranges 
for which there is no feed, and which consequently are threatened with 
death from starvation during the coming winter. " The Association then
^^Luna to Tom Ctonnally, October 30, 193^, National Archives,
R. G. l4$.
^^Wallace to Kleberg, November l4, 1934, National Archives,
R. 6^  14-5. Purchase funds were again made available in Texas. This 
t/as simply another example of failure in an attempt to limit pur­
chases .
^^ Americein Cattle Producer, XVI ( October 1934), 13.
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passed a resolution asking continuation of the purchase program until 
January "in order to protect stockmen in case a hard -winter makes it 
necessary to dispose of additional s t o c k . T h e  American National 
Livestock Association led most of the other cattlemen's organizations 
in opposing the government's plan to end the purchase project.
During October the drought administration attempted to develop 
a follow up program. G. B. Thome presented a plan to help eastern 
farmers with adequate feed supplies buy good cattle from the drought
69areas. Others were working on plans to increase and expand the pur-
70
chase and distribution of feed into the drought region. These pro­
jects were not enough to satisfy the critics, ho-wever. T. R. Reid 
warned Philip Murphy that:
. . . the feed program will be of little service to our farmers.
The value of cattle is still too low to justify a farmer feeding 
even a maintenance ration. . . .  I suspect that unless addi­
tional cattle can be moved from the farms, that many farmers 
will drive their cattle into the bottoms hoping that they may 
be able to make their -way thru the winter and at least they 
■will be far enough away that they will not be able to see them 
if they starve to death.71
On that gloomy note the final struggle over extended buying opened.
On November 8 the Purchase Committee emphasized that the state
^^Ibid. (November 193^), 10.
^ Ibid. (December 1934), 12.
69Thome: Memorandum from Drought Plans Committee, October
2 5, 1934, National Archives, R. G. l4$.
70Mordecai Ezekiel: Memorandum for Secre-tary Wallewïe,
Noveniber 1, 1934, National. Archives, R. G. l4$.
124.
71Reid to Murphy, November 1, 1934, National Archives, R. G.
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and local organizations had not cooperated in its efforts to regulate 
purchases. An October survey of the drought and cattle situation con­
firmed the Committee's opinion that no further buying "was needed. This 
attitude "was based on the belief that farmers were not putting forth any 
effort on their own and would not do so so long as the government tzas 
willing to do everything.
It has been quite apparent for some time that producers in the 
drought States were not going to give their best efforts in 
figuring out ways and means of getting cattle through the winter 
so long as there was a chance that the Government would buy some 
of them at prices higher than they could expect to get from them 
throu^ any other outlet. This is a serious situation.
Although death losses might be large, the Committee insisted that the
government could not buy all the cattle and warned that:
. . . the longer we continue purchases the more obligated we 
are to assume the major share of the burden of distress.
Placing the responsibility squarely on the individual, then 
aiding him in his own efforts as best we can, is in our opinion 
the most effective way of getting a maximum number of cattle 
through the winter, which should now be our major objective 
with cattle numbers having been so drastically reduced.
More purchases could not possibly end all protests and complaints about 
unfulfilled promises. In any case, the Committee contended, "promises 
of such an unofficial character should not be considered as an obliga­
tion on the Government." Also, "much of the pressure to buy these 
cattle has been originating with loan agencies," and such buying would 
not be in line with the objectives of the program. Besides, the Commit­
tee hopefully claimed, protests against closure were rapidly decreasing
and "buying can be discontinued with a minimum of pressure provided we
72take a united stand." Basically, the Purchase Committee hoped to
72
Livestock Purchase Committee: Memorandum for C. C. Davis,
November 8, 193^j National Archives, R. G. l4$.
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shift survival responsibility to farmers and ranchers and reduce 
dependence on the government. Also, a fear existed that too many cattle 
had been purchased and that blame for this might fall on the adjustment 
programs. If the project were reopened, many wanted it emphasized that 
it i-Tas only because of the drought and not a part of the agricultural
adjustment program. Some officials even wanted to turn any further pur-
73chasing over to the relief agencies.
Although the arguments against extending purchases were persua­
sive, the proponents of more buying were too strong. Almost all of the 
State Directors, who met in Kansas City on November 3, emphasized the 
necessity of continuing the program. They evidenced a general feeling 
that everything depended upon the government, and indicated that the 
people in their states had expected everyone to have an opportunity to
sell cattle. If the program were terminated, the government would be
yk
letting them down. With this backing, Petrie returned to Washington 
and insisted on the purchase of 1,250,000 more cattle.
Petrie cited all of the common reasons for further purchases, 
but he placed major enphasis on the political considerations. He ex­
plained that no one had any conception of the size of the program 
during its early weeks, and as a consequence, there was no restriction 
on buying "the general inpression being that funds were unlimited for
73Calvin B. Hoover: Ifemorandxam for C. C. Davis, November 7,
193k, National Archives, R. G. I6; Harry Petrie: Reasons for pur­
chasing more cattle under the Emergency Cattle Program, November 8,
193^f National Archives, R. G. 1^ 5»
714-
Minutes of Meeting of State Directors of Drought Relief
Service, November 3, 193^, National Archives, R. G. 124.
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TnaVing cattle purchase and that a culling program would follow. . , .
(The damage had been done and regulations promulgated by the Livestock
Purchase Committee at the time of their inception could do little to
help. . . .)" When the western ranchmen learned of the cut off "the
reaction was anything but favorable," and Petrie warned that if;
. . .  no further purchases were made, the reaction in the 
Western country, particularly the intermountain areas, would 
be very severe, and that criticism that would follow wuld 
wipe out much of the good feeling that has been constantly 
evident since the buying program was instituted. . . . many 
of these people feel that the Government has actually obli­
gated itself to continue the purchase. . . .
He also 'vramed that ending purchases would send a "tremendous volume of 
inferior cattle" to market and result in considerable confusion and "a 
very marked reduction in prices," something no one in the Department 
could look forward to with calm impartiality. Petrie concluded that he 
felt "very strongly on this matter and am sure that it would be an un­
fortunate decision if the buying vreis immediately concluded. By extended 
purchases . . .  we believe . . . that the reaction to the whole program
will be much more favorable than will be the condition if the program
75is terminated now."
With their subordinates divided, the decision was apparently 
left up to Davis and Wallace. The political considerations were prob­
ably a deciding factor, for it was announced on the 22nd that the AAA 
would buy approximately 1,500,000 more cattle. The decision was made, 
the Administration declared, because purchases were necessary to prevent 
severe losses during the winter. A press release issued on December
75Petrie: Reasons for purchasing more cattle under the Emer­
gency Cattle Program, November 8, 193^j National Archives, R. G. 1^ 5.
7^
New York Times, November 24, 1934, p. 2.
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77k estimated that total purchases would reach about 8 ,522,0 00.
At the time of the December announcement purchases totaled 
about 7,300,000 which left 1,200,000 cattle to be purchased under the 
extended program. Thus, the extension met the proposals of Petrie, and 
he was primarily responsible for allotting the new purchase quotas.
Under the restriction drive of the Purchase Committee, buying had been 
stopped in twelve states. The expanded buying 'vm.B projected for the 
remaining states in the Southwest and Inter-Mountain areas, with the 
latter receiving the greater consideration. To the consternation of the 
proponents of the reopened buying, government buyers found it extremely 
difficult to fill their additional quotas. This resulted in a realloca­
tion of funds to some of the Mississippi Eivcr states which had been 
demanding renewed access to government funds. Only three of the 
drought states, Illinois, Wisconsin and California, were not restored 
to the buying list in December 193^ and January 1935*
The AAA became so anxious to buy cattle that it opened up buy­
ing operations in soma areas which had never been on the emergency 
drought list. The situation in Iowa, where "all local authorities and 
agencies, the Governor, senators, congressmen, the local PEEA adminis­
trator, and the extension service agreed that additional purchases were 
essential," was common. Some of the petitioners insisted that at least 
200,000 cattle should be taken from southern Iowa alone. Funds were 
allocated to buy 6 0 ,0 0 0 cattle, but farmers sold only 4,420 head.
R. G. 145.
76
77AAA Press Release, December 4, 1934, National Archives,
FitzGerald, Livestock Under the A A A , 205-2C^. 
^^Ibid., 2 0 6.
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This difficulty was encountered throughout the extended purchase period. 
L. J. Allen, inspector at Oklahoma City, reported that it was extremely 
difficult to get cattle.
On January 31, 1935» Philip Murphy wired Petrie that "in ac­
cordance with previous understanding Emergency Cattle Purchase Program
8lterminates ïtehruary first. Wo extensions to he made in any state • "
In spite of the obvious lack of any great need or desire by farmers to
sell, demands for continued buying were still made. J. D. LeCron, from
Wallace’s office, refused the request of Donald R. Murphy, managing
editor of Wallaces' Ih,rmer, for continued buying:
As you know, an extension was made of the time for purchase.
. . . Colonel Murphy, who has charge of the cattle purchase 
program for us, talked over the phone to Mr. Bliss Evidently 
in charge of buying in lowa^ day before yesterday and Mr.
Bliss told him that in al l the drought counties and in the 
four additional counties, every farmer had two or three letters 
inviting him to sell cattle. Bliss seemed to feel that every­
one has had an opportunity to sell cattle and that the closing 
date of January 31 was perfectly satisfactory; he stated, in 
fact, that half of the cattle when brought in for sale were 
purchased by speculators rather than by the government.82
With the refusal of farmers to sell, the AAA finally concluded its pro­
ject at the end of January, two and one-half months after the Purchase 
Committee had wanted to stop.
A variety of explanations were offered for the failure of pro­
ducers to take advEintage of the offer. L. J. Allen believed that Okla-
00
Allen to Chief of Bureau of Animal Ihdustiy, January 30, 
1935, Rational Archives, R. G. 124.
81
Murphy to Petrie, January 31, 1935, Rational Archives,
R. G. 16.
82LeCron to Murphy, February 1, 1935, Rational Archives,
R. G. 16.
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homa farmers held back "on account of the up-v/ard surge in the prices, 
the mild winter, the brighter outlook for the cattle industiy and the
Og
realization that it is only sixty days until grass." M. T. Morgan 
of the AAA later contended that more cattle were not bought because
the "commercial market price, even for drought cattle, had risen above
8Uthe Government price." There was some justice to this contention as 
the average price on common grade cattle sold at Chicago had been 
$3-6J on November 3, but was up to $4.55 on December 29 and $6.10 on 
January 26.^^ While FitzGerald admitted the rise in prices and mild 
winter, he insisted that farmers had never really t-ranted or intended to 
sell. The irresistible demand for prolonged buying was based, he said, 
not on any wish or great need to sell but on the desire of producers "to 
have this alternate outlet available in case they wanted to take advan- 
tage of it." The purchase of less than 800,000 cattle after November 
15 proved that the Purchase Committee had been correct when it wanted 
to cease buying on that date. But the good will which was gained, as 
Petrie had promised, was unmeasurable in numbers of cattle bought or 
dollars spent.
^^Allen to Chief of BAI, January 30, 1935  ^National Archives,
R. G. 124.
g2|.
Morgan: Memorandum for G. B. Thome, June 24, 1935; National
Archives, R. G. 145.
®^"The Drought of 1934-35/' table l6, p. 175- 
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FitzGerald, Livestock Under the A A A ,  206.
CHAFPER VIII 
PROBLEMS OF THE DROUGHT PURCHASE PRCXÎRAM
The magnitude of the emergency drought buying far outweighed 
all previous purchase projects. Not only were the costs much greater 
but the problems were more basic and the criticism was often more 
vicious. Many of the problems and reproaches came from the inability 
of the Administration to settle the pui^ose and goals of the buying 
program. Some protests centered on the handling of the project, espe­
cially on the condemnation and burial of so many animals. Other 
complaints came from the lunatic fringe and professional New Deal 
critics who pictured with horror this attempt to buy the souls of the 
independent cattlemen while at the same time destroying the livestock 
industiy. Although cattle producers appreciated the giant relief 
measure, they obviously hoped to take advantage of it without giving 
acquiescence to further government programs.
During the eight months of buying, the DRS purchased almost 
8 .3  million cattle, with nearly 18 per cent being condemned as unfit 
for food. For their livestock, producers received purchase payments 
of almost $70 million and benefit payments of over $4l million. Over 
two million cattle, nearly 25 per cent of the total, were bought in 
Texas. The Indian Service used almost $800,000 of USDA funds to buy
217
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were al 1 bawling as only cattle bawl, somewhat as dogs howl when taken 
to a strange place." The drought victims, as Porter described them, 
presented a "pitiful picture. Eone was a good fat cow. All were 
gaunt, scrawny bony looking in various degrees. One could count their 
ribs sticking out and see the ridge of their backbone and the humps of 
their hip bones as if they were skeletons covered with canvas in a 
museum. They stood almost lifeless, with their heads down and their 
tails between their legs like whipped dogs." These were the animals 
accepted for food purposes; the condemned were even in worse condition. 
Despite the quality of cattle, producers and others felt the government 
bounty should be even more generous than it was.
Farmers and businessmen from Chippewa County, Minnesota, 
petitioned against the "unjust price schedule" established by E. W. 
Sheets.^ Oscar L. Peterson of Glenwood City, Wisconsin, requested that 
twice as much be paid for the cattle and that farmers who suffered death
g
losses from starvation be given a bonus. In August Bert Brumfield 
protested that cattle were:
. . . being bought at bankrupt prices.
. . . The situation is serious. If it does not rain soon 75?^  
of the cattle between the Mississippi River and the R. Mountains 
will have to be disposed of.
To sell these cows at $20 will bankrupt most producers. Where 
will the cattle come from to replace them.
^Porter, "Drought Produces Lean Kine of Egypt," Hew York 
Times, August 2, 193^ , p. 6.
J^. L. Saltness, et al. to Wallace, June 4, 1934, National 
Archives, R. G. l4$.
^Peterson to Wallace, June 13, 1934, National Archives, R. G.
145.
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. . . The Government should send a lot of these cattle some­
where to winter even if it must he as far as South America.
It is plain that the country ceumot stand the slaughter or 
loss of any such number of cattle neither can it stand to have 
any such large number of producers bankrupted.7
In tferch 1935  ^the North Dakota Senate claimed that, although producers 
were entitled to the cost of production or parity price for their cat­
tle, the government had paid only about 25 per cent of the just price. 
Since producers were entitled to adjustment benefit payments of approxi­
mately $^0 million, the legislators asked that a program be developed 
immediately to give cattlemen parity prices and enable them to "re­
establish their almost depleted estates. . . ." Worthy of note was the 
emphasis the legislators placed on banks and credit institutions, for 
"unless the producers receive just compensation for their cattle it is
going to work a hardship on banks, credit companies, and other mortgage
0
holders. . . ."
Some of the demands for a higher price schedule came from the 
creditor interests. Shortly after purchases began, Peter Norbeck gave 
the best of all possible answers to such requests. He agreed with the 
South Dakota Bankers Association that better prices would be fine, but 
he warned that the viewpoint of the taxpayers must be taken into account. 
Besides, Norbeck declared, the program must be viewed as "partly in the 
nature of a gift from the treasury as partial relief for a distressed 
people— debtors, creditors, borrowers and depositors. One difficulty 
lays in fact we are put in position of a person who received a gift
7
Brumfield to Clifford B. Hope, August 13, 193^; National 
Archives, R. G. 1^ 5.
8U. s.. Congressional Record, Y^th Cong., 1st Sess., 1939;
LXXIX, Part 4, p. 3300.
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asking that it be increased and therefore his request is not veil re- 
g
ceived.' Most cattlemen realized, as Worbeck said, that any price the 
government paid for the drought cattle vas in the nature of a gift and 
were happy to get it.
Administration concern over the claims of creditors was partly 
responsible for one of the most bitterly criticized aspects of the 
purchase project. The Emergency Cattle Agreement included a clause 
which bound the producer to participate in "further general programs 
pertaining to adjustment or reduction of production. ..." Although 
the compulsory pledge encountered early criticism, the agricultural 
officials were never able to adequately explain the requirement. The 
AAA insisted that a demand to end the forced signing of contracts 
"puzzles us for cattle raisers are under no compulsion to sign contracts 
with the Government for the purchase of their animals. Although 
cattlemen were not compelled to sell their cattle, many of them felt 
that requiring such a pledge under the circumstances amounted to the 
use of force.
5y August resentment against the cattle agreement had reached 
a fever pitch. One critic complained that the contract was a "usurpa­
tion of authority . . .  an abuse of power." Congress, he declared, had 
no idea that Wallace would "force every farmer to abide by any rule or 
regulation which he might hereafter issue in order to benefit by this
9
Korbeck to South Dakota Bankers Association, Telegram, June 
6, 193^ , National Archives, R, G. 1^ 5*
^^Paul R. Preston to Fifth District Farmers Union Convention, 
June 12, 1934, National Archives, P.. G. IU5 .
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relief." Thus, Wallace and Rexford Tugwell, assistant secretary, vere
taking advantage of both Congress and the farmers.^ Hoard’s Dairyman
also denounced the agreement: "Bailed as a humanitarian act to aid
drought stricken farmers, the government's contract for the purchase of
cattle ties the farmer hand and foot to the chariot wheel of a dicta- 
12tor." As Wallace said in September, the Administration seemed unable
13to escape the complaints. Because the cattlemen had signed the agree­
ment and received its benefits, another critic protested, the govern­
ment claimed that they had forfeited their right to question its consti­
tutionality. Thus, he declared, "actually we have bartered our liberties 
for a mess of potted ham; we have surrendered our birthright for a herd 
of canner cows. To Alva Johnston, the drought gave the Government an 
opportunity to seize control of the cattle business. When cattlemen 
were threatened with the loss of their herds:
. . . the AAA offered to buy the cattle that were threatened 
with destruction. It offered handsome prices, provided that 
the cattlemen would sign up to let the Government regulate 
them. Thousands of distressed ranchers took the Government 
money and signed the pledge. Today, many of them are demand­
ing to have this pledge canceled. They assert that the Govern­
ment took advantage of their distress and that the pledge is 
illegal because the signer was under duress.
The president of a cattle association, Alva Johnston wrote, told her
^^Harold McGuin to F. C. Flory, August 9, 1934, National 
Archives, R. G. 14-5.
12Hoard's I^iryman, LXXIX (August 10, 1934), 354, in National 
Archives, R. G. l4$.
no
Wallace to E. K. Sherwood, September 20, 1934, National 
Archives, R. G. l4$.
l4J. Evetts Haley, "Cow Business and Monkey Business," Saturday 
Evening Post, CCVII (December 8 , 1934), 9 6 .
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that "'Secretary Wallace was so crazy to get us into the program that
15
he was willing to pay any price for an old cow.'" Although this 
attitude was inconsistent with the attacks on the price schedule, it 
was common in those groups who regarded the purchase project as a 
Government attempt to take over the cattle industry.
The President of the National Live Stock Association,
Charles E. Collins, called the purchases very beneficial, but he saw a
danger in the possibility that it would set a precedent for further
unusual and perhaps unwise government programs. The Administration
made a very grave mistake, Collins declared;
. . . and that was the unfair and un-American contract which 
cattlemen were forced to sign in order to participate in the 
benefit from this cattle selling program. Few would have 
dreamed of their government, under the guise of relief, 
compelling them to sign such a contract. I feel that this 
convention ^ he AssociationJ should request the Congress of 
the United States, by joint resolution, to abrogate these 
contracts and restore to the cattlemen their constitutional 
rights and liberties, as free men.^°
Opposition to the emergency agreement culminated in a resolution intro­
duced in the Senate by Eobert D. Carey of X/oming which provided that 
no one could be forced to sign a contract which bound him to cooperate 
in future AAA programs.Thus, critics insisted that the Administra­
tion, in a dictatorial fashion, took advantage of the problems of the 
cattle producer to bring him into subjection to the Department of Agri­
culture .
^^Johnston, "The Hamburger Bonanza," Saturday Evening Post, 
CCVII (May 4, 1935), l8 .
^^American Cattle Producer, XVI (Febniaiy 1935), T*
17Congressional Be solutions, National Archives, R. G. 1^5*
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The Administration iTas never able or willing to satisfactorily 
or honestly answer the charges. The AAA claimed that the agreement was 
the result of very careful study and forethought and was based on the 
belief that, with al1 respect for the rights of creditors, the cattlemen
should have a reasonable share of the money paid for the cattle to sup-
X8ply them with ready cash. Late in the purchase period AAA administra­
tor, C. C. Davis, avowed that the project saved the cattle industry and 
attempted to justify the agreement:
I need not remind you of the plight of the cattlemen with their 
stock dying for lack of feed because of the drouth. It was evi­
dent that these cattle had to be handled as soon as possible.
No drouth relief funds trere available or immediately in prospect.
The emergency drouth relief budget was not appropriated until 
June 19 and no funds were actually al l ocated from it until August 
21. The Triple A had no money to use except $100,000,000 that 
had been specifically appropriated by congress for use under the 
act in helping to bring about adjustments in beef and dairy 
cattle.
That furnished the way out, the only way out except to wait for 
a month or two, or more perhaps, for other funds. Under the 
conditions that prevailed the alternative was unthinkable.
A clause was inserted in the buying contract whereby the farmer 
selling drouth cattle agreed to co-operate in any cattle produc­
tion control program that might be offered by the government.
By an administrative ruling it will become inoperative after 
June 1, 1935 (uid those who have mouthed such fear of it
may rest easy again. Naturally, with more than 7>300,000 head 
of cattle which would have staarved already bought under the plan, 
the peak of the cycle has been leveled off.
In order to understand another very pertinent feature of this 
same clause try to imagine that there had been no government 
cattle buying program. The starving cattle that were not killed 
and buried on the spot would have gone to the glutted markets 
of the packers. If the packers had paid any more than the 
equivalent of freight and marketing expenses, in view of such 
a glut of inferior cattle, the little money that did remain 
would have gone to the creditor who held the mortgage on the
ifi
"The Drought of 1934-35," p. 51.
225
cattle. The farmer would, have got nothing, in most cases, for 
himself.^ 9
Thus two hasic excuses, other than the necessity for great 
speed., were used, to justify the contract. It was claimed, that the only 
way Jones-Connally fund.s could, he used was as a part of an adjustment 
program. Therefore, the clause and the benefit payment were necessary 
to provide for such a general program. Also, it ensured that the 
debtor farmer would receive something from the project. By dividing 
the payment and reserving the benefit portion for the exclusive use of 
the faimer, the producer was assured of at least a part of the federal 
money. In evaluating the Davis explanation, his emphasis on the need 
for speed and the lack of federal drought funds, it should be remembered 
that just before purchases began he had told the President that there 
would be no need for funds other than those already available.
The contention that the use of Jones-Connally funds made neces­
sary the pledge to participate in future programs was not valid. The 
funds could be used in the drought project to buy emaciated cattle
under a disease eradication program and to purchase others under a
20surplus removal plan. The first al lowed the purchase of the condemned 
and the second the buying of those fit for food. Neither use required 
agreement to cooperate in future programs. The AAA, however, perhaps 
remembering the problems of the Farm Board, seemed to avoid the straight 
surplus removal type of program.
19Davis, "Triple A Saved Cattleman," Oklahoma Famer-Stockman, 
XLVIII (Januaiy 1, 1935), 6 .
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The Administration also contended that the only way to ensure
that the individual producer received some benefit from the project \t8.s
to reserve a portion of the payment from the claims of lienholders. If
a flat payment, even a much larger one, vere made, there would be no
assurance that the farmer would profit at all. Thus, a price large
enough to cover all debts would result, AAA officials believed, in the
government buying most of the cattle and general injury to the industry
21
"with very little of the money going to the farmers. " Concern with
the debt problem had been evident during the period the purchase program
was developed. The entire Administration worked day and night on the
drought project which was seriously complicated, Barry Petrie declared;
. . . owing to mortgages being held by various loan organiza­
tions including local banks, these loan agencies insisting 
that all money received from sales of their cattle be delivered 
into their hands. . . .  It is our thought that the farmer and 
the stockman should be the beneficiaries to some extent on 
account of the Governmental money that is being put in for 
their relief; . . . .  We thought it unfair to allow al 1 the 
money spent by the Government for purchases and bonuses to 
go to the loan a g e n c i e s . 2 2
Evidently it had already been decided to make a bonus or benefit pay­
ment. Thus, reserving the benefit payment for the producer was obvious. 
To do this it was not necessary, however, to require future participa­
tion. The same effect was achieved in the sheep and goat program with 
a service and disposition payment which required no pledge. Nor did the 
pure bred cattle producers promise future cooperation. Perhaps the
21
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Administration, did not think of using the service payments until after 
the benefit payment had been so severely criticized, but it ivas also 
true that there had been no attempt to institute an adjustment program 
for sheep and goats as there had been trith cattle.
Uncertainty as to the extent of the buying project and the 
possible need for a further adjustment program caused the Administra­
tion to require farmers to promise participation in future government 
programs. Many in the AAA for some time regarded the drought buying 
as a part of the general cattle program. Csi June IF. F. Elliott, 
Chief of the Production Planning Section, suggested the purchase of 
cows and heifers from 2 to 5 years old and the use of adjustment con­
tracts to make the drought project useful in the long range adjustment 
23program. About the same time Harry Petrie, Chief of the Cattle and 
Sheep Section, wote the Cfe,ttle Committee of Twenty-five and asked 
them to advise and aid the DBS, for, with the drought purchases, "it 
appears that our program's well under way." The ultimate results of 
the drought operations were not certain, however, and the DEIS had 
various duties not in line with the adjustment program. Therefore, 
Petrie continued, the Committee and the Cattle and Sheep Section must 
see that the DBS promotes "our program as far as may be possible with­
out interfering with the purely emergency functions of that service. " 
He then declared that if the DEîS did not accomplish the adjustment "as 
far as we may desire it nay be necessary . . .  to meet the situation." 
Although the drought might cause the desired reduction of cattle
R. G. 145.
23
Elliott to H. E. Talley, June 1, 1934, National Archives,
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numbers J Petrie said., his section and the Committee must "continue to 
carry the responsibility of the long time cattle adjustment program
gij.
until that program reaches a satisfactory consummation." Petrie thus 
expected to use the buying to further the postponed adjustment plan and, 
if necessary, to follow the purchases with a regular reduction program. 
As late as August 10 K. C. Me Chord declared the purpose of the clause 
'Sms to pledge the producer whose cattle were being purchased to co­
operate under the general cattle reduction program. It is believed that
25you will readily see the justice and fairness of such procedure•"
The Administration, however, had already begun to back down.
In July the contract was modified so that a program had to be instituted 
before June 1, 1936.^^ Prom an indefinite commitment, the pledge was 
reduced to less than two years. After the reorganization of the drought 
administration, the agricultural officials moved away from using the 
purchases as a part of an adjustment program or of instituting a subse­
quent reduction plan. In October the Department of Agriculture declared
that production control for the beef industry would not be needed if
27full employment could be restored. In April 1935 Chester Davis made 
the full retreat. Be declared that the clause simply required the same
gl).
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cooperation fundamental to all AAA programs. No adjustment program, 
Davis insisted, had ever "been or would ever be put into effect without 
the producers i-eceiving full information about it and giving considera­
tion and approval to it, and, he believed, that "farmers generally
28understand this policy."
The cattle agreement caused additional problems. As E. W,
Goumnitz, agricultural economist, noted, confusion existed in the minds
of some people as to whether the buying project i-zas an emergency program
or a production control measure. Although contracts were signed and
29benefit payments made, there was no real program.  ^ It should be 
remembered that some AAA officials evidenced the same confusion.
The refusal of some creditors to sign the emergency contract 
added to the administrative problems. Late in June Secretary Wallace 
reported that many thousand cattle were being held, especially in North 
Dakota, because second lienholders refused to sign the purchase agree­
ment. Therefore, he wanted the contract revised so that only the pro-
■50ducer and first lienholder need sign. This trouble came because the 
government price often did not cover the indebtedness of the first much 
less the second lienholder. Administration assurance that creditors
who signed the agreement waived only that part of their lien attached
31to the cattle sold did not satisfy some creditors who wanted and even 
28Davis, "If Drought Strikes Again," Saturday Evening Post, 
CCVII (April 27, 1935), 8o.
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attempted to get the benefit payment as well as all of the purchase pay­
ment. Roy Adren, Dunn Center, North Dakota, reported that his loan 
company would not allow him to sell the 89 cattle he had listed with 
the DSS unless he turned the benefit payment over to the company: "I
told them I couldn't let them have it for I didn't have any money to 
buy feed and to help keep my family of 6 for this w i n t e r . A n  
Oklahoma bank went even further in an effort to collect its full debt.
A producer, R. L. KillingsT-rorth, >jent to the bank, which was his lien­
holder and had signed the cattle agreement, to cash his benefit check.
He was told to endorse the check for payment, but the bank took the
33check and kept the money. Such incidents were not common, however, 
and had little influence on the buying program.
A most serious problem centered on the relationship anong, and 
the different goals of, the agricultural authorities, the ÏERA, and the 
packers. The relief authorities not only handled the government animals 
after the DRS purchased them but also had many other relief duties. The 
FSRC was anxious therefore to use the government purchases to provide 
food for the needy and to give Jobs to the unemployed. As a conse­
quence, processing and canning establishments staffed by people on 
relief rolls were opened throu^out the country, including states which 
were not in the drought section. Although Texas, which had IQ plants 
left from the previous canning operation, began this work with the first
32
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purchases, it took considerable time for such establishments to be 
created elsewhere.Late in August the relief plants were still in 
the planning stage in Oklahoma. Only one of the six projected process­
ing plants was in operation and plans called for the establishment of
35local canneries in some ho Oklahoma counties. The relief administra­
tion, interested in work relief, seemed willing to prolong the process­
ing operations as long as possible, which conflicted with the interests 
of both the Itepartment of Agriculture and the pilvate packers.
The processors were, of course, interested in only one thing, 
getting the government business for themselves. During late tfey and 
June many packers and canners, often backed by members of Congress, 
asked for contracts to process the government beef. As the tremendous 
size of the operation became clear, the processors became increasingly 
resentful of the FSRC policy. Although the packers did a great part of 
the government processing and, at the peak of buying, were obviously 
unable to handle all of the drought purchases, they were bitterly criti­
cal of the relief plants. In August the President of the Institute of 
American Meat Packers raged that ISRO backed establishments "are a men­
ace to the. public." Be wanted the relief plants closed and the purchase 
program kept to a minimum with the professional canners and packers 
doing the work. ^  further insisted that it was not right for the
3k
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Administration to use public funds to create competition for the pack- 
37ers. Early in October, the processors again asked that the relief 
plants be closed and the rest of the drought cattle left for the private
qo
packers. A month later Mordecai Ezekiel, economic advisor, told 
Wallace the packers were yet again objecting to the FSRC policy, charg­
ing that the processing and canning ira,s being dragged out as long as
possible to provide work relief. Ezekiel saw some basis to the charges,
39and he felt the policy resulted in added expense and wasted feed.
Agricultural officials were primarily interested in completing 
the processing and preserving as much feed as possible for the surviving 
cattle. Early in November Ezekiel criticized the relief administration 
for its long delay in putting the program into operation. Although the 
private packers had large volumes of unused slaughter capacity, he 
complained, the FSRC was holding back over a million cattle for gradual 
slaughter in the relief plants. Instead of cattle being slaughtered as 
rapidly as possible to reduce the drain on the limited feed supplies, 
"they have been fed over extended periods of time to provide work for 
state relief programs. Some two weeks later Wallace expressed his 
alarm to Harry Hopkins because the state relief committees still had a
W. ¥. Woods to Wallace, August 21, 193^> National Archives,
R. G. 16. 
30
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number of cattle on hand, and he virtually demanded that Hopkins have
4lthe cattle processed immediately to preserve feed. While the relief 
agencies sought to use the purchase project as a general relief measure, 
the agricultural officials viewed it as solely for the benefit of the 
cattle industry.
The same difference of view developed over the redistribution 
and exchange of the drought cattle. Early plans had called for the 
distribution of some of the cattle as subsistence stock, and Hopkins
k-2.
directed the relief agencies to use the cattle for rehabilitation.
But the Department of Agriculture evidently opposed any large-scale 
distribution plan. The issue was further complicated when canning 
facilities became overtaxed in the drought area and cattle were sent 
to the South for pasturage. Almost immediately a movement developed 
in the southern states, especially in Georgia, for the exchange of the 
poor quality native stock for the better quality drought purchases.
The relief administration, politicians and individuals an supported 
the action. But Wallace and the Department were against such a plan. 
Agricultural officials emphasized that they were pledged to keep drought 
purchases out of commercial channels, that it would not be fair to cre­
ate added competition for those in such dire straits, and that the
43government would be subsidizing those who received cattle. All of
^^allace to Hopkins, November 19, 1934, National Archives,
R. G. 124.
42Hopkins to All State Emergency Belief Administrations, June 
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the obstacles could have been, overcome, however, and leaders of the cat­
tle industry gave general support to the exchange. Dolph Briscoe, head 
of the southwestern association, approved of the plan, "provided the 
low grade cattle are slaughtered and used only for relief purposes. 
Hopkins continued to support the plan in September, but Keith Southard
of the FSRC passed the buck by insisting that the decision must rest
45squarely on the Department of Agriculture. McChord declared, however, 
that the Department had definitely decided against the exchange because
46it was considered too complicated and even illegal.
A plan, therefore, which offered a great opportunity to improve 
the quality of southern livestock was cast aside by agricultural offi­
cials . Evidently they felt that it would be only another complication 
and feared that it might be unpopular in the drought states. They had 
agreed, however, to a rehabilitation program, but it turned out to be 
a very limited affair and of only minor value. In Texas some dairy 
cows were provided as subsistence for relief clients, but only 131 head
of the more than two million cattle purchased were diverted for rehabil-
47
itation purposes.
Controversy over disposal of drought cattle continued into 1935
44 IBriscoe to E. B. Weatherly, August I7 , 1934, National
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vhen the New Mexico relief agency sought to sell some of the AAA pur­
chases to nev cattle ranchers. The Nev Mexico Bural Rehabilitation 
Corporation was paying $6,000 a month to pasture 12,000 cattle in 
î-fexico. With the pasturage bill totaling $80,000 on August 15, the
relief officials wanted to bring them back to sell, trade, or give to 
kA
the Indians. Both the AAA and the cattle organizations opposed any
return of the cattle to commercial channels. F. E. Mollin protested
that it would be against the purchase agreement and urged that the cat-
k-9
tie be sent to the canning plants. Although the cattle belonged to 
the FSRC and the Department of Agriculture had no control over them,
J. D. LeCron, assistant to Wallace, claimed that in their contract 
Hopkins had agreed that the cattle would not go back into normal usage. 
According to the agreement, the drought purchases could be used only to 
provide relief meat and for rehabilitation purposes.
From the start of the buying, the Department had emphasized 
that none of the drought cattle would be returned to conpete on the 
regular market. Criticism developed rapidly, however, over the commer­
cial use of drought hides and beef. In July Louis J. Robertson, of the
Tanner's Council of America, protested the throwing of drought skins on
51
the market so as to ruin the leather, shoe and agriculture interests.
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On August 1 the California Drought Relief Advisory Board passed a reso­
lution against the disposal of any of the drought meat through regular
52
commercial channels. Although the government had stated that none of 
the drought beef would compete with regular meat, the first processor 
contracts allowed the packers to keep the hides and tenderloins from
the cattle they slaughtered and canned. F. E. Mollin demanded that the
53contracts be revised immediately. Under new contracts, the FSRC 
retained the hides but the processors still kept some cuts of beef.
The relief organization planned to process the drought hides into 
leather, shoes and clothing for relief use. After protests from the 
leather industry, the project was dropped and the government promised 
to make large purchases in the open market to give a boost to the 
leather industry. Keith Southard of the ïSRC later promised the 
Tanner's Council that the government would consult that group before 
anything was done with the hides.
The Drought Administration was also criticized about its state 
and local organization and administration of the program. Ifeny people 
agreed with Gus Kleinschmidt of Ortonville, Minnesota in his protest 
against the appointment of the "Brain Trust" type to handle the project 
when "practical farmers" should be in charge. He further attacked the
52
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program as designed to strip the farmer of his "grub-stake," his cat­
tle. The Farmer's Committee of Brantwood, Wisconsin claimed that the 
relief organization was charging high prices for feed and hay and ex­
pecting farmers to work off the charge "at the miserable wage of 35^ 
an hour." Miss Ida Vehvilaine presented four demands which the Commit­
tee considered essential for any relief program. Ho farmer should be 
forced to sell his livestock because of hay and feed shortage. instead 
the government should ship:
. . . sufficient hay and feed into the drought stricken areas, 
to be delivered direct to farmers needing it at cost prices.
2. That farmers working off relief and loans shall receive 
$1.00 an hour for man and team and 50^ an hour for man alone.
3. That al 1 relief be increased to take proper care of all
the needy and their families.
4. That all committees to administer relief be elected by the 
farmers and unemployed workers.
These demands cover only the ^arej necessities to guarantee 
our right to live and to put an end to the discriminations now 
practiced in the distribution of relief. WE DEMAHD THAT IM­
MEDIATE STEPS BE TAKEN FOR THEIR FULFILIMJNT. 57
Although the demands of the Brantwood Committee were more ex­
treme than most, they were not unique. Dfore common complaints, however, 
were expressed by Mrs. R. L. Willingham of Corona, New Mexico. She 
attacked the low cattle prices and the high feed and grocery prices, 
and declared that not one who was put on government jobs needed the 
wcrk. But her experience with government buyers led to the real griev­
ance: "The veterinary who came, may be a good Democrat, which is well
56Kleinschmidt to Roosevelt, June 1934, National Archives,
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enough, but he certainly is not a co-wman." The inspector, she avowed, 
"didn't know a yearling from a two year-old." Mrs. Willingham added 
a postscript: "If I had pay even at condemned prices, for the 28 cows
and 43 calves lost while waiting for aid, I could send ny boy to 
school. Although complaints about the handling of the drought buy­
ing were numerous, they did not compare in extent to those of the Emer­
gency Hog Marketing Program.
Nevertheless, there were many instances of speculative and even
criminal activity. In July it was reported that speculators were al-
59ready buying up stock to sell to the government. Rosa Peters of 
Strang, Oklahoma complained that people who bought cattle in July and 
August were selling them to the government and swearing they had raised
60 ,
them. Some sold cattle bought after April 1, 1934-, which, according 
to the purchase agreement, was the cut off date. These people, it was 
ruled, could receive the appraisal value but not the benefit payment. 
There were more serious violations, such as the Texas County, Missouri 
case. Federal investigators estimated that 600 cattle had been illegal­
ly sold in that county. In addition, a large number of cattle accepted 
for food had disappeared and many truck loads of cattle had been shipped
Willingham to Roosevelt, August 28, 193^, National Archives,
R. G. lit-5.
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to St. LouisApparently some condemned cattle were not killed but 
resold; and others accepted for food were removed from government pens 
Anri resold. Charges of conspiracy to defraud the Government were later 
filed against a number of Texas County residents.
Arthur Wells, the chief instigator, obtained cattle and had 
truck drivers and farmers sell them to the government, signing the pub­
lic voucher that they had owned the stock before April 1, 193^- Wells 
also bribed a federal appraiser to accept the cattle. A number of 
truck drivers and farmers pled guilty. They were fined $150 and given 
a two year prison sentence, but were placed on probation. The appraiser 
was fined $1,000 and sentenced to two years at Leavenworth, but he also 
had his sentence probated. Wells alone stood trial. He was convicted 
and given two years at Leavenworth.^^ Although this was a most blatant 
case of fraud, violation of both the spirit and substance of the program 
was less of a problem than in the pig purchase project.
Drought purchases encountered the same attacks as those leveled 
against the waste of food in pig buying. Some were hysterical and po­
litical, but most indicated a basic opposition to the destruction of 
food. Farmers still questioned the morality of the adjustment program, 
and asked such questions as: "Is it right to cut down production when
people are going hungry? Shouldn't we try to feed everybody in the 
United States before we begin to reduce production?Mrs. L. L.
62H. J. Balpin, Summary of Texas County, Missouri Investiga­
tion, March I6, 1935, National Archives, R. G. 1 6.
Richard K. Phelps to Attorney General, Januaiy 1, 1937, 
National Archives, R. G. I6 .
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Blankenburg, representing the consumer, aslsed the General federation of 
Women's Clubs: "Shall we destroy our food when millions are hungry.
Attacks centered on the restrictions against using condemned 
animals and on the idea of classing some cattle as unfit for food when 
many people were going without adequate supplies of meat. In August 
Robert H. Cumutte, Iteirlin, Texas, protested a government order that 
the condemned animals could no longer be saved for relief use but must 
be "burned or otherwise made unfit for human consumption."^^ Although 
Wallace denied the existence of such an order, many people believed 
that good food was being haphazardly destroyed. The government policy, 
Wallace declared, was to permit the farmer to save any of the condemned 
animal fit for use for his family, but not to use those condemned in 
general relief. He insisted, however, that no edible food was being 
destroyed and that there was plenty of beef saved for all relief pur-
67poses.
Early in September R. C. McChord wrote that "every day we
have letters to the effect that good cattle are being condemned and
feel it is a crime to waste food." He admitted that the ÏÏE® had been
68organized so quickly that it was difficult to get uniform inspection. 
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Many people, however, refused to consider the difficulties. They 
preferred the version given by William W. Vreeland, who charged: "Nor
can the farmer, it seems, having killed such livestock, give the meat 
to the needy families of his district. The destruction must be complete 
— the carcass buried. The government will even attend to the actual 
slau^ter and burial, so that the farmer has nothing to do but collect
69
his few dollEirs of compensation."
Some critics attacked the government's motivations for buying 
cattle. Although there were several variations in this vicious assault, 
the basic theme held that the whole purchase project was a fiendish plot 
by the government to gain control of the cattle industry. The charges 
ranged from the claim that federal funds were being used for political 
purposes to the more extrens denial that there was any drought problem.
It was inevitable that the political opposition would consider, 
or at least claim, that the relief funds were being used to influence 
voters. Henry P. Fletcher, Chairman, of the Republican Rational Commit­
tee, charged in October that with election day nearing "the process of 
placing relief checks where it is figured they will do the most polit­
ical good is speeding up." Although Fletcher did not specifically men­
tion the cattle purchases, he did attack the buying programs: "The
little pigs that died for the Democratic Party sure now being i«,id for
70by the administration." Others, however, had already hit directly at 
the drought purchases. Frank H. Bell, advertising manager of the Pacific
69 1 1Hew York Times, Hovember 10, 193^, IV, 14.
^^Ibid., October 6, 193^; p. 6.
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RuraJ. Press and California Farmer, vrote: "Natiirally the Administration
wants to make the utmost of the relief it is extending . . . for polit­
ical purposes. The humanitarian side of it is urgent and desirable,
but the politicians must cash in on the situation, and to do so they
71build up the picture. . . . " Ralph Miller of the Okilahoma garmer-
Stockman claimed that farmers would not have known about the drought
had there not been so much publicity: "Farmers and others had a tough
time of itj but they did not begin to feel real sorry for themselves
until the politicians and others began reminding them that they were
indeed in a sorry fix." People had told him. Miller wrote, that the
politicians "saw in the drought emergency funds a splendid opportunity
to get on the gravy train and make political hay for themselves through
money they might get for their counties !" There was nothing new in
this, he insisted, since politicians had been keeping themselves in
money and office since the Populist period by their ability to convince
72the farmers that they were not being treated right. H. C. Bardison 
of the Western Farm Life Denver, Colorado, agreed that publicity brought 
the drought to the attention of farmers and that a county in Colorado
7'3
without a single farm was receiving thousands in farm relief. It was
natural that, in their desperation, political partisans would seize on 
federal relief expenditures as an issue. Any attempt to write off the 
drought disaster as a vote buying publicity trick carried things too
^ ^ 1 1  to Printers* Ink, CLXVIII (August 22, 1934), 28.
^^inters' Ink, CLX7III (September 13, 1934), U3-H4.
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far, however, and most reputable critics stayed away from it. Besides, 
too many members of the opposition wanted money for their own area to 
challenge the program.
Nevertheless, others saw a still more diabolical motivation
behind the government purchases. J. Evetts Haley implied that the whole
project was a plan to capture the cattle industry. Policies of the "New
Dealers," Haley declared, had "in the idiom of the range, left us 'high
dry and windy.'" But he added, the Administration promised to "come
to our relief on condition that we surrender to the Secretary of Agri-
culture the right to manage our affairs." Alva Johnston charged that
the program was a lavish attempt to bribe the cattlemen and that much
of the aid went to producers who did not need it: "There was a Santa
Claus angle to it. The Government was anxious to run the cattlemen's
business. The lavish distribution of . . . money was partly propaganda
to convince the cattleman that he should let Washington handle his 
75affairs." To Dan D. Casement, the purchases were simply another mani­
festation of the New Deal drive to restrict and control the cattlemen 
whose opposition had caused the government to hesitate in applying AAA 
controls. Then, both the cattlemen and AAA realized that there was a 
serious drought problem, and at once. Casement declared, the AAA quit 
trying to get the cattlemen to accept a reduction program and "proceeded 
to accomplish its purpose by purchasing as quickly as possible, at
7^Haley, "Cow Business and Monkey Business," Saturday Evening 
Post, CCVII (December 8, 193^28.
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artificial values, all offerings of cattle. ..."  The shameful aspect 
of the measure was the exaction of a promise tc abide by any rules 
Wallace might "impose on the conduct" of the cattle industry. Casement 
feared that hard times had "sapped the admirable independence of the 
cowman . . . clouded his formerly clear vision, and . . . altered his 
traditionally fine and free philosophy of life." As a result, he 
believed, many cowmen \rexe prepared to deliberately blind themselves and 
"to yield to the temptation of the bribe disguised "as a 'benefit. '
Pears that the cattle industry was ifilling to go along with a 
production control program were unfounded. The American Cattle Producer 
expressed the view of many cattlemen in July 1934: "It appears entirely
possible that the drought purchase program is indeed the cattle program, 
and that we shall never have to accept a processing tax with its cumber­
some accompaniment of contracts to be signed, reductions to be enforced.
. . Charles E. Collins, President of the National Live Stock
Association, considered the need for any reduction program to be over. 
Now that drought purchases had ended, Collins felt cattlemen could be 
"thankful that we escaped the annoyances and entanglements inevitable in 
any hard-and-fast reduction program."
Officials involved in the drought project believed that it had
been a "great boon" and that it had caused a "more friendly feeling, a
79more optimistic view and a ncre hopeful attitude. . . . " Cattlemen
American Cattle Producer, XVI (November 1934), 17-18.
^^Ibid. (July 1934), 13-14.
^^Ibid. (February 1939), 7- 
79Barry Petrie, Eeport on Sheep and Goat Purchases to G. B. 
Thome, Department of Agriculture, Library.
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throughout the country ea^ressed appreciation for the program. The 
National Live Stock Association, meeting in Rapid City, South Itekota 
in January 1935, passed a resolution commending the drought purchases 
and praising the officials for their efforts to help the cattle indus-
80try. But spokesmen for the cattlemen usual!y limited their thanks 
by indicating that, now that the government had saved the cow men, the 
government could go its way and leave the cattle industry alone.
The attitude of the cattle-drought committees of Brewster, 
Presidio, Jeff Ifevis, and Culbertson counties in Texas was typical. In 
a telegram to Dolph Briscoe, read at a meeting of the Committee of 
Tv/enty-five in February 1935, the committeemen expressed their apprecia­
tion for the past buying programs. The major thing they wanted now, 
however, was the maintaining of cattle prices at the "present high level
81in order for cattle men to . . . make a comeback." Although the AAA 
did not consider any further reduction necessary, officials did believe 
that a production control program was essential to prevent a return to 
the same dangerous situation which existed at the start of 193^- The 
Committee of Twenty-five, however, was still pushing marketing agree-
82ments and was unreceptive to any control program.
The explanation of the attitude of cattlemen offered by Alva 
Johnston was interesting;
Rn
American Cattle Producer, XVI (February 1935), 6.
81Grover B. Bill, Report and History of Cattle Buying Brought 
Relief Program, National Archives, R. G. 1^5*
^^Meeting of Committee of Twenty-five, February 28, 1935,
National Archives, R. G. 1^ 5.
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The staad of the livestock men is rather suiprising, since 
they generally admit that the Government met the drought 
crisis strenuously and efficiently. They agree that the AAA 
tided distressed ranchman over a great emergency by paying 
fat prices for emaciated cattle. There is a tendency, how­
ever, to attribute Federal philanthropy to the eagerness of 
the Government to take over the cattle industry and start 
experimenting with it.&3
Many cattlemen reacted in that fashion, but most did not. D. A.
FitzGerald believed that probably a majority of the cattle producers,
at least out of the Western range states, ivsnted to "develop a concrete
plan for consolidating the gains made in 193^•" But he felt that the
84
leaders and spokesmen of the industry refused to cooperate. In real­
ity, cattle producers had much the same attitude as hog farmers had 
expressed earlier. They were willing to go along with anything which 
offered immediate money and guaranteed higher prices in the immediate 
future. But, since cattlemen felt that the purchase program had removed 
all the surplus and cattle prices were already improving, they were less 
willing than hog producers to accept a regular production control pro­
gram.
^^Johnston, "The Hamburger Bonanza," l8 .
84
FitzGerald, Livestock Under the A A A  ( Washington ; The 
Brookings Institution, 1935)7 I9O-I9I.
CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSIONS
During its first two years of operation, the Agricultural Ad­
justment Administration was challenged from all directions with serious 
crises. In attempting to find answers to the problems of farmers, the 
AAA used a number of new and unprecedented methods. Two of the most 
spectacular and unusual of these were the Emergency Hog Marketing Pro­
gram of 1933 and the more vital drought cattle purchase project of 193 -^ 
35• The slaughter of baby pigs and waste of good beef dramatically 
brought to public attention the production control or reduction phases 
of the new agricultural policy.
In the fall of 1933 almost six and one-half million hogs, many 
of them young pigs, were purchased by the federal government. Although 
some of the hogs were processed and distributed to the needy, the smaller 
animals were either destroyed or turned into inedible by-products. To 
many people this seemed like an unwise and needless waste of good food 
at a time when millions of people were going without adequate supplies 
of meat. Although the hog slaughter project resulted in severe criti­
cism of the theory and practice of production control, the government 
embarked in less than a year on an even larger livestock purchase pro­
gram.
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The drovight which had threatened the western ranges for almost 
a decade forced cattlemen in 1934 to reject their traditional independ­
ent attitude. On beaded Imee, cattlemen from Texas to Worth Dakota 
begged the government to come to their assistance. After Congress 
placed the cattle industry under the AAA in April 1934, the drought
cattle purchase program was launched in June. Dy the first of Ptebruary
1935> the Drought Relief Service had bought over eight million cattle 
and almost four million sheep and goats. Itost of the cattle VTere turned 
over to the Federal Surplus Relief Corporation to supply meat for relief 
families. But more than a million cattle and a large part of the sheep 
and goats were condemned as unfit for food and destroyed, causing an­
other outcry against the AAA and its wanton destruction of good human 
food. Only the desperate economic conditions and the havoc wrought by
nature combined with a major evolution in the philosophy of farm relief
permitted such unprecedented government intervention in agriculture.
Although apparently quite similar, the origins of the two live­
stock purchase programs were very different. Hog buying was openly 
based on the theory that it was necessary to reduce surplus supplies.
The project was designed to limit future pork tonnage and to induce hog 
producers to participate in a general production control program. Put­
ting money into the pockets of Com Belt farmers had been a vital but 
largely incidental consideration in the plans. This and the extra aid 
to drought stricken farmers made up the relief aspect of the hog buying 
project. In contrast, buying cattle in drought areas was basically a 
relief measure. It brought about the desired reduction in cattle 
numbers, but it was developed to aid cattlemen without feed for their
2h9
steirving cattle rather than to introduce a production control program. 
Although some in the AAA regarded the purchases as the opening phase of 
a general program and even though the purchase agreement laid the 
foundation for future action, the drought purchases started and. ended 
as a rescue measure for weather-stricken cattlemen.
The direct and immediate economic benefits of the purchase 
programs were great. The very nature of drought buying made it essen­
tially a project to place money in the hands of needy producers. But 
cash relief for farmers assumed the most important role in the hog 
purchase program only when it became obvious that the sow buying portion 
of the measure which was to restrict future supplies had failed. At 
the same time the buying of pigs took on the nature of drought relief. 
Many of those purchased from the drought areas might have starved to 
death, and their owners were certainly better able to withstand the 193  ^
drought without further emergency help.^  In all, livestock producers 
received about $l4o million for their animals. Almost half of this was 
the drought purchase pajrment which was subject to the claims of credi­
tors, but there is no way of estimating how much went to them. It would 
be impossible to gauge the over-all economic effects the slaughter 
programs had through their increasing of the farmers' buying power, but 
it was significant.
More important, in many ways, than the economic results was 
the contribution the iurchase programs made to the restoration of hope 
in the rural sections. This, what mi^t be called a spiritual boost,
A. FitzGerald, Livestock Under the A A A  (Washington:
The Brookings Institution, 1935)» 2 5 7.
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cannot be ■weighed and measured^ but it was of tremendous importance.
The slaughter of baby pigs proved beyond any doubt that the AAA -was
willing to do everything possible to aid the needy farmer. Although
subjected to serious criticism, the project demonstrated an eagerness 
to help which comforted many. The cattle program resulted in the same, 
although probably greater, feeling that there was someone who cared and 
could help. This attitude was expressed time and time again, but no­
where better than by Mrs. B. F . Caldwell of Oklahoma, who wrote in 
November 193^ :
. . . this year when we were getting our hopes up until we 
could see a good chance to have something ahead at harvest
time, the drouth hit us and it hit hard. Most feed crops
burned up.
You couldn't sell a cow for the simple reason there was no­
body to buy, because it was dry everywhere near us. Just 
when things were looking blackest the AAA announced that they 
were going to buy cattle in the drouth stricken area.
Talk about your clouds with silver linings, ours was lined 
with pure gold! And they did not just talk about it, but 
they bought and paid for them. Many of the poorest ones were 
sent on to their happy grazing ground quickly. (I regretted 
that part of it but it "was better than a snow bank this 
•winter.) Many of the best ones were canned by people who had 
no meat and no money to buy it with.
I have confidence that when emergencies arise our national 
leeiders are going to be able to meet them. And if we will 
only pull together and help in every way we possibly can, 
how much easier and quicker we ■wj.ll all reach safety to­
gether. 2
That s'wing from despair to hope has been recognized as characteristic 
of the New I^al, and the decisive action of the AAA contributed to it.
Although more spectacular, the cash relief given to livestock
2
Oklahoma Parmer-StocTanan, XLVII (November 1, 1934), 4.
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producers was comparable to other forms of direct relief supplied by 
the FERA, the CWP. and other such agencies. In this sense, there was 
little difference in principle for the government to buy and destroy 
animals, and to provide made work for the unemployed. Many farmers 
needed money just as much as those on town and city relief rolls. This 
helped them to feed and clothe-their families and allowed them to feed 
and save livestock which would otherwise have been sold or have starved 
to death. In reality, of course, it ims not this aspect of the projects 
which aroused such great opposition. Although the waste of food was 
severely attacked, it was the accompaniment of cash payments in the 
purchase programs by the evil genie of production control which most 
critics really resented.
Although something similar to the Drought Purchase Program 
would probably have been developed even if there had been no AAA, it 
was that organization which shaped and administered the project. More­
over, the AAA operated on the principle of production control. Thus, 
hog buying, a direct lead in to a regular curtailment program, and 
drought purchases were viewed in much the same light by critics. A 
distinction must be drawn, however, between what might be called profes­
sional critics and actual farmers. Also, a further distinction might 
at times be found between the attitude of the average producer and that 
of spokesmen or leaders of the livestock industry. Where the nonfarm 
critic and agricultural leaders would usually be concerned about the 
idea of production control, the average producer was more interested in 
immediate gain and short range benefits.
Hog raisers who produced about 77 per cent of all hogs grown
252
ia 1932 contracted to reduce production up to 25 per cent in 1934 and
3
com production ty 20 per cent. Beef producers, however, did not agree
to a production control program. The hog farmers accepted controls and 
paid for the emergency purchases through the processing tax. The cat­
tlemen had opposed the idea of a processing tax from the first. When 
Congress made cattle a basic commodity and appropriated money for a 
program, it was left uncertain whether a tax would be levied to repay 
the treasury. Although Secretary Wallace expected to develop a control 
program and to levy a tax to regain federal money, the stockmen and 
their spokesmen in Congress made it clear that they wanted the benefits 
without the tax. One of the great fears of cattle producers during the 
drought purchases was the possibility that the AAA would institute a 
processing tax to pay for the buying as it had after the hog purchasing. 
The AAA officials found it necessary to constantly assure the ranchers
that there was no danger of a tax being levied until a regular produc-
h
tion control program had been launched.
The AAA decided late in the summer of 1934 that there was no 
further need for a beef reduction program, but agricultural officials 
continued to hope for some kind of production control. The possibility 
that some plan including a processing tax would be put into effect 
lasted through most of 1935- Wallaces* Farmer suggested that "hog 
producers seem to have been a little jealous" of the drought purchases
3
FitzGerald, Livestock Under the A A A ,  82, 123-
^C. C. Davis to Daily Drovers, June 26, 1934; R. C. ffcCSiord 
to Laurel Johnson, Secretary of the Butler Oounty Livestock Associa­
tion, August 2 7, 1934, Rational Archives, R. G. l45-
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since bog buying was paid for out of a tax on the pork industry, but 
"cattle have borne no processing tax." The editor, however, considered 
it "likely that this debt of the cattle industry will be forgiven." 
Bather than a straight adjustment program for cattle, the AAA now pushed 
a plan to reduce feed grain acreage with a tax on cattle to help pay 
for the plan. ^ This was an attempt to get back to a system which would 
cover hogs, cattle and feed crops at the same time. But F. E. MoUin, 
Secretary of the American National Live Stock Association, refused co­
operation. The cattle industry had wanted marketing agreements and he 
still favored them, MoUin declared, but the AAA had refused to go 
along. Since there was no longer a cattle suip’lus, MoUin also rejected 
the feed control programs Although the AAA continued to i-ram against 
a rapid expansion in beef production, G. B. Thome, Director of the 
Division of Livestock and Feed Grains, admitted late in 1935 that an 
adjustment program for cattle would not be practical. Surveys indicated, 
Thome acknowledged, that "many cattle producers in some major producing 
regions are opposed to undertaking a program of this kind and would not
Y
provide sufficient participation to insure its success."
Thus, the hog growers by cooperating with the AAA paid for 
their emergency program, but the cattlemen were not forced to contribute 
to the relief which they received. There were various reasons for the
W^allaces' Farmer, LX (February l6, 1935)> 15-
A^mendments to Agricultural Adjustment Act. Hearings before 
the House Committee on Agriculture, 74th Congress,1st Sess., February 
26-March 6, 1935, PP- 134, 137-
7
Thome: Memorandum for Mast in B. Nhite, November 9, 1935,
National Archives, R. G. l4$.
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difference. Obviously many leaders of the cattle industry refused co­
operation, but other factors were of equal importance. The time element 
was rather vital. The months between October 1933 and February 1935 
brought a definite decline in that sense of emergency which -VTas so 
obvious in 1933 - Absent in 1935 was that earlier adventurous spirit 
which was willing to try most anything. In addition to the passage of 
time and some over-all economic improvement, drought buying virtually 
solved the major problems for cattlemen. The cattle surplus \r&s gone 
and prices had greatly improved. The average farm price of cattle was
close to parity by Itebruary 1935, and remained "at or near parity" for
8the next ten months. The price situation was, of course, the determin­
ing factor in the attitude of most cowmen. In contrast, the hog project 
barely dented the surplus and it was months before hog prices showed any 
real improvement.
Although removal of the surplus and the price increase made it 
possible for cattlemen to reject any long-range program, other factors 
influenced their decision. In December 1933 it had been noted that 
"farmers refused to accept the idea of 'overproduction.'" To farmers, 
a better explanation of their difficulties could be found in undercon-
Q
sumption and "faulty distribution." In general this view of farm opin­
ion was still valid. There were exceptions which saw some individuals 
swing to the other extreme. The advice offered by J. M. Jfeyfield, from
8Thome: Ifemorandum for Mastin B. Wiite, November 9, 1935,
National Archives, R. G. 14$.
Q
Samuel Lubell and Walter Everett, "As the Farmer Sees It," 
Current History, XXXIX (December 1933), 292.
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Oklahoma and probably a part time farmer, illustrated the extremism of
a fev advocates of reduced production; ’ -
I want to say to all readers of the Oklahoma Earmer-Stockman 
that I was raised near Tahlequah, Oklahoma, and I never saw 
times as hard as they are now.
I own ray own farm and have plenty as far as farm stuff is con­
cerned. You can't sell anything and if you buy anything you 
have to pay two prices for it. For instance, I have a fat 
calf to sell. All I can get dressed is 4 cents a pound for
it. If I go to the meat market and buy a pound of beef I pay
15 cents to 25 cents for it.
I say to a11 of you farmers, cut your production. Just plant 
what you will use. Don't sell anything you can use at home.
Don't go in debt. Live hard for two or three years. Don't 
buy anything you can do without. Raise plenty of hogs to make 
al 1 the meat and lard to do you. Have your oim com and wheat 
ground. Sell a few eggs to buy your sugar and coffee, and if 
you need farm tools, borrow from your neighbor. Put your old 
auto in the shed and let it stay there. Go and see your neigh­
bor. Stay all day with him. Bave a good time.
If we all will do that, times will get good and we will go to
town with what we want to sell and we won't have to ask what
they will pay. The buyers will ask you what you will take.
If the farmers will stick together and help one another, they 
can rule the prices on everything. The merchants stick to­
gether, have meetings and fix their prices. So can the 
farmers.
Obviously, Mayfield was not advocating production control in the AAA 
sense, but a farm strike to permit farmers to fix prices and to restore 
agriculture's place in society. Apparently he also held some of the 
ideas expressed by the Grangers eind Populists in the 19th century, 
especially that tendency to blame the middlemen for farm problems.
The inclination to reject the theory of surplus production and 
to cite middlemen for their troubles was prevalent among spokesmen of
Oklahoma Farmer-Stockman, XLVII (February 15, 193^), 4.
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Oklahoma and probably a part time farmer. Illustrated the extremism of
a few advocates of reduced production; ’ -
I want to say to all readers of the Oklahoma Farmer-Stockman 
that I was raised near Tableguah, Oklahoma, and I never saw 
times as hard as they are now.
I own my own farm and have plenty as far as farm stuff is con­
cerned. You can't sell anything and if you buy anything you 
have to pay two prices for it. For instance, I have a fat 
calf to sell. All I can get dressed is k cents a pound for 
it. If I go to the meat market and buy a pound of beef I pay 
15 cents to 25 cents for it.
I say to al1 of you farmers, cut your production. Just plant 
what you will use. Don't sell anything you can use at home.
Don't go in debt. Live hard for two or three years. Don't 
buy anything you can do without. Raise plenty of hogs to make 
all the meat and lard to do you. Have your o\m. com and wheat 
ground. Sell a few eggs to buy your sugar and coffee, and if 
you need farm tools, borrow from your neighbor. Put your old 
auto in the shed and let it stay there. Go and see your neigh­
bor. Stay all day with him. Bave a good time.
If we al1 will do that, times will get good and we will go to 
town with what we want to sell and we won't have to ask what 
they will pay. The buyers will ask you what you will take.
If the farmers will stick together and help one another, they 
can rule the prices on everything. The merchants stick to­
gether, have meetings and fix their prices. So can the 
faimers.
Obviously, Kbyfield was not advocating production control in the AAA 
sense, but a farm strike to permit farmers to fix prices and to restore 
agriculture's place in society. Apparently he also held some of the 
ideas expressed by the Grangers and Populists in the 19th century, 
especially that tendency to blame the middlemen for farm problems.
The inclination to reject the theory of surplus production and 
to cite middlemen for their troubles was prevalent among spokesmen of
Oklahoma Farmer-StockmEin, XLVII (February 15, 193^),
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the cattle industry. Cattle producers had never recognized excess out­
put as a major problem. Instead, they consistently claimed that the 
most valuable industry in the nation was being stabbed in the back by 
various interest groups, the meat packers, the dairymen, the inporters 
of foreign meat, and, finally, the government. Their support for market­
ing agreements was, therefore, a quite logical result of their view, 
î^ anifestly, the views of cattlemen as to the source of trouble and the 
needed remedies resembled, in many ways, those of the agrarian protesters 
of the previous century. Since they had never accepted the more modem 
idea of a surplus with its solution of production control, cattlenan 
could, with a clear conscience, refuse cooperation with the AAA. More 
important in this rejection than the denial of the validity of controls, 
however, was the absence of the two things which had compelled many 
farmers to cooperate in an AAA program. Although some producers may 
have been influenced by other motives, it was desperation and the 
prospect of immediate cash which drove most to production control 
measures. The spring and summer of 193^ had been the time of despera­
tion for cattlemen, and the drought purchases had helped them through 
the crisis period. Furthermore, it was doubtful that the AAA would 
hand out much if any more money in the foreseeable future.
Various considerations influenced the Administration to exert 
less pressure on cattlemen to get them into a control program than on 
hog producers. The contrast in organization of Com-Hog farmers and 
cattlemen was an obvious and extremely important factor. Hog producers 
were without any recognized organization and were thus subject to 
tremendous Administration influence both in organizing and drafting
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plans for their industry. Cattlemen, hovever, had a number of long 
established and strong associations, with officers who were usually 
conservative and out of sympathy with AAA objectives. Concern about 
the reaction against what was considered compulsion in the purchase 
agreement made agricultural officials cautious to exert much pressure.
In addition, fear of consumer reaction contributed to a growing doubt 
about the efficacy of the destruction policy. Attacks against the 
waste of food became very severe in 193^- This criticism was not 
directed at the drought purchases as such, but against the basic philos­
ophy of the AAA as expressed in its surplus reduction programs. As the 
government considered additional purchases of cattle in 1935 and 1936, 
and as it defended the hog and drought projects, agricultural officials 
sought rather desperately to divorce the reduction and slaughter meas­
ures from the production control policy.
In the summer of 193^ attacks on the New Deal farm programs 
became more intense. Criticism centered on the theory of controlled 
production and more specifically on the contention that the AAA and 
food reduction were necessary to deal with emergency situations. 
Socialist Norman Thomas insisted that controls would be as difficult 
to enforce as prohibition because they countered an "instinct for produc­
tion at least as deep as the desire for alcohol." To Thomas, the real 
problem was the inability of the American system to cope with abundance. 
"We do not know," he declared, "how to manage it, and therefore, by 
subsidized destruction, we return to familiar scarcity, in order to 
give our farmers prosperity."^ Others, who were perhaps more in
^^orman Thomas, "Starve and Prosper!, " Current Histoiy, XL 
(May 1934), 135, 137-
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sympathy 'with, the system, held the same opinion. "One of the first A M
principles is that we must destroy to prosper," the Hew York Times
charged in an editorial called "Prolonged Emergency." The idea had led
to the "destruction or restriction of wealth in the form of livestock
and crops in a year when Nature herself has chosen to take a dreadful
12hand in destroying livestock and crops." This meant the subsidizing 
of farmers to destroy existing or to prevent future supplies. Once 
established, the editor later prophetically warned, it would "probably 
prove as politically difficult to get rid of that subsidy-, even after 
the present supposed reasons for it have passed, as it has been to lower 
the tariff." Opposition to the theory of production control and its 
accompanying baggage was not new, but the unprecedented natural ravages 
made planned reduction seem even more objectionable.
Charles W. Burkett, called an agricultural authority by the 
New York Times, developed still another area of criticism. Considerable 
fear was evidenced in 193^ and 1935 that the havoc wrought by nature, 
added to the reduction policies of the government would result in food 
shortages and extremely high prices. Apprehension of this had been ex­
pressed during the earlier hog program and was renewed with added 
strength the following summer. "We are going to have a shortage of food 
in this country, with deplorable conditions, in a year to eighteen 
months," Burkett warned. "Crop reduction is ridiculous," he declared, 
for "at the present time we have an under supply of milk, fruit, vege-
^^ew York Times, July 31, 1934, p. l6. 
^^Ibid., October 6, 1934, p. l4.
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tables, and meat. And •prices are going to go so high that I don't know
how the poor are going to pay for what they eat. Although such fears
were greatly exaggerated, they made for a strident attack on the AAA.
Objections of consumers and those not receiving AAA bounties were common.
In reply to a defender of the AAA, M. H. Dow of Arkansas wrote:
He appears to think that Uncle Sam is a bully good fellow, 
playing Santa Claus— but it is the taxpayer and general con­
sumer (many poorer than he, perhaps), who is feeding him and 
other 'beneficiaries' of the 'plow-ups,' and 'kill-offs,' etc.
Hence the letter's hand is being bitten, and then some. That 
is the little farmer, the common people generally, who neither 
raise cotton, wheat nor nany calves and pigs.
Dow then attacked the increase in food prices, and claimed that pork
]_5
cost "three times as much as before the AAA destroyed the pigs."
Senator William E. Borah told the Grange in Boise, Idaho that 
the reduction programs worked with "the chinch bugs, boll weevil, 
storms and drought in making scarce the things for which millions are 
nightly praying." It was obvious to the Administration that its 
opponents had seized on the drought disaster to attack the whole philos­
ophy of the agricultural adjustment policy. The agricultural officials 
definitely did not repudiate the principles of production control, but, 
as they attempted to refute the scarcity argument, they became more 
cautious about the expansion of existing, or the developnent of new, 
reduction measures.
Secretary Wallace had always insisted that the creation of a
^^Ibid., August 4, 1934, p. 11.
15Oklahoma Farmer-Stockman, XLVIII (January 1, 1935), 4.
^^Hew York Times, August 10, 1934, p. 4.
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balanced abundance was the aim of the adjustment program. Starting in
the fall of 193 ,^ friends and members of the AAA emphasized this idea
over and over again. Chester Davis warned that there was "a limit to
reduction," but he then declared that the "American farmer never has
looked towai'd extremes of artificial scarcity to make him rich." Davis
was defending the farm policy, but the heart of his message was that "we
must strive for balanced production," so that the farmer could go on
producing everything the country needed and, at the same time, be fairly 
17compensated. Wallaces * Farmer, once edited by the Secretary and a 
consistent AAA supporter, joined in the defense. An editorial in îferch 
1935 insisted that the AAA program was "based not on creating an arti-
18ficial scarcity but on creating a balanced abundance."
The continued drought problem in 1935 and 1936 found the Ad­
ministration far more interested in conserving and preserving production 
than in reduction. E. 0. Pollock who toured the dry areas in the spring 
of 1935 warned that the situation was most critical and urged aid in 
feeding the livestock. Otherwise, the cattle would be sold or die. If
large numbers were thrown on the market and prices depressed, he feared
19the ranchers would clamor for another purchase program. Late in îfey 
the President's Drought Committee proposed that emphasis be placed on 
moving feed into the drought region. If any cattle purchases became
17Davis, "We Must Strive for Balanced Production," Oklahoma 
Partner-Stockman, XLVII (November 1 5, 193^), 5, 9*
-1 0
Wa.llaces* Farmer, LX (March 2, 193$), $.
R. G. 16.
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Pollock to W. A. Wheeler, May 16, 1935  ^National Archives,
261
necessaxy, the Committee suggested that it be emphasized that the 
measure was to increase and save the supply of food. Concern for the 
attitude of the consumer was evidenced in the'recommendation that any 
statement made should "allay any possible reaction growing out of con­
sumer's sentiment with respect to food supplies, especially supply of
. „20 meat.
I-Jhen it was reluctantly decided to buy cattle in 1936, the
whole operation was underplayed as much as possible. The purchase method
was designed to discourage a rush to federal buyers. As Paul H. Appleby
wrote, there was a "waiting attitude, and the problem has been to buy as
21little as possible." Only 3,663 head were bought during the entire 
22purchase period. Although drought conditions or cattle numbers did 
not compare to that of 193^, the Administration had no intention of 
allowing panic and another extensive purchase program develop.
Ey the spring of 1935 agricultural officials had started defend­
ing the hog and cattle reduction projects as food conservation measures 
rather than as surplus reduction or price lifting programs. The defense 
emphasized the argument that had the projects not reduced hog and cattle 
numbers the drought would have caused equal if not greater meat shortages 
than actually existed. Secretary Wallace expressed this view when asked
20Minutes of President's Drought Committee, Tentative Proposal 
of Policy Statements by Eric England, May 25, 1935, National Archives,
R. G. 16.
21
Appleby to Calvin B. Hoover, July l8, 1936, National Ar­
chives, R. G. l6.
22
Cattle Purchase Committee: Memorandum for J. W. Tapp,
November 27, 1936, National Archives, R. G. l6.
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if there wo\ild be enough meat for everyone:
The supply of meat is not normal, but no one is going to 
starve to death for lack of that product. . . . There is 
more beef in this country as a result of government activi­
ties than otherwise would have been the case. recollection 
is that the government has canned 100,000,000 pounds. A large 
part of that is meat that would have been lost through starva­
tion of animals on the range.
In the case of pork, there is definitely more pork than other­
wise would have been the case had there been no little pig 
slaughter. That little pig program of 1933 means that there
was more com available for feeding to hogs this past winter.
. . .23
In July R. G. Tugwell defended the pig slaughter along the same lines. 
The program, he declared, had prevented a demoralization of hog prices, 
but the slaughter was not responsible for the pork shortage or high 
prices. Instead, he argued, the project had saved feed and thereby the
2h
current hog supplies were larger than they otherwise would have been. 
Clifford V. Gregory, active in the hog project, insisted that the gov­
ernment purchase of cattle "conserved beef that would have been lost
by starvation" as well as adjusting cattle numbers to feed supply and
25keeping "a large section of the industry from going bankrupt." The 
same defense was still being used in 1937 « J. D. Le Cron, assistant to 
the Secretary, declared that "it turned out that the real effect of 
slaughtering pigs and sows in 1933 under the Government Program, in 
advance of the tremendous 193^ drought shortage of feed, was to save
Oklahoma Parmer-Stockman, XLVIII (April 1, 1935), 6.
2k ,Tugwell to Charles J. Colden, July l6, 193$, National
Archives, R. G. l6.
25
Gregory, "The American Farm Bureau Federation and the AAA, " 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, CLXXIX 
(May 1935), 157"
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26feed and make it available for maintaining supplies of hogs in 193^-"
In spite of the Administration arguments, the ghosts of the
little pigs were called the "major New Deal political worry" in the fall
of 1935. According to the Oklahoma Farmer-Stockman, the specter of the
wasted pigs was "threatening trouble not only in the east but in the
cities of the west and south as well," because housewives blamed the
slaughter for high meat prices. Housewives found it difficult to follow
the contention that more pork was available as a result of the reduction
program, it was suggested, because "they see pork out of reach and >rant
somebody to blame." The possibility of continued high meat prices, it
27was concluded, suggested "political dynamite to some high officials."
Although the drought purchases never received as much criticism as the
pig project, the same general trends were evident in the Administration's
defense. A press release issued in November 1935 pictured cattle buying
as a surplus removal program to deal with an emergency situation. It
was emphasized, however, that the purchases "assured maintenance of a
28plentiful supply of foundation livestock on farms."
The election of 1936 demonstrated rather conclusively that the 
slaughter programs, even with the high meat prices, did not result in 
any significant anti-New Deal vote. Obviously much of the criticism 
came from chronic conplainers, but there was enough honest censure to
^^LeCron to E. H. Johnson, President of Twin States Livestock 
Association, Ifay 1, 1937  ^National Archives, R. G. I6 .
27
Oklahoma Parmer-Stockman, XLVIII (September 1, 1935)> 5-
28
AAA Press Release, November I8, 1935f National Archives,
R. G. 145.
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contrilDu.te to a change in the Administration line. Another factor which 
influenced the shift was the awesome display of power by nature. Wallace 
denied that the drought disaster had upset the plans of the AAA. In­
stead, he suggested that the drought might make it possible "to develop 
a concept of what may be called 'an ever normal granary.'"  ^ Actually, 
of course, the drought caused major modifications in existing and 
planned projects as well as providing a useful alibi for what had already 
been done.
Critics charged that the buying programs resulted from a general 
drive in the AAA to socialize agriculture and. to buy votes. After 
George N. Peek turned against the AAA policies, he discovered a scheme 
by the "collectivist group" to use the farm act to bring about planned 
agriculture and to keep the farmers from finding out what was going on 
by deluging them with money. " The pig killing progiam had its political 
implications, he said, because the experiments "were in regions which 
were either normally Republican or which had a way of being on the 
fence." Peek then pointed to the fact that Roswell Garst, active in 
developing the program, and Secretary Wallace had been partners in the 
seed com business in Iowa. In addition. Peek disclaimed any part in 
the project:
I had no part in shaping the program. It was presented to me 
by the Hogs and Com Sections of the A. A, A. as the consensus 
of opinion among both producers and processors, and as such 
there seemed nothing to do but go along with it in view of the 
existing emergency. I did not know until later that the steam 
roller had been used to get producer agreements. I did know 
that a marketing agreement with the processors— an essential to
R. G. 16.
29 ,
Wallace to H. G. Brownson, June 12, 1934, Rational Archives,
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any real plan— had been prevented hy the group in the A. A. A. 
which \TB.s trying to get control of the big packers apparently 
as a prelude to controlling other private business.
Although a great deal of money was distributed to com and hog producers,
the endeavor to aid them failed:
. . . because the chief undercover attention was given to di­
verting the Agricultural Adjustment Act into a farm and food 
business regimenting device. What these people called 'reform'
--that is, the destruction of the American System— was made an 
issue paramount to putting the com-hog farmers on their feet.
The money was poured out, not alone to help the farmers but to 
keep them quiet while their future liberty to earn in the 
American fashion was being taken away from them.30
Essentially Peek was disgruntled because Wallace was in charge of farm 
policy rather than himself, and because control of production was being 
emphasized over marketing agreements and government aided export of sur­
plus supplies. There was, however, some basis to his charges.
Nevertheless, both the hog price situation in 1933 and weather 
conditions in 193^ were serious enough to warrant emergency action. The 
wastefulness of the methods chosen merited criticism. Condemnation of 
the cattle wjas necessary, but the destruction of young pigs was a part 
of the scheme to raise prices by reducing production, similar to the 
plowing up of growing cotton plants. Wallace consistently opposed a 
straight surplus removal program, perhaps fearing that it would become 
a permanent crutch. Be quickly despaired, however, of the destruction 
measures. "Certainly none of us," he wrote, "ever want to go through 
a plow-up canpaign sigain, no matter how successful a price-raising
on
method it proved to be." Wallace also felt that the only excuse for
30
George K. Peek with Samuel Crowther, Why Quit Our Own (Hew 
York: D. Van Ho strand Conpany, 1936), 121, 132.
31
Henry A. Wallace, New Frontiers (Hew York: Reynal and
Hitchcock, 1934), 174-1 7 5.
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the hog slaughter was to provide pork for the needy.
Without any doubt the most valuable material contribution of 
the purchase programs was their role in the development of a new concept 
of relief, for both farm and urban needy. Although something similar 
might have evolved, the hog purchases led to the creation of the Federal 
Surplus Relief Corporation and to the continued buying of surplus agri­
cultural products for the hungry. This became a permanent part of 
federal farm policy. The practice of surplus removal has been continued 
ifith the supplies being used in such diverse projects as the school lunch 
and the Food-For-Peace programs. Only through soms stratagem such as 
this could the production restrictions justify, not only to their critics 
but to their own conscience, the reduction of available food supplies. 
Although the principles behind operations of the IBRC represented as 
significant a departure from tradition as that of production control, 
there was little objection to the activity. Hot many could criticize 
giving food to the hungry. Also, as Secretary Wallace suggested, few 
realized how radical a departure from tradition it was for the govern­
ment to buy surplus products and give them to the needy. Those who did 
tended to object to the broad powers of the FSRC rather than its objec­
tives .
One of the most disturbing features of the whole New Deal farm 
policy was its assault on a long standing American myth. Thomas Jeffer­
son had idealized the self-reliant yeoman farmer as the best protector 
of American independence. Others, before and after Jefferson, had held 
a greatly exaggerated, and largely false, esteem for the average f&rmsr. 
Although the place of the fanner in American society, and certainly his
267
influence ^ had undergone serious '^ rosion since the days of Jefferson, 
it was obvious that a number of the Administration leaders, some farmers 
and many of the New Iteal critics still clung to the tradition. The 
cattlemen were especially addicted to viewing themselves as the chosen 
ones to defend the great American traditions against all attackers.
While the AAA leaders felt that they were enhancing the ability of the 
producer to maintain his independence, others insisted that the pro­
grams were debauching.
Thomas V. Wickersham of the Chicago Board of Trade spoke for
the critics when he said: "I can only see the farmer as I have always
known him, virile and sturdy in his own strength, independent, self-
supporting. I cannot visualize him standing at the kitchen door of
33bureaucracy with his hat in his hand." Although there was nothing 
more natural than for farmers to join other interest groups in demand­
ing government aid, neither supporters nor critics could discover a 
satisfactory compromise between their view of what the farmer should 
be and what he actually was. Thus, the extremes of opinion on the 
character of the AAA were to be expected. To 0. E. Burkett, the farm 
relief projects "undermined the farmers* manhood and debauched agri-
L. Wilson of the AAA declared in 1933  ^ "%t is an American 
plan— a plan peculiarly adapted to the tenperament of the American 
farmer. The rock upon which it is founded is the essentieil democratic 
principle of self-government. . . .  it attempts to preserve the finest 
traditions of the American feirmer- -to maintain the best elements of his 
individualism. ..." In 1935» he added: "The economic democracy which
the farmers of this country have set up under the AAA is to my mind the 
biggest, the most satisfactory thing about the whole program." Quoted 
in Edwin G. Eourse, Joseph S. Davis, and John D. Black, %ree Years of 
the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (Washington: The Brookings
Institution, 1937j, 057-25^.
^^ew York Times, May 4, 1934, p. 15-
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culturists." According to Burkett, the agricultiiral officials had
borrowed theories and plans from Soviet Russia which led to;
. . . regimentation, reduction, destruction. The AAA scheme 
of farm control that slaughtered little pigs, butchered 
pregnant sows, plowed under com and cotton, that debauched 
fanners by forcing these unthinkable things upon them, was 
damnable, silly, idiotic, inqpossible to thinking men. But 
they did it— undermining the very manhood of our farm people, 
destroying the ideals and aspirations of the men and women 
. . . who have sought so heroically to build for a better and 
more enduring agriculture.3^
Wallace was influenced by an exaggerated view of the importance 
and character of the farm producer, and sought to preserve as much of 
the old myth as possible. Ai.though he denied that he believed farmers 
any more intelligent, virtuous or courageous than others, Wallace 
declared that farmers "have probably been more active than any other 
group in searching for economic democracy." This was because, he in­
sisted, "they have suffered more, and because they still live in the 
simpler and plainer environment wherein this democracy was born.
Just before the start of the hog buying program Dan E. Mahoney warned 
the Secretary against any pretended virtues of farmers;
The F6.ct must not be lost sight of, that, there is no greater 
amount of honesty to be found among the general HERD OF AGRI­
CULTURISTS than in the average Run of our HnXJSTRIAl£; Hence 
it is up to our LAW MAHERS and Others as well, in this case 
to devise means and ways of assistance to the Farmer in such 
Form that it will pay him better to (COMB CLEAR) than to under­
take to chisel in or double deal his ’Benefactor.’36
Although Mahoney may have had other motives as well, he was essentially
^^Hew York Times, August 17, 193^  ^p. 23*
35Wallace, Rew Frontiers, 137-
^^ îfehoney to Wallace, August 17, 1933, Rational Archives,
R. G. 1^5.
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telling Wallace that farmers were simply men, no better and no worse 
than the average. The way hog producers received the government pro­
ject vindicated the contention. This was also true of the cattlemen and 
their reception of the drought purchases. The Oakland Fhrmers Union, 
which passed a resolution in 1936 to the effect that Congress should 
reimburse them for the full value of the cattle sold in 193^,^^ and the 
farmer, who asked in 1937 to dig up the bones of the condemned cattle 
for commercial uses, were simply demonstrating a typicaJJy human con­
cern for their own welfare. This was, perhaps, one of the great, if 
ignored, lessons of the government purchase programs.
The livestock slaughter projects did serve to put cash in the 
pockets of needy farmers. As a means of bringing direct and immediate 
relief to producers hit by low prices and weather conditions, the pur­
chase programs proved very effective. By demonstrating the ability of 
the government to act decisively and vigorously, they certainly helped
to turn "the tide of defeatist psychology" and to give farmers renewed
3 9hope. The buying and killing of young pigs and cattle wo.s, however, 
too wasteful and unpopular to become a vital part of farm policy. In 
any case, the value of such purchases as an aid in controlling produc­
tion was subject to serious doubt. Wallace and his close advisers had 
always viewed the buying as an emergency measure to deal with a specific
37Paul R. Preston to The Oakland Farmers Union, February 21, 
1936, National Archives, R. G. 1^9.
R. 0. McChord to C. D. Schanyenback, May 24, 19377 National 
Archives, R. G. l4$.
39Nourse, Davis, and Black, Three Years of the Agricultural 
Adjustment Administration, 259■
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and immediate crisis. Buying of cattle had been great enough to reduce 
the surplus, but offered no solution to the long term troubles and, 
indeed, destroyed any possibility of dealing "with those problems. Hog 
buying apparently had no significant effect on decreasing future sup­
plies, but set a precedent for government purchase programs.
Obviously human nature and the problems of planning in the 
livestock industries made government buying impractical as a part of 
a permanent control plan. Indeed, such a method of surplus removal 
smacked greatly of the McSfary-Baugenism or two price schemes of the 
twenties. It was for this reason that Wallace and his group always 
emphasized the purchases as merely the introductory phases of a long 
range control program. Government slaughter projects to reduce current 
surpluses could meet existing crises, but unless accompanied by a perma-
than the activities of the Federal Farm Board. That this is a legiti­
mate criticism of the two projects should not be held against Wallace 
or the AAA. Human nature and Mother Nature both intervened to the detri­
ment of their planned use of the purchases. Although it would be unjust, 
the Administration might be held accountable for its failure to under­
stand the one and to anticipate the other.
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